

Public Policy and Ethnicity

The Politics of Ethnic Boundary Making

Edited by

Elizabeth Rata and Roger Openshaw

With a Preface by Jonathan Friedman

Public Policy and Ethnicity

Also by Elizabeth Rata

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEOTRIBAL CAPITALISM

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STRUGGLES OVER DIFFERENCE: Curriculum, Texts and Pedagogy in the Asia-Pacific (co-edited)

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The Politics of Ethnic Boundary-Making

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

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2007 978-0-230-00338-5

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First published 2007 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world

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ISBN 978-1-349-28105-3 ISBN 978-0-230-62530-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230625303

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Public policy and ethnicity:the politics of ethnic boundary making/
edited by Elizabeth Rata, Roger Openshaw.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Ethnicity—Political aspects. 2. Politics and culture. 3. Ethnic barriers. 4. Ethnic relations. 5. Race relations. I. Rata, Elizabeth, 1952– II. Openshaw, Roger.
GN495.6.P83 2007
305.8—dc22 2006047634

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07

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Preface

Jonathan Friedman

I remember seeing a cartoon some years ago in which a American politician standing in front of a crowd of supporters yells 'send the immigrants home.' Just behind him an Indian whispers in his ear: 'I'll help you pack.' The world has certainly changed rapidly in the past few decades. It has been a shock for many, not least researchers in anthropology and sociology who have found themselves confronted by Others who have become actors in their own right and whose voices have gotten in the way of a certain classificatory calm that once dominated our understanding of the world. This all began in the mid-1970s, a period that I have tried to understand in global systemic terms in which declining hegemony is linked to rising cultural politics. This multilevel process can be depicted in terms of political economy, and social and cultural transformation.

Political economy

The political economic logic of this decline has been outlined in a number of publications and dovetails with certain other analyses (Friedman, 1994; Friedman and Chase-Dunn, 2005; Silver and Arrighi, 2005; Wallerstein, 2003). The logic is one in which a wealthy hegemonic centre becomes too wealthy to reproduce its position. Capital is exported en masse and the centre becomes a net importer of the products of its own exported capital. This leads to an increasingly negative balance of payments, increasing debt and declining state finances. Capital export, a highly uneven process, leads not only to the emergence of new and rising centres of production for the world market, but also to a more general decentralisation of capital accumulation. All of this goes today under the heading of globalisation and is often described in evolutionary terms. Yet it is different, because the process is more total in geographical extent, and more rapid and penetrating than in the past. But the logics, I would argue, are largely the same and, in fact, predate the so-called industrial capitalist world associated with Western hegemony.

When we first suggested that the West was in hegemonic decline in the mid-1970s it was considered to be nonsense. Today this is no longer the case and current events might be said to lend some credence to the approach. East Asia (minus Japan) was part of the underdeveloped world in the 1970s, but this is certainly no longer so. China has emerged as a major global power with its own supply-zone peripheries in South-east Asia. In production terms, China has become a workshop of the world, not least in strategic areas such as computers and electronics. It is expanding rapidly in Africa and South America and spending billions that the West can no longer afford on major infrastructural projects, soaking up raw materials and oil wherever possible. This may be compared to United States expansion after the Second World War when it penetrated and appropriated former colonial hegemonies of Europe in the Third World.

The rate of Chinese production as a percentage of world production[1] has increased over the past few years, not least with the acquisition of IBM's laptop division. These are changes that are part of the decentralisation of accumulation and the formation of new potential hegemonic centres. At the economic level, there has clearly been a shift in economic clout from West to East. While this shift in accumulation has occurred, the debt of the United States and Europe has also increased and the former has become dangerously dependent on Chinese investment (i.e. 50 per cent of United States government bonds). In fact the new and apparently failing American imperial surge is to be expected in a situation where real control over the world is decreasing.

The social and cultural transformation

This transformation changes the overall conditions of identification and cultural production in the global arena. In areas of decline, states become weaker and decentralisation pervades, not only state financing but even the large fordist companies that dominated the period of industrial growth. Both turn to flexibility to solve their problems, sub-contracting away part of their problems, by slimming and cutting, leading to a decline in real wages for many. Capital that remains in the centre thus becomes increasingly flexibilised or invested in financial and 'fictitious' forms of accumulation. Outsourcing is itself a process fragmentation into smaller units of action and, as suggested, it is not only an issue of capital but of all institutions. This explains the formation of military firms, the privatisation of violence in general and the complex of illicit trades that network the world today. Decentralisation of capital

accumulation has been paralleled by the political fragmentation process and the decline of a great many peripheral and sub-peripheral states, including the Soviet Empire. This has led to increasing conflict, warfare and poverty that in its term spurred massive migration to the old primarily urban centres of the West, where they form the core of a new underclass, and where drugs and violent crime have been on the increase.

In this situation there is a loss of future orientation or what might be called modernism, the social projects that dominated much of the last and this century. Instead, there is a retraction into roots and identity politics. When the future does not work, there is always the past. The latter is stable and theoretically unchanging, as much as it is refurbished according to specific needs. This stability offers a haven from a world of alienation in which mobility is no longer a general option and where the future no longer dominates the present. Alienation is okay if one is going somewhere as Goethe expressed it in *Faust*. But when the movement stops, alienation becomes unbearable. Thus the retreat, as it were, into cultural identity is a logical product of a decline of the modernist pole of Western identity. In this new situation there are still those who would maintain the latter in face of the rapid changes in the world. These range from a minority of intellectuals to those who occupy upscale positions within the world system in which modernism is necessary and workable with substantial amounts of cash. For other intellectuals there is a slippage towards a postmodernism in which the major target is the West as the embodiment of all that is modernist, that is science, rationalism, abstract knowledge and so on. Instead there is a celebration of ritual, wisdom in the form of different cultural knowledges and the primitive in the sense of a liberation from the prison of modernity itself. This can prevail in the most interesting places. In what is called 'managerial New Age' the rituals of channelling combine the Isis cult with a plethora of traditional magics – all in a kind of identification with the world's cultures as a total set of human possibilities.

There is also a growth of primitivism in this period, an attraction to that which is repressed by culture/civilisation/modernity and which is understood in terms of a wellspring of all human creativity. This is expressed not only in some of the work by Foucault, but also in post-feminism, and more energetically in satanism, some forms of neo-paganism, the urban indian movement of squatters and the popular culture that developed around these phenomena. For the great majority of people, however, there has been a drift towards the neo-traditional, towards religious, ethnic and other forms of cultural identity or roots.



Figure P.1 The identity space of modernity

These tendencies are all part of the identity space of modernity and can be represented as in (Figure P.1; Friedman, 1994).

In other words, tradition, primitivism, modernism and postmodernism are all constituent poles of the modern. They are not either before or after the universe that we inhabit and which is a cultural structure of capitalism and the latter's transformative effects on identity space. There have always been representatives of the four poles in the form of various political positions and identification, but their salience varies very much with the conjunctural cycles of hegemony. Particular political practices can even combine the poles in interesting ways, as in the combination of primitivism and modernism that can be found in movements, from Futurism to Nazism.

The decline of hegemony is, in this argument, the basis of the shifts in identity outlined above. But these shifts apply only to those who actually participate in modern identity space and this is not the case for the entire globe, not, at least, for many of the populations that anthropologists study. Primitivism and traditionalism are not about extant 'primitive' or 'traditional' social orders nor about the identities that are produced within the former. This is an issue to which we shall return below.

If graphic representations help then Figure P.2 might summarise the kind of argument that I am proposing. The cultural identities that are so explosively prevalent today are the product of a breakdown of the hierarchical order of Western hegemony and here we can include Soviet hegemony as well which lost out in the Cold War to a declining West. This is a general process affecting a range of identities, from the mid-1970s onwards.



Figure P.2 Hegemonic and cultural cycles

In this period those researchers specialised on ethnicity, who had speculated about how long it would take for minorities to become completely assimilated to larger national populations, were shocked by the re-emergence of regional minorities. In Europe there were the Bretons and the Occitans in the most republican and assimilationist country of the continent. Tom Nairn (1977) had already completed his *The Breakup of Britain*, of course, and there was a consensus that former predictions had been wrong. But national identity was also changing. In this period popular interest began to gravitate towards the 'primitive'. In France, books about Celtic France replaced the usual literature on French civilisation. In Germany, one of the most popular series was *Heimat*, a very ethnographic project, about twentieth-century everyday life in the country. It could be said that national identity, which had been generally understood in terms of citizenship, began to move in the direction of cultural identity, that is the individual was no longer a member of the nation but the bearer of its cultural characteristics.

This is the era of minority ethnic politics in the United States. And in the world it is marked by the rise of indigenous politics. It consists of the revitalisation of cultural practices and demands for rights – from land to political sovereignty. Finally there began, following this, the development of cultural politics of immigrant minorities, often supported by states unable to manage integration. Thus the process of integration that led to national minority formation has been replaced by increasing diasporisation. Everything from language to cultural rights were common political issues. This has culminated in Europe with the larger-scale issue of Islamic and Islamicist politics. Some states that were among the most homogeneous have openly declared themselves to be

multicultural. In a very top–down mangerial Sweden, the nation state is now officially the multicultural state, and Swedes are officially designated as just another ethnic group among the rest. In a television interview in the late 1990s, the newly appointed minister of integration claimed that he was definitely not a Swede as his genealogy contained Scottish and Danish blood (Ekholm and Friedman, 2006; Friedman, 2003; Swedish Government, 1997/98). There is, in some states, a kind of silent coalition between cultural politics of minority organisations and the state, but even where the state is strongly assimilationist, cultural politics has had similar kinds of divisive results.

The point here is that ethnicisation and cultural politics, just as the emergence of postmodernism and 'occidentalism', are expressions of declining hegemony. They are not separate phenomena but are linked in a unitary process of fragmentation. This process is double-edged. It creates a new integration between the individual and the smaller entity while weakening larger state-based integration. And it is the decline of modernist identity itself which triggers this new identification. In conditions of poverty, modernism still provides a strong sense of integration in the sense that it channels action to a politics of social transformation within a developmental cosmology. This is the basis of class struggle and the varieties of socialist ideologies that dominated most of the past century as oppositional projects. With the decline of the latter, the practice of identity can no longer find its source within the imaginary trajectory of the social order, but regresses to the cultural identities discussed above. One principal aspect of this transformation is what some have called 'occidentalism' (Buruma and Margalit, 2004). The latter authors argue that occidentalism is itself an integral part of Western culture, the negative part, and that it has been expressed in the form of romanticism, traditionalism and anti-modernism. These are terms that are included in the identity space depicted in Figure P.1.

Buruma and Margalit argue that anti-Western movements, from the Russian romantics, to Japanese Kamikazes to the current Muslim 'fundamentalists', share the same set of representations that have been culled from the Western occidentalists. While this is something of an exaggeration, there are interesting connections between such movements and Western anti-Westernism. Here, again I would argue that this must be understood in terms of historical process. The trajectory of the left is interesting in this respect. From 1970 to 1990 there is a shift from the critique of imperialism in economic and political terms to the critique of Western culture as such, the latter being seen as the ultimate cause of the former. This is the ideological framework of much of cultural and

postcolonial studies. No longer the fault of the Rockefellers, now transmuted into Shakespeare and Keats, the occidentalist critique combines an attack on scientific rationality, literature and so on with its reduction and essentialisation to Western modernity as such. This accounts for the ambivalence of many Western intellectuals with respect to current terrorist violence as to all expressions of anti-Westernism. It is our fault they insist and we deserve it! This is not an empirical analysis of the phenomenon, but a simple moral positioning. The left then has also been part of the decline of modernism and the rise of cultural identity politics, even if much of it has been carried out within universities which is the last stronghold of their power, having by and large lost their foothold in the public sphere.

A note of caution

I have described a general phenomenon of emergence of cultural identification and its polarisation. But I have not discussed and will not do so here, the fact that this processes articulates with very different kinds of social situations. There is a very great difference between indigenous groups and immigrants both legally and socially. This is evident in a politics by which the former have attempted to separate themselves from the latter, in which relations to and their claims on states are of a very different nature. This is so even in terms of the way in which the states of which they are parts define themselves in relation to indigeneity. The difference itself is reflected in the current globalist onslaught on indigenous politics. If we add regional minorities and national populations, the articulations are again quite specific, so that any theoretical understanding of the phenomena must take such differences into account.

Double polarisation and globalisation

The decline of the hegemony of modernism has led to the proliferation of new cultural identities or at least of their revival. Most of the latter have been within states and led to internal fragmentation of social and cultural projects. They include not only indigenous groups, who are a minority in this respect, but more importantly the massive cultural politics that has been linked to contemporary migration, including the transformation of the nation state into the multicultural state. But this process that might be designated as horizontal polarisation pitting cultural identities against one another is only part of the story. There is

a simultaneous vertical polarisation that frames the former process and which must be taken into account in any full analysis of the contemporary situation.

This, expressed in increasing Gini indexes in many Western countries where the rich have become very much richer and the poor much poorer, is a process that began with the stagnation/decline of working-class incomes in the 1970s in the United States. It has combined with the immigration of cheap labour to many countries, the flexibilisation of the labour force in general and the decline of working-class politics, all which have contributed to generally more fragile conditions of existence, if not real poverty. The difference between political regimes is an interesting factor in this regard, such as the degree of state intervention in maintaining welfare levels, but these differences do not change the actual trends which are directly related, as we have suggested, to hegemonic decline itself. Those economists who proclaim that poverty is on the decrease because of globalisation forget to state that it is primarily because of the development of new potential hegemons like China and India that the statistics seem positive. Subtracting these two giants where enormous middle classes have emerged, the world is experiencing increasing impoverishment, including most of the West. The polarisation can be expressed as a combination of upward and downward mobility of the following type (Figure P.3).

Upward mobility can affect any sector and often creates divisions within any particular 'horizontal' category. This has been brilliantly demonstrated in the work by Elizabeth Rata (2000) on the stratification



Figure P.3 The dialectic of cosmopolitanisation and indigenisation

resulting from the success of the Maori movement. Most interesting in this respect is the formation of cosmopolitan elites as a result of upward mobility. We suggested above that globalisation is itself an expression of declining hegemony. It is in such periods that vertical polarisation becomes prevalent. And it is the rising cosmopolitan elites that are the bearers of the discourse of globalisation along with those intellectuals who identify with this process. We suggest here that much of the post-colonial discourse of hybridity and fluid multiculturalism is a product of this process. That these two terms have a tendency to become part of a new dominant ideology is related to the extension of this cosmopolitan identity as a general characterisation of the world. We note that the core of this identification is not an intellectual product but an immediate experience of a certain position in the world. An employee of a transnational consultancy firm expressed it as follows:

> J'avais 30 ans et j'aspirais à m'ouvrir sur le monde »« Je suis pour l'évolution: le décloisonnement est très enrichissant. On s'apporte mutuellement beaucoup. (in Chemin, 2001, p. 22)

Reformulated in official consultancy language:

> Awareness of global interconnectedness is the key. Most globally aware individuals can tell you about the gradual process they experienced or the 'ahha' moment when they suddenly realised 'its all one world'. From Earth Day to the Amazonian rainforest, it may have been their interest in ecology and the environment; for others it may have been actual travels, or exposure to international organizations like the United Nations or humanitarian relief agencies, even the Peace Corps. Space exploration has also contributed to the 'one world' realization. Whatever the source, being able to think and feel interconnected on a global level is what's causing the paradigm shift here. The world is borderless when seen from a high enough perspective, and this has all kinds of implications: socially, politically and even spiritually. Regardless of how the awareness began, it generally culminates in a sense of global citizenship. The best approach is to develop a sense that 'I belong anywhere I am, no matter who I am'. (Barnum, 1992, p. 142)

This is not the product of postcolonial studies but of the (neo)liberal world in which it has developed. It is the leitmotiv of official pronouncements from global institutions, from UNESCO to the World Economic

Forum, as well as from global media transnationals. This discourse has thoroughly penetrated the universe of globalising anthropologists who would urge us to think ourselves beyond the nation (Appadurai, 1993, p. 411) and who take to criticising indigenous peoples while siding up with immigrants-in-general:

> Across the globe a romance is building for the defense of indigenes, first peoples, natives trammeled by civilization, producing a sentimental politics as closely mixed with motifs of nature and ecology as with historical narratives . . . In Hawaii, the high-water mark of this romance is a new indigenous nationalist movement, still mainly sound and fury, but gaining momentum in the 1990s. This essay is not about these kinds of blood politics. My primary focus here is not on the sentimental island breezes of a Pacific romance, however much or little they shake up the local politics of blood, also crucial to rights for diaspora people, and to conditions of political possibility for global transnationalism. (Kelly, 1995, p. 476)

Here we see a reaction to ethnicisation of a specific type, the indigenous type, and praise for the transnationals of the world. I have referred to this as trans-x discourse, an expression of vertical polarisation in which anthropologists take the side of 'the world' and sometimes the 'universal' (Kuper, 2001) against the particularisms of the indigenising peoples of the world, here reduced to global rednecks. There is a significant overlap here of globalisation and inventionist discourse with respect to the systematic debunking of the inauthenticity of 'native' cultural representations. In previous work (Friedman, 1994, 1999a, 1999b) I have tried to understand this from an external perspective that is related to the polarisation process itself. The pervasiveness of trans-x discourse can even be found in the supposedly radical work of Hardt and Negri (2000) where the cosmopolitan is transformed into the nomadic:

> Nomadism and miscegenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first ethical processes on the terrain of Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 362)

and the indigenous as the local is a sign of ultimate danger:

> Today's celebrations of the local can be regressive and fascistic when they oppose circulation and mixture, and thus reinforce the walls of nation, ethnicity, race, people and the like. (p. 362)

The same globalist representation of the world is exactly replicated in these words and reinforces what is clearly a soon to be dominant ideology, the ideology of the dominant.

At the bottom of the scale there is a radically opposed discourse produced by certain indigenising populations, and here I refer to the wide variety of those that practice indigeneity and not those that are officially designated as indigenous. The case of the Washitaw Indians, a 'new' *Black* tribe equipped with a homepage, an empress, licence plates, and arms and an alliance with the rightist Republic of Texas. The alliance is possible because of that which is shared, including, here, the separation of the races. More important is the opposition to the Washington consensus, the American nation state, the Vatican, the Jews and all other cosmopolitans and their supposedly unified agenda of world dominance (Friedman, 1999a). This is a specific discourse; however, one that is part of a strategy of closure and exit from the world system. And while the latter may be characteristic of many populations who are 'official' members of the category of indigenes, they do not, by and large, share the extreme forms of rooting that joins some of these contemporary 'Indians' with the European New Right. The latter, it should be noted, are not mere extreme nationalists. On the contrary, they are quite open to the idea of its demise and replacement by a conglomeration of closed or even gated communities. They often are spokesmen for multiculturalism as well.

> A plurality of cultures can coexist without either destroying or absorbing the one another only if embodied in organic communities, not merely isolated individuals. In the latter case, the outcome is not only the gradual erasure of cultural particularity but the very decomposition of individuality, which explains the inextricable connection in the US between cultural homogenization through the culture industry, the rise of the therapeutic industry, and the progressive disintegration of communities (de Benoist, cited in Piccone, 1994, p. 16).

> Given this situation, we see reasons for hope only in the affirmation of collective singularities, the spiritual reappropriation of heritages, the clear awareness of roots and specific cultures . . . . We are counting on the breakup of the singular model, whether this occurs in the rebirth of regional languages, the affirmation of ethnic minorities or in phenomena as diverse as decolonization . . . [whether in the] affirmation of being black, the political pluralism of Third World

> countries, the rebirth of a Latin American civilization, the resurgence of an Islamic culture etc . . . (de Benoist: 33 February–March 1980, 1920, cited in Taguieff, 1994, p. 119)

It is significant as well that an entire number of the Left journal, *Telos*, was devoted to the texts of the New Right. Its editor, Paul Piccone, elaborated at length on the similarities between the New Right and the old New Left. For those on the left who have found ways of supporting acts of terror via their own guilt, it should be remembered that the militia groups in the United States were by and large supportive of the attack on the World Trade Center.

While indigenising may produce such discourses which are, I stress, neither right nor left in political terms, actual indigenous populations do not partake of such discourses, although they clearly express aspirations for sovereignty. There is, however, a logical continuum involved here that should not be overlooked. Under the political pressure of ethnic competition, certain indigenous leaders in Hawaii have re-classified all the immigrant labour to the islands as colonisers.

The crucial distinction between global fields and the constitution of experience

This sketch, as we have already suggested, concerns reconfigurations within what might be called the Western identity space even if there are actors from outside of that space who participate within it. The vertical polarisation between the cosmopolitan and the indigenous is a relation between relative categories and not between actual social actors. It may be said to encompass the horizontal polarisation of ethnic and cultural fragmentation that it is also a categorical polarisation and not a relation between actual people. It is important to understand this in terms of a particular space of identifications and not confuse this space with other spaces insofar as it has often been the case that real populations have been conflated with the processes involved in revitalisation and ethnicisation. The latter refer to the social structuring of identity but not to its cultural content. That is, identity is not a mere invention. The latter is based on the practice of identification which is a selective operation performed upon a larger corpus of cultural materials that are integrated into the lives of a particular group.

Hawaiians may demonstrate using terms such as *aloha, aloha ʻaina, malama, malama ʻaina* – terms that are meant to express their specific relation to the land and even to their culture in more general terms,

often contrasted to the capitalist regime of private property. These may further be combined with ecological discourses that turn the population into the guardians of nature. This is where the accusations of invention and inauthenticity are invoked. But what is really happening is the outcome of the politicisation of aspects of a larger cultural space. This is not the invention of tradition, but the reconfiguration of political identity. The reason why it works is related to the resonance that such politics has within the everyday lives of those who participate in such movements. Hawaii is an extreme example in which the entire political order was destroyed, the culture forbidden, the population marginalised to such a degree that very little of Hawaiian life was preserved intact. But there are also many continuities in this process that can be traced in forms of socialisation, sociality, exchange relations, modes of religiosity – and it is these that form a basis of shared experience, implicit and immediate sets of understanding of the world upon which culture is elaborated and which provides the latter with an existential foundation.

When social life is understood in such terms, an invitation to a phenomenological approach to ethnography, then the issue of invention and authenticity can be recast in more comprehensible terms. It also clearly situates the difference between political identification as such, and the reasons that it actually works. The point here is that social experience is configured in radically different ways in different social orders and that this cannot be avoided by redefining culture as just a bunch of things, texts, rules and discrete objects. This has been one way that inventionists and globalisers have made common cause in eliminating the real differences that exist in the world. Now whether we call them alternative modernities or argue in some other way against difference, there is ample evidence indicating that such differences do indeed exist. Culture is not simply about symbols, labels and elective affinity. It is about the very organisation of social (shared) experience and this is a deeper phenomenon than the difference between different commodities. When Kwakiutl Indians potlatched with sewing machines they were not into an alternative modernity because of the machines. On the contrary, the latter were fully integrated into Kwakiutl forms of sociality. Now, of course, if culture is merely a set of objects it is easy to define a culture for every such set, but this simply avoids the issue of real differences in the way people go about the world. It also tames culture and makes it available as collector's items.

This is not merely an issue for those involved in the debates concerning indigenous politics. It is just as applicable to phenomena such as Islamism where a certain cosmopolitanism both apologises

for and neutralises the phenomenon, while transforming Islamists themselves into passive objects, the product of a larger context. This kind of intellectual activity is a curious form of colonialism, paradoxical in the light of the progressive profession of its practitioners. Recent ethnographic work (Khosrohavar, 2002, 2006) explores the way in which very different experiences in several countries are linked to the construction of cosmological frame of interpretation of the world which is a particular kind of immediate sense. This cannot be grasped externally but must be understood emically, the result of real acts of constitution of reality.

Conclusion

It is crucial that social scientists maintain a perspective on the issues that does not suck them into the polarisation process itself. It is not unusual and it is also to be expected that many researchers should find themselves taking sides in the conflicts but it is important to maintain enough distance so as not to lose our bearings. The importance of Elizabeth Rata's work is that instead of becoming involved in debates about authenticity, it concentrates on processes of social change within the Maori movement. While this was certainly a hot issue, it was not about the authority to represent or identify a particular culture, but about the real tendencies at work in a historical process, one that has parallels in many parts of this world in upheaval. We all participate in the world, of course, and often we are directly implicated in the contemporary politics of that world. It is crucial that social scientists engage their own world, but it is also crucial that they do so on the basis of as deep an understanding as is possible. This is not, of course, an argument for political correctness. Understanding should not be conflated with 'understanding'. On the other hand, to say that we would struggle for a particular kind of modernist society should not be based on universalist assumptions. Otherwise, we fall into the same kind of theocratic discourse that we would seek to defeat. Universalism is in fact quite particular, both historically and, to a lesser degree, geographically. As an instrument of war, we have seen what it is capable of producing in recent conflagrations where universal principles have been implemented with disastrous results. If we wish to maintain our own social orders, I am afraid that we shall have to do it locally and in the name of sovereignty, the control of our own conditions of existence, something that would not make globalising cosmopolitans particularly happy. I myself disagree with many of the arguments of this book, but I also believe that

they are worthy of discussion and debate. It is such debate that is the cornerstone of a public sphere to which the authors all subscribe, and which is, if not a solution to real problems, a necessary way of coming to some kind of understanding of the contemporary situation. It is this openness which is in greatest need of protection in a world increasingly pervaded by political correctness that would simply ban particular expressions on the grounds that they are associated with some form of unacceptable evil. This is often a sign of intellectual weakness, an inability to confront issues upfront for fear of inadequacy, sometimes a mask for a hidden agreement with 'the other side'. This book raises some of the most crucial questions of the contemporary world. Let us hope that it opens the public arena.

Notes

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1. Chinese production as a per cent of world production in 2002: tractors 83 per cent, watches/clocks 75 per cent, toys 70 per cent, penicillin 60 per cent, cameras 55 per cent, vitamin C 50 per cent, laptop computers 50 per cent, telephones 50 per cent, air conditioners 30 per cent, television 29 per cent, washing machines 24 per cent, refrigerators 16 per cent, furniture 16 per cent, steel 15 per cent.

1

Introduction: Of Mohammad, Murals and Maori Ceremony

Elizabeth Rata and Roger Openshaw

In September 2005, a Danish weekly, *Jyllands-Posten* publishes 12 cartoon caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad apparently hoping to initiate debate over censorship in Denmark. In December 2005, following peaceful protests from Danish Muslims, a Danish Muslim delegation visits the Middle East to publicise the cartoon controversy. Subsequently, many European newspapers reprint the cartoons in defence of press freedom (Ratnesar, 2006). Violent demonstrations erupt in the Middle East accompanied by threats of retaliation. In the West, political leaders attempt appeasement, citing possible loss of trade and an escalation of terrorism as justification for their stance.

Half a world away in New Zealand, a female probation officer is warned after refusing to move behind men as demanded by Maori protocol during a *poroporoaki* or graduation ceremony for male offenders who had completed a violence prevention programme. Frustrated at the Department of Correction's lack of progress investigating her sexism complaints concerning the incident and knowing that another officer's previous complaint had been ignored, Josie Bullock goes public and speaks to the media. For this she is sacked (Sonti, 2005). Following intense public debate in which the woman is accused of cultural insensitivity and even racism, the Department finally announces superficial changes to its protocols. The woman, however, is not reinstated.

In the United States Midwest, a controversy erupts at the Indiana University (IU) Bloomington Campus over a mural depicting the Ku Klux Klan by an artist, Thomas Hart Benton, entitled *Parks, Circus, the Klan, the Press* (Cronin, 2004). There are calls from staff and students for its immediate removal on grounds where the imagery constituted 'a hostile climate' for black and minority students. Whilst the offending mural remains, a diversity education programme is built around it. Students

are able to contact the Bloomington Racial Incidents Team in their quest for closure. Cronin concludes that the university had 'exhibited a form of intellectual pusillanimity utterly at odds with its scholarly pedigree and lustrous history of supporting freedom of thought and expression' (pp. 4–5).

What *is* going on? To what extent are such geographically separated early twenty-first century events – one with global import, one having national importance, and the one on the face of it, possessing only regional and campus significance – inextricably linked? If indeed they are linked, how might we interpret them? This book argues that these examples, and numerous others like them, are symptomatic of the ideologies of culture used to justify ethnic politics in contemporary liberal democracies. Given such culturalist hegemony we question its basic assumption to ask: Should the ethnic heritage of people, one that provides identification with a social group, be included as a political and legal category in the institutions of democratic government? If the answer is 'yes', then to what extent should ethnicity be permitted to overrule arguments based on universal human rights in the development of public policy? In turn, a consideration of these issues inevitably leads to further and broader questions. Is ethnic politics, also called multiculturalism,[1] a fine ideal, one corrupted by the practice of identity politics, in its various ethnic, indigenous and religious guises? Or is multiculturalism fundamentally flawed, unable to resolve the paradox at its core: Can the collective political rights claimed by various identity groups be included in a democratic political system that owes its existence and character to the principles of universalism and individualism?

Since the 1970s, a number of liberal democracies have recognised their multi-ethnic populations as political categories in the assumption that public policies based upon ethnicity are the effective way to address social disadvantage and to achieve fairer wealth distribution goals. This has occurred through the development of ethnicised public policies and is justified both by appeals to the primacy of culture and by embracing moral and cultural relativism. However this practice of ethnic politicisation has, in more recent times, been seen as eroding democratic conditions (Barry, 2001; Kuper, 2001; Rata, 2003).

Despite vigorous defence (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 2000), and attempts by its more zealous adherents to silence vocal critics through a mixture of intimidation and political pressure, multiculturalism is under increasing attack in academic and popular circles. Greater ethnic divisions and tensions, new or heightened boundaries between

ethnic groups, ethnic and religious fundamentalism, elite capture, the persistence of ethnicised under-classes, the projection of culturalist ideologies through education and health systems (often referred to as 'political correctness'), together with concerns that ethnic identity is the contemporary justification for racial ideologies, have produced a growing critique against multiculturalism. It is a critique that requires investigation into the specific nature of ethnic politics.

This book contributes to that investigation. To that end, the chapter contributors provide specific empirical evidence of the practice of ethnic politics in a number of countries. The evidence shows how these practices have heightened boundaries between various identity groups, rather than, as originally intended, leading to greater understanding and tolerance. In their different ways and settings, the case studies included in this book point clearly to the irresolvable nature of the collective human rights paradox. Ultimately, the studies suggest that democracy is compromised, rather than served, by the widespread and uncritical use of ethnicity as a political category. We must point out that our critique of ethnic politics is not a denial of the social reality of ethnic group identification by many individuals. Nor is it a rejection of those individuals' rights to belong to ethnic-based associations. Our focus and critique is on the politicisation of that ethnic identity whereby ethnicity becomes an institutionalised category recognised in government policies.

The relationship between ethnicity and the political system thus provides the unifying structure to this book. Each chapter investigates the specific materiality of ethnic politics to illustrate precisely how politicised ethnic relations are institutionalised into government structures and used to shape public policy. The studies cover a range of areas: business, health, education, the church, government, the economy and politics. While the focus of the chapters differs, each is concerned with identifying and explaining the assumptions, intentions, practices and outcomes of ethnic politics. Underneath these concerns is a shared recognition of the inadequate explanatory power of the terms 'ethnicity' and 'culture', terms which are the basic conceptual tools of identity politics.

New Zealand was identified by many of the international contributors to this book as representing an outstanding example of the global process of ethnic politics at work – hence, the country features in a number of the chapters. Although in some respects it has affinities with the ethnic politicisation that has occurred in other long-standing democracies, the New Zealand experiment with biculturalism has gone further

than many other nations such as the United Kingdom, in the institutionalisation of ethnic categories. In addition, New Zealand has not seen, in any significant way, the reaction against ethnic politics that is apparent in France and the Netherlands. This tendency for excessive experimentalism is nothing new to New Zealand. In 1914, Andre Siegfried referred to the country's 'strange rage for novelty' (1982 [1914], p. 62), and his term 'experiment' in relation to New Zealand political enthusiasms surfaces again in reference to its dalliances with socialism in the 1930s, and neoliberalism and culturalism in the 1980s and 1990s. It is this tendency towards political experimentalism in New Zealand that has provided case studies which clearly highlight the consequences of a particular political direction.

Background

Various types of ethnic politics are studied: indigenous, ethnic-religious and ethnic-immigrant, with reference to countries in Europe, North America, the Pacific and Asia. Similarities are drawn with that other major movement in identity politics – religious fundamentalism. The chapters by Roger Openshaw, John Clark, and Erich Kolig refer to the close similarities and interdependence between ethnicised forms of identity politics and contemporary religious fundamentalist movements. Jonathan Friedman (1994) has located the common origins of both movements 'in the search for security and even salvation provided by traditionalist identity in times of crisis. This identity is both fixed and ascribed. It provides a medium for engagement in a larger collectivity, and provides a set of standards, values and rules for living'. Moreover, 'in times of crisis, traditionalism is frequently articulated in the desire for roots, calls for global ethnification, and social movements advocating the return to revealed religion and stable values. [It is] thus an age of tribalism in which individualism is declining and being replaced by increasingly strong collective pressures' (p. 243).

We suggest that culturalism, which we define as the ideology of ethnic politics, can be defined by the oxymoron, 'secular religion'. In this ideology, as in religious fundamentalism, ethnic identity becomes a type of sacred identity, one blessed by tradition and evocative of a special destiny for those 'of the faith'. Both offer the psychological security of group belonging and the stability of a known past. They show the intensity of commitment that crosses easily into fanaticism. The practitioners observe similar rituals and share in the use of evocative, almost mystical language to emphasise the group's transcendence

of the present into a timeless continuity between past, present and future (Keesing, 1989). In those countries which have experienced relatively recent European colonisation, such as New Zealand and Australia, this intensity and wholeheartedly uncritical adoption of ritual deemed 'traditional' has become as much a feature of predominantly European new middle-class professionals as it has amongst the indigenous groups whose culture they embrace.

The attraction of cultural politics, whether ethnic and indigenous or religious, is nothing new. It is a feature of modernity itself, part of the intellectual tradition stretching from the Counter-Enlightenment to nineteenth-century Romanticism, and appearing more recently in various forms of postmodernism. This is recognised by writers who locate their criticism of culturalism within the broader Enlightenment – Counter-Enlightenment debate (e.g. Barry, 2001; Sandall, 2001; Nanda, 2003). However, the location of ethnic politics within modern intellectual discourse is rarely conceded by culturalists. Yet the debate between universal humanity and ethnic primacy emerged in response to the liberal and universalist claims developed by Enlightenment philosophers. Cultural politics was oppositional from the late eighteenth century. In Adam Kuper's words, 'culture (was) always defined in opposition to something else'. It was, therefore, 'an authentic, local way of being different that resists its enemy – globalizing, material civilization' (2001, pp. 14–15).

The book is arranged according to a number of themes which we first sketch in this introduction. Our references to Erich Kolig's discussion of culture as modernity's oppositional politics is followed by a brief outline of the political economy argument developed in the chapters by Elizabeth Rata, Alain Babadzan and Toon van Meijl, which, in different ways, investigate ethnic politics in terms of the regrouping of people in relation to material resources. We then refer to those ideologies of culture that emphasise the politics of difference and, in doing so, contribute to a new race discourse; a process shown clearly in the chapters by Martin Devlin and Christopher Tremewan. This is followed by a discussion of the liberal left's role in promoting ethnic politics – a process acutely observed in Roger Openshaw's chapter of the indoctrination of New Zealand's educators. The chapter by Lorraine Culley and Jack Demaine, along with those by Paul Callister and Roy Nash, provide accounts of what actually happens when ethnic categories are used in developing public policy. From this discussion we argue that the liberal left, in its alliance with identity politics, entered an alliance with reactionary forces and, in doing so, left the liberal democratic inheritance to be claimed by

the right. Following references to the Clark and Butterworth chapters, we discuss the brokerage mechanism used by governing members of the liberal left to institutionalise ethnic categories as the structuring principle for public policy. We also show how this mechanism was the process for the transformation of the leaders of identity movements into self-interested elites.

Creating the opposition

In the first chapter, 'Freedom, identity construction and cultural closure: The *taniwha*, the *hijab* and the *wiener schnitzel* as boundary markers', Erich Kolig discusses the practice of cultural politics in terms of its emergence as an oppositional force to the perceived hegemon of the West. With reference to the assertion of Maori indigenous rights in New Zealand, the diasporic situation of British Muslims, and the identification patterns of Austrian Muslim teenagers, Kolig shows how the markers of the 'taniwha, the hijab and the wiener schnitzel' became 'potent symbols of cultural closure difference and boundary erection'. Kolig argues that 'boundary markers, in themselves representing a justification for separateness (i.e. a stated inability to merge one's identity with another), do not only signal the disinclination to accept the hegemonic identity, but in extreme cases indicate even a refusal to seek a rapprochement in the form of mutual integration'. His study of identification patterns among a group of young Austrian Muslims in 1990 foreshadows the recent Denbigh High School case in the United Kingdom. In a 2006 court ruling, the British Law Lords overturned a Court of Appeal's decision which had allowed a Muslim girl to wear full Islamic dress to school. The Law Lords distinguished between the right to believe, which may be absolute, and the right to practise belief, which they argued must be qualified by circumstances. In a media interview the girl expressed her dream of becoming a TV presenter demonstrating what the interviewer called 'the dilemma for British Asian youth – the veil of Islam versus the exposure of Five, the television channel' (Gerard, 2006, A19). The case, along with Kolig's Austrian Muslim youths, suggests that the experience of adolescent identity formation is an extremely complex one, often characterised by extremes and contradictions and, in that way, distinguishable from adult cultural identity.

Kolig regards the adolescent experiences of attitude formation:

> *as producing consequences that may not be noteworthy if practised by adults observing rules of abstinence; in a social environment informed*

> *by multicultural policy or generally by a populist sense of tolerance – or indifference. Among adolescents, however, such observances because of their exclusivist nature, do create a boundary, which effectively delineates religio-cultural identities which cannot easily merge into each other.*

This is an important chapter for educationalists and policy makers. It suggests that the practice of multiculturalism among adolescents in schools is different from the practice of multiculturalism in society generally, with less than desired consequences. The emphasis on diversity at the expense of acknowledging commonality, and the resulting opportunity to iconise symbols of difference, has great appeal for young people who are already preoccupied with identity formation. A response to adolescent angst is everywhere an embrace of radicalism, especially when such extremism has all the visible accoutrements of dress and lifestyle that mark one as different from, hence interesting to, one's peers.

The political economy of ethnicity

Ethnic politics is the repositioning of groups in relation to each other and to material resources. Culturalist ideologies justify the new relations and new forms of regulation that are established to create a social environment of accumulation responsive to the ethnically defined categories (Rata, 2000). Simione Durutalo, in his 1986 study of the politicisation of ethnicity in Fiji, gives an illuminating account of how this process occurs. He refers to ethnicity as 'a flexible and socially constructed category emerging under circumstances of economic change as groups organise in relation to access to resources' (p. 6). Politicising ethnicity by placing ethnic categories into the institutions and policies of government takes that process of group re-organisation in relation to each other one step further.

Elizabeth Rata illustrates the process of ethnic elite emergence with examples from New Zealand, Fiji and Malaysia. These show how the initial recognition of the identity group by respective governments leads to the group's subsequent institutionalisation, then to the brokerage of its leaders and finally to the consequent development of policy, even to the point of constitutional change, based upon ethnic categorisation. She argues that it is in such institutionalised events, practices and positions that the reshaping, even transformation, of the democratic ideals, intentions and protagonists of peoples' identity movements produces reactionary politics and elite emergence.

Alain Babadzan's discussion of the politics of culture in several Melanesian nations shows how the invocation of tradition is a contested arena in the struggle by elites for control over economic resources of the region, particularly the mining and petroleum industries of Papua New Guinea. In a thought-provoking argument which looks forward to a possible 'post-culturalist' phase, Babadzan asks if culture is 'likely to fade off the political scene in New Zealand as well as in the Pacific Islands, given that it seems more and more difficult to resort to neo-traditionalist ideologies to legitimize the economic, political and social order spawned by globalisation'. Perhaps, as he suggests, 'the only place that is now reserved for culture seems to be that of folkloric or exotic goods destined for the world market'. If this is the case, then the fact that the elites described in several of the chapters are sufficiently established as a national bourgeoisie and a cosmopolitan elite (Friedman, 2001) no longer requiring neotraditionalist legitimation would support his argument.

Toon van Meijl's chapter about indigenous mobilisation is another approach to the re-organising of groups in relation to material resources. He provides a thoughtful discussion of the paradox at the heart of ethnic politics in liberal democracies in his account of the struggle over the ownership of New Zealand's foreshore and seabed: Is the struggle for ownership of this huge resource about customary rights for an indigenous people, is it about an ethnic group's privatisation of a public resource, or is it about the human rights of the entire population?

The politics of cultural difference: A new race discourse

Yet if ideologies of culture may have peaked in terms of their political and economic efficacy in some parts of the Pacific as Babadzan suggests, the legacy of such ideologies remains considerable. This is the case because in many liberal democracies ideologies of culture were developed by intellectuals to justify the practice of ethnic politics and those influences are still strong. As an effective political symbol, culture is able, as David Turton (1997, p. 11, with reference to Glazer and Moynihan, 1973) explains, to 'mobilize groups around common material interests' by 'masking or mystifying those interests for the group members themselves' bounded by the dominant symbol of a Herderian cultural whole. In his 2003 book, *Liberals and Cannibals*, Steven Lukes describes how this previously 'staple vision of anthropology' is still widely current in both popular and philosophers' discourse, and among practitioners of identity politics (p. 92).

There is a political purpose to this notion of intact and stable cultural wholes which underpins this culturalist viewpoint. It enables clear demarcation lines to be drawn between one 'cultural whole' and another. Such differentiation is an integral feature of the process by which boundaries are created and maintained. The chapter by Martin Devlin provides an insightful example of the demarcation process. With reference to the notion of Maori business, Devlin traces the ideas behind the belief in ethnic business and ethnic economies to show the underlying politics.

Despite the insistent rejection of race ideology in ethnic politics and in such notions as 'ethnic business' and 'ethnic knowledge', the focus on difference can lead nowhere else but to discredited notions of racial demarcation. Adam Kuper (2001) argues that although

> contemporary anthropologists repudiate the popular idea that differences are natural and dispute the view that cultural identity must be grounded in a primordial, biological identity, a rhetoric that places great emphasis on difference and identity is not best placed to counter these views. On the contrary, the insistence that racial differences can be observed between peoples serves to sustain them. (p. 240)

There is no better illustration of the way in which a politically constructed difference becomes self-fulfilling than in Christopher Tremewan's analysis of the Anglican Church in New Zealand. Within the political context opened up by the liberal left's support for ethnic politics, a Maori tribal elite established a foothold in that country's Anglican Church, one which has provided the institutional location, government contacts, and ideological justification for its larger ethnonationalist aspirations. His chapter provides evidence from the Maori church elite themselves of their aristocratic pretensions and ethnonationalistic political ambitions. It reveals the extent of the church's intellectual failure in its inability to put forward a counter-argument to the elite's 'partnership' strategy. As a consequence the Anglican Church in New Zealand finds itself in the bizarre position of willingly dividing itself into racial categories.

It is in the neotraditionalist strategy of primordial identity, one used so successfully in the rewriting of the Anglican Church's constitution, that the genetic or racial component of ethnic politics most starkly reveals itself. Walter Benn Michaels argues that cultural essentialism is, in fact, racial categorisation. 'What's wrong with cultural identity is that, without resource to the racial identity that it repudiates, it makes no

sense' (cited in Kuper, 2001, p. 241). In New Zealand an influential Maori scholar leaves no doubt that contemporary cultural identification is merely an updated version of race ideology. Thus, according to Professor Sidney Mead, 'If you are born a Maori, then you accept the consequences of that biological fact, and the culture that comes with it' (1997, p. 8).

The liberal left

The success of ethnic politics is not the result of identity groups acting alone. Indeed it would be impossible if this were so. Rather, success has stemmed from a *de facto* alliance between the identity movements themselves and intellectuals of the liberal left. The 'flaccid eclecticism' of multicultural theory was particularly attractive for a number of reasons. Multiculturalists, as Barry points out, tend to be 'intellectual magpies, picking up attractive ideas and incorporating them into their theories without worrying too much about how they might fit together' (2001, p. 252). Second, culturalist discourses appeared to be the answer to what Kuper has described as a 'long-running, shifting intentional academic discourse on culture that has been the central project in post war American cultural anthropology' (2001, pp. ix–x).

A further and arguably more compelling reason has its genesis in May 1968 event, with the revolt of Parisian students, which reverberated around the halls of academia at a crucial juncture. The next decade saw 'French structuralism give way to a variety of poststructuralisms of a decidedly relativist cast. Idealism and relativism were now in the ascendant. In consequence, generalisations became impossible because each culture was held to be founded on unique premises, embodied in the phrase "culture makes us" ' (Kuper, 2001, pp. 18–20).

But why did this happen so quickly and so emphatically? Gouldner (1979), and others have argued that it was the liberal left's new middle class status that left it ambivalent towards the polemic of class politics. Hoisted on an uncomfortable petard of 'goodness and power' (Gouldner, 1979), the new radicalised middle class supported the shift from class to identity politics and the accompanying rejection of representational politics for more direct forms of participatory politics. It was argued that representational democracy excluded and marginalised minorities. In the new understandings of identity politics, it was no longer the proletariat who experienced the oppression of capitalist exploitation. Instead victimhood, the result of oppression from colonisation, the patriarchy and 'Western' culture generally, was the preserve of ethnic groups, indigenous peoples, women, gays and religious minorities.

The liberal left championed direct participation by minority groups in the nation's political life. New voices were to be heard and respected for the first time. Diversity became the holy grail of left-wing politics, not least for its role in deflecting attention from the liberal left's discomfort with the contradiction between its intellectual idealism and its relative economic privilege. The moral acrobatics required to live with this contradiction enabled the liberal left to commit to identity politics. Postcolonial theory, postmodernism and the numerous forms of cultural studies that proliferated throughout universities provided the intellectual justification for identity politics despite its increasing reactionary nature. Indeed one of the truly remarkable features of the Josie Bullock case is the fact that some of her most virulent critics were feminists. This is not uncommon; the champions of universal human rights in the 1960s and 1970s metamorphose into the defenders of reactionary culture beliefs and practices in the 1980s and 1990s.

Academics who drew on cultural theories that insisted upon the primacy of culture played a considerabe role in the boundary-making strategies that increasingly characterised ethnic politics. In commenting on the role played by scholars in creating ideologies, David Turton acknowledges the contribution of academia to ethnic politics: 'Whether we like it or not, our disciplines – especially, perhaps, history and anthropology provide what Hobsbawm calls the "raw material" of nationalist and ethnic ideologies' (1997, p. 37).

Roger Openshaw's chapter offers a revealing account of the actual process of installing culturalist ideology. This New Zealand case study shows a cumulative process whereby a handful of committed social anthropologists with a particular view of culture were to have a profound impact upon contemporary bureaucrats and educators. These officials went on to reshape the direction of education to a point where culturalism (termed biculturalism in New Zealand) became the only acceptable ideology. Openshaw shows how totally culturalism became the unquestioning (and unquestionable) doctrine in the minds and practices of government officials and educational professionals alike, and in all sectors from early childhood to tertiary. What this case study demonstrates clearly is the thoroughness of the installation of culturalism into a government institution, particularly one serving as the artery of social life as does the education system.

New Zealand of course is not unique in witnessing the long march of culturalism and its attendant political correctness into education, particularly into its tertiary institutions. Dinesh D'Souza has been one of many commentators who have observed the determination of the

liberal left to impose its view of the good society upon a new generation of students. D'Souza sees two reasons for this. First, yesterday's radical culturalist activists have become today's college deans. Second,

> a lot of professors are experiencing a kind of ideological indigestion and what they are saying is that we may not be able to influence events in the world . . . but we can take over the English department. So there is a temptation for them to say, 'Here on campus where we are in charge, our generation has come to power" '. (D'Souza, 1992, pp. 18–19)

While D'Souza may be dismissed as a neoliberal by the left, the same can hardly be said of critics such as Allan Bloom and Roger Kimball, whose books similarly sought to warn against the detrimental impact of militant politicisation and culturalist dogma for academic freedom. As early as 1987, Bloom drew attention to the dominance of cultural relativism that had resulted in the indoctrination of a whole generation of American students, despite the fact 'that the lesson the students are drawing from their studies is simply untrue. History and the study of cultures do not teach or prove that values or cultures are relative' (p. 39). Bloom and others have documented the growing infatuation of 1960s radicals with German philosophy and their corresponding rejection of Enlightenment values. These 'mutant Marxists' thus 'de-rationalise(d) Marx and turned Nietzsche into a leftist' (Bloom, 1987, p. 222). The result for many American campuses has been a climate of fear leading many to adopt the rhetoric of anti-elitism, anti-sexism and anti-racism (p. 351) while avoiding any engagement with the realities of the political economy.

Writing in 1998, Kimball observed that the academic study of humanities in the United States was in crisis. Deconstructionists *'and other politically motivated challenges to the traditional tenets of humanistic study were now the dominant voice in the humanities departments of many universities. The conviction underlying the otherwise disparate groups were summed up in the radical chant of the late 1980s – "Hey hey ho ho, Western culture's got to go".*' The end result, argues Kimball, has been a reactive multiculturalism that has encouraged the cults of ethnicity and separatism. The supreme irony is that Western culture is denounced as irredeemably racist and sexist, whilst non-Western traditionalism and tribalism are uncritically and often falsely held up as examples of freedom, diversity and tolerance (Bloom, 1987, pp. 216–237).

New Zealand, the subject of a number of contributors to this book, exhibits many of the disturbing trends manifested in the United States and elsewhere in the Western world. What is perhaps most distinctive about New Zealand, however, is the extent to which culturalism as an ideology is embedded in its tertiary institutions, a pervasiveness revealed in ongoing issues and tensions, particularly given the university's role as 'the critic and conscience of society'. As a result of government policy developed since the late 1980s, tertiary institutions in New Zealand are obliged to work with the local tribe to ensure 'a functional relationship' based on post-1987 interpretations of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi as New Zealand's 'founding document'[2] and a 'partnership' between the government and the tribes. The obligation exists despite ongoing widespread dispute about interpreting the treaty in this way, and the fact that the partnership interpretation dates from only 1987. Indeed the recent appearance of a new phrase 'Treaty evasion' suggests that *de facto* avoidance strategies do exist, despite the government's Treaty audits.

The consultative process between the universities and the tribes is prone to capture by excessively culturalist-minded university bureaucracies. The University of Otago's recent policy decision to consult the Ngai Tahu tribe over, not just concerning research involving Maori, but all research undertaken by employees of the university, is a case in point. An *Otago Daily Times* editorial entitled 'Research Restricted' (Friday 22 August 2003), whilst welcoming the debate and the principle of wide research consultation, also warned of the immense bureaucracy involved in having *all* research considered in this manner, not to mention the privileged position a single group now enjoyed regarding the control of researchers.

Educating professionals

This discussion underlines the supreme irony, especially given the claims made by university intellectuals to be the critics and challengers of received wisdom, that the main citadel of the culturalist fortress lays within academia itself. As Alain Babadzan (2000), a contributor to this collection, noted about anthropologists, many academics tend to appropriate the essentialist ethnic-culturalist discourse that actors hold about the meaning of their own practices rather than provide the critique that enables reflection and scrutiny. This 'uncritical self-representation' that Peter Munz (1994, p. 61) identifies in the writings of Anne Salmond, a New Zealand anthropologist who has made a major contribution to

culturalism in that country, has led to an intellectual orthodoxy in many of the new professional subjects introduced into universities since the 1980s.

The new professions, such as teacher education, nursing, social work and business studies, now expect their members to have higher education qualifications specific to the profession, rather than an undergraduate diploma or a postgraduate diploma in the professional area underpinned by a degree in the liberal arts, humanities and social sciences. These new degree courses draw on the intellectual ideas of the more established social sciences and humanities. On one hand, the increased theoretical base does give greater intellectual rigour. On the other hand, without constantly delving back into that intellectual well to ensure that the theoretical framework of the new subjects remains under constant scrutiny, those frameworks rapidly become rigid orthodoxies.

The problem here is that the intellectual framework for these vocational subjects was laid down during the high point of culturalism in the 1980s. There it seems likely to remain, as academics in these subjects tend to concentrate on issues pertinent to the profession itself rather than rework the established intellectual framework and wrestle with the philosophical issues of causality and concept definition. An example of this is the way in which the 'culture wars' raging in anthropology since the mid-1990s are almost unknown in New Zealand's teacher education studies.

It appears in New Zealand, and in nursing and education studies in the United Kingdom at least (see the chapter by Lorraine Culley and Jack Demaine), that several decades of vocational studies at both undergraduate and postgraduate level in subjects based upon rigidified social science theoretical positions have produced an uncritical conformity to culturalism. (See, for example, the compulsory cultural safety component in New Zealand nursing studies courses.) Martin Devlin's examination of the concept of 'ethnic business' shows the ways in which professional programmes such as business studies tends to work from unexamined assumptions. Concepts of ethnicity, culture and entrepreneurship are taken as givens, something that also occurs in teacher education and nursing studies. As Devlin points out, working from unexamined and confused concepts can lead to strange and highly contestable claims, as is the case in the strange claim that 'New Zealand Maori are the third most entrepreneurial people in the world'. It seems likely that the separation of vocational studies from their intellectual roots will lead to greater ideological conformity amongst professionals,

as new generations of professionals take their first degrees in the vocational subjects themselves rather than acquiring a more general bachelor's degree in the humanities, social sciences or general sciences, followed by a postgraduate qualification in the professional subject.

The 'failure to consistently and adequately theorise ethnicity' in health and education research identified by Jack Demaine and Lorraine Culley in their chapter may well be a result of the way in which those trained in vocational studies and later employed in policy areas are unaware of the ongoing intellectual debates about social categorisation that occur in anthropology, sociology, political science and other established disciplines. The two writers note that 'while such debates' (i.e. about how social structures influence inequalities) 'continue in the sociological and epidemiological literature, they do not commonly surface in the policy arena'. In addition, they make the insightful comment in relation to their discussion of the failure of government policy documents to adequately discuss explanations of ethnic inequalities in health and education, that 'perhaps surprisingly, questions of causality rarely feature in policy documents'.

Similarly, Roy Nash's chapter illustrates how culturalism serves the interests of ethnic politics thus contributing more to ethnic boundary making than to any material improvement amongst the disadvantaged. He makes a plea for the tools of theory and method to be used in the service of explaining social disparities in education, rather than serving as objects of struggle in a political contest. In his severe criticism of several Maori educationalists, Nash asks that the rules of conduct, for empirical evidence and logical argument, be observed in the pursuit of social science, even in an area so politicised as ethnic relations.

Policy makers, having institutionalised ethnicity, are stuck with an incoherent framework of policy categorisation, itself based upon flawed assumptions and concepts that, by meaning everything to everyone, end up meaning nothing at all. This conceptual confusion is demonstrated by Jack Demaine and Lorraine Culley's reference to the United Kingdom education document which illustrates how the plethora of terms used to categorise people ethnically becomes farcical:

> *Within the space of a few pages the reader can find: ethnic groups; Asian backgrounds; Chinese and Indian (in the UK); White British; ethnic minority groups; Black Caribbean pupils; Black and Asian students; Black British; Asian British (all on the same page); minority ethnic groups; pupils from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds; BME which is explained in a Glossary at the end of the document as meaning Black and Minority*

> *Ethnic; BEMG which is said to refer to Black Ethnic Minority Group; Traveller; Irish heritage; Gypsy/Roma; individual minority ethnic groups; Black young people; White British young people; Black young males; and Ethnic Minority and ethnic diversity; Black, Asian and people of mixed ethnic origin. (Department for Education and Skills, 2005b)*

In the same vein, Paul Callister's chapter discusses the vexed issue of ethnic measurement, asking what exactly is being measured, given that comprehensive public policy is developed on the basis of a concept which attempts to capture and simplify what is in fact a complex social reality. Callister focuses on the difficult problem of how those people who belong to more than one ethnic group have been recorded and classified in official surveys. In particular, he addresses the issue at the heart of the liberal left's commitment to ethnic politics: Can ethnic data help in identifying factors that influence disadvantage? Not only is the left's reliance on ethnic politics as the mediator for social disadvantage open to critique given the emergence of elites as a consequence of this form of politics but, as Callister shows, the notion of a differentiated, distinct ethnic group is not the social reality. He refers to the way that heterogeneity among social groups is often not acknowledged by political activists and is not captured in broad-brush ethnic measurement approaches. Drawing on Simon Chapple's (2000) scholarly study of Maori educational underachievement, Callister argues that ethnic measurement and the recognition of the resultant categories in public policy may overlook other more relevant factors that have caused individual disadvantage. He warns against too much reliance on ethnicity data in social policy analysis and delivery, saying that its usefulness for political purposes is compromised by its inability to identity and explain causation.

Callister also adds that while researchers who inform policy development are increasingly aware of the need for data to reflect the complexity of ethnic group composition, more sophisticated descriptive data still does not explain the causes of social inequalities. Indeed, he comments, ethnicity is a poor predictor of outcomes; the average differences between ethnic populations are not typically overwhelmingly large and there is a large degree of dispersion of people within all ethnic groups around the average ethnic group outcome, which consequently does not well predict the outcome of any person in that group.

Using groups[3] as the fundamental unit of analysis and group averages as the outcome in a public policy context *imposes* commonality of experience and outcome on members of the group. This often obscures the social reality that people simultaneously belonging to multiple groups,

so, by default, groups become mutually exclusive, again obscuring policy-relevant realities. Consideration of groups as the fundamental unit promotes stereotypes of people as group members and thus leads to stereotypical policy approaches. Starting with groups paints a picture of the social terrain where group membership is readily perceived as strongly causal and highly deterministic even when this is not the case. Equally, it promotes a simplistic holus-bolus targeting of resources to pre-selected macro-ethnic groups.

In addition, group-based approaches to public policy often unwittingly reinforce personification of groups. This is the presumption that groups can be characterised and will act as a unified individual force with a distinct personality and trait. In its development, this personification is frequently Manichean in nature (witness use of terms like 'our people', 'us' and 'them' in political discourse). This tacit personification means that issues of within-group coordination and consequent problems of group collective action are conventionally neglected by those adopting a group-based analysis. Personification also means that the related issue of within-group heterogeneity continues to be ignored. The consequence of ignoring in-group differences means that it is very easy for policy makers to accept that one person who is a member of the group can accurately speak behalf of that group, a situation that complicates the brokerage process discussed below.

Given that government recognition of ethnicised political groupings, along with other identity-based groups, and the subsequent institutionalisation of ethnicity occurred with, indeed because of, the support of the liberal left as part of a wealth redistribution, egalitarian agenda, it behooves policy makers to demonstrate the putative link between ethnic categorisation in public policy on the one hand and increased wealth distribution and social justice on the other. According to Roy Nash's criticism of ethnic explanations for educational failure, 'the transformation of the social order can only be achieved through actions directed at its effective mechanisms and it is for that reason that a realist sociology is imperative. To misrepresent the nature of the social world is, in fact, to deny oneself the opportunity to change it.' Nash shows how culturalist educators accept that 'the criterion of an acceptable theory is not its correspondence with the nature of the world, but its possible political consequences'. With reference to Maori failure in New Zealand education, Nash argues that 'many writers involved in the development of Maori education take for granted the cultural theory on the causes of educational disparities and make no attempt to examine its empirical or theoretical foundations'. His chapter illustrates how a particular theory

of culture serves the interests of ethnic politics and hence contributes more to ethnic boundary making than it does to any material improvement amongst the disadvantaged.

A rigid culturalist orthodoxy in a number of areas, including vocational subjects in universities and among government policy-making officials, can mean that scholarly criticism is withheld or silenced. Those who do criticise cultural theory may be accused of racism, find their career paths restricted, or simply not be appointed to positions for which they are, in fact, well suited, or indeed, as this chapter itself demonstrates, must remain anonymous (see note 3). This, in turn, lessens the likelihood that ongoing intellectual scrutiny will occur in the future, making change almost impossible. The silencing of criticism is made relatively easy because the culturalists, as claimants of the radical left inheritance, have maintained the moral high ground that goes with that inheritance, despite jettisoning the actual reasons for claims to moral and political superiority, – leadership of the poor (of all races and creeds). The left has long been accustomed to its place in the vanguard of radical reform. To be recast as conformists following an orthodox line, especially an orthodoxy supporting reactionary politics, is unpalatable. This existential dilemma may go some way to explaining the vehemence expressed towards those critical of ethnic politics. It is a defence not, as it first appears, in support of multiculturalism, but in support of the vision of the left as liberators and defenders of the downtrodden.

Cultural relativism and historical revisionism

The withholding or silencing of scholarly criticism can lead to the suppression and distortion of knowledge. John Clark's chapter about western science and indigenous knowledge gives the infamous example of the suppression of knowledge by New Zealand's national museum, Te Papa Tongarewa. An exhibition about the Moriori people of the Chatham Islands deliberately omitted the rather important fact of their massacre by Maori invaders in the 1830s. The omission was justified on the dual grounds that there is no real objective truth, and that *Matauranga Maori* (Maori knowledge) must be protected at all costs. The prevailing assumption is that different ethnic groups have different knowledge bases, and that these have equal value, an assumption forcefully challenged by Meera Nanda (2003) in her analysis of 'Vedic science'.

The manipulation of terms and the resulting confusion surrounding the concepts of 'race' and 'ethnicity' is also the case with the concepts

of the 'traditional' and 'history'. On the one hand, the 'traditional' is elevated to mystical heights and is used to justify the concept of a cultural whole, especially one located in the 'blood and soil' rhetoric of indigenous status. This is the case despite such 'self-conscious traditionalism' being 'a thoroughly modern movement of renewal' (Habermas in Barry, 2001, p. 259). Ethnic groups are presented as primordial with unchanging timeless cultures that are outside history. This presentation has had some disturbing consequences for the future of empirically based academic research, particularly when culturalist views have received official endorsement from opinion leaders and policy makers.

The impact of culturalism on the writing of history, for instance, has been considerable, especially across the Pacific where, in Roger Keesing's words, 'Pacific peoples are creating pasts, myths of ancestral ways of life that serve as powerful political symbols' (1989, p. 19). One consequence has been that, since the 1960s, both popular and academic views of European colonialism and settler impact on indigenous peoples have been extensively revised, often resulting in work that claims deliberate bias in order to redress the balance in favour of indigenous cultural minorities. In both Australia and New Zealand, this has led to well-publicised government and even vice-regal apologies, accompanied by an official endorsement of the new historiography as 'the one true account'. In New Zealand, it has given rise to a new history of colonisation emanating especially from the Waitangi Tribunal, a statutory body set up in the 1980s to consider Maori land grievances. Tribunal history embraces what Giselle Byrnes (2004, p. 199) has recently characterised as several distinct elements of postcolonial discourse, including the tension between legal and historical discourses and methodologies, the 'paradox' of indigenous agency, the emergence of the so-called 'liberation history' and an inherent present mindedness.

In this book, Graham Butterworth examines the ideology underlying historical revisionism in a case study of the way in which the changes in the Maori population during the nineteenth century are claimed to be linked to land loss. Butterworth shows that the new orthodoxy – one that claims that population decline and land loss are causally linked and, in addition, are the result of devious motives by the settler government – cannot be sustained by the evidence. Because this orthodoxy has fuelled contemporary Maori grievance and played a significant role in the reparation settlements, including creating a climate of acceptance of these settlements by the larger population, the chapter provides a timely reminder of the role that history, and its distortion, plays in

policy making. Australia too has seen a similar process, albeit with rather more severe consequences for the future of historical debate. A book by Keith Windschuttle (2002), for instance, contending that much of the portrayal of frontier warfare and consequent violence against Aborigines was, in fact, a myth deliberately created by the culturalist assumptions of revisionist historians, was subsequently vilified by outraged culturalists. There were even calls to have the book withdrawn from circulation.

The use of historical appeals to tradition in this way has had even more dire consequences in the Northern hemisphere. Gallagher (1997, pp. 47–75) has described traditionalist techniques (with reference to Serbian and Croatian political and intellectual elites) as 'the assertion of inalienable historical rights, the cultivation of a persecution complex by reminding people of past wrongs committed by ethnic opponents and an insistence that guilt for past wrongs is both hereditary and collective'. They provide 'the potential for a lethal force in human affairs through the deliberate calculation of political elites'.

Brokerage politics and 'direct' democracy

We have argued that the support of the liberal left for multiculturalism was the first and crucial step in its politicisation. Yet what was the mechanism by which these 'legitimate defenders of the common good' (Kellner and Heuberger, 1992, p. 11) went on to establish ethnic categorisation as the basic criterion for public policy? That mechanism was the brokerage of the leaders of various ethnic and indigenous groups into government institutions, policies and practices. It was a pragmatic mechanism that seemed to be democratic because it brought ethnic groups directly into the political process (Rata, 2003a). By creating a site for diverse voices, brokerage appeared to create the 'common political culture' identified by Habermas (cited in Taylor, 1994, p. x) as essential to the preservation of democracy. This common political culture is 'marked by mutual respect for rights'. Constitutional democracy dedicates itself to this distinction by granting members of minority cultures 'equal rights of coexistence with majority cultures'. However, in contrast to the belief that participation by minority groups is sufficient in itself to ensure democracy, Habermas here joins writers in the tradition of liberal political thought to argue that they are:

> *individual rights of free association and nondiscrimination, which therefore do not guarantee survival for any culture. The political project of preserving*

> *cultures as if they were endangered species deprives cultures of their vitality and individuals of their freedom to revise and even reject their inherited cultural identities. Constitutional democracies respect a broad range of cultural identities but they guarantee survival to none.*

Brokerage is a crucial element in the progression of ethnic politics because it not only ensured survival for minority groups, it institutionalised and transformed them. The key to this transformation is in the brokerage function itself, as advantages are bestowed and self-interest follows. The effects of brokerage are formidable. The process not only creates ethnicised elites – itself a considerable function. It also establishes itself – that is, the brokerage function – as an essential mechanism of democratic governance. This is change at the structural level, one that alters the very institutions of government. The new elite's positions and privileges exist only as long as the brokerage function itself exists. Creating boundaries creates a space between groups that needs to be crossed. This is the brokerage site where brokers provide essential and profitable services (Rata, 2003a).

Brokerage, or 'participatory democracy', is at the heart of ethnic politics. It links the marginalised group to government agencies and begins the process of ethnic policy development. Despite the earlier promise that these direct forms of participation will bring marginalised groups into the common polity, the brokerage mechanism of direct democracy leads to elite creation. As the chapter by Christopher Tremewan about the ethnicisation of the Anglican Church in New Zealand shows, this process of elite creation can occur in different types of institutions and is not confined to central and local government.

There are further repercussions to brokerage. The function exists only as long as the differentiated group is maintained as a separate and distinctive entity. This leads to the naturalising of ethnicity as a primary human category. Ideologies of a differentiated cultural entity, with primordial origins in a distinctive ethnic group, ensure that the group is permanently separated from other groups. It is an ahistorical separation that creates a permanent boundary between ethnic groups. The group is locked into its distinctiveness forever, bonded by an otherworldly essence that is expressed as a spiritual link, but which is in fact genetic. The group's permanency ensures that the brokers' role as its representatives is also permanent. They are cast as the authentic voice of a group which must itself be unchanging in order to preserve its authenticity. The unchanging authentic essence ensures that ongoing accountability

to the group's members is unnecessary. Those who were leaders in the beginning must continue to be so.

In this way the elite are a permanent ethnicised elite. The ethnic boundary itself becomes institutionalised as a permanent brokerage site. Policy is developed that categorises the group within all government institutions as separate and distinctive. Ironically, the 'authentic voice' that required participation is now the voice of a culturalist ideology. It ensures the power of the new ethnicised elites. Individuals within the ethnicised groups can be represented only in terms of their ethnic identity. The consequence is that political inclusion is limited and prescribed rather than opened up to marginalised peoples as was originally intended.

Conclusion

The case studies presented in this book show the consequences of ethnic politics: cultural closure and the creation of ethnic boundaries that segregate people in all areas of social life – residential, physical and emotional. However, rejecting ethnic politicisation does not mean rejecting ethnic identification as a social practice. In his chapter, Erich Kolig reminds us that 'the world must find enlightened answers to the principle of cultural freedom and rights to culture and freedom of choice of identity'. Classical liberalism found answers to the devastation caused by religious fanaticism with the separation of church and state in the political sphere, and the separation of belief and science in the intellectual sphere. Different nations have reached pragmatic accommodations with the need for such separation. For example, as a consequence of its revolutionary history, France maintains a strict separation between church and state. Anglo-Saxon influenced nations, on the other hand, tend to more pragmatic arrangements that enable some rituals to be maintained for symbolic rather than religious purposes. The Christian prayer intoned at the opening of New Zealand's Parliament each year is an example of this pragmatism.

The cultural fanaticism that characterises ethnic politics is similar in many ways to religious fanaticism – a comparison made by a number of the contributors. This analytical comparison suggests a similar solution, one that will ensure tolerance for cultural values and practices that are consistent with universal human rights, one that tolerates the desire of many people of shared ethnic descent to associate together, but one that does not politicise people in terms of those ethnic or racial categories.

It is a mistake to understand ethnic politics as an extension of the liberal democratic project of the past two centuries. While the demand by ethnic groups for recognition appeared to be that extension, and was understood in those terms by the liberal left – hence their support for ethnic politics – the studies in this book show that ethnic and cultural politics has from the beginning contained a more potent force. This force is the aspiration of the various elites who have successfully used identity politics, in its ethnic and religious forms, to acquire the means to challenge, not to extend, liberal democracy. Part of that challenge is an overemphasis on the perceived primacy of ethnic and religious heritage, of the separation of cultures considered fundamentally different and of exclusive forms of ethnic identity. It is a process that has not produced the cultural freedom and tolerance for difference that was initially intended by many of the participants in these movements. Instead, it has created an institutionalised oppositional type of politics in liberal democracies. The oppositions between the West and the Other, between radical Islam and liberalism, between indigenous peoples and settler descendants and between ethnic groups are contrived strategies by various types of emergent elites – clerical, indigenous and ethnic – to challenge liberal democracy and to restore the hierarchies of pre-modern societies, in which they have a privileged place.

In the culturalist ideology of ethnic politics, 'culture' is elevated to an all-powerful position outside the concerns of human existence. At its extreme, culturalism resolves the democratic discussion referred to by Habermas about 'which traditions citizens want to perpetuate and which they want to discontinue, how they want to deal with their history, with one another, with nature and so on' (Habermas in Taylor, 1994, p. 125) into the reactionary politics of traditionalism. And as Brian Barry (2001) observes, this process has its costs in that the anti-liberal and anti-universal rhetoric of multiculturalists is not uncongenial to the reactionary right. It diverts 'attention away from shared disadvantages such as unemployment, poverty, low-quality housing and inadequate public services' and contributes to the right's 'long-term anti-egalitarian objective' (pp. 11–12). It also, as we pointed out in the three examples 'Of Mohammad, Murals and Maori Ceremony', at the beginning of this chapter, produces a less than desirable feature of globalisation – an excessive localisation. This parochialism is the retreat from universalism, the denial of a common humanity and the rejection of the individual as the bearer of political and legal rights, for a reactionary politics based upon group rights organised according to ethnic or racial categories.

Notes

1. The term 'multiculturalism' is used in a number of ways: to refer to the multi-ethnic composition of a population, to the range of social practices associated with an ethnic group - particular food, the arts and language and to ethnic politics, whereby people are categorised according to ethnic group membership in government policy. We use the term in the latter sense.
2. In New Zealand there are a number of candidates for the important symbolic honour of founding document including the establishment of Parliament in 1852; the first General Election in 1853, where men, Maori and settlers aged 21 or over with some property were allowed to vote and the first meeting of the new Parliament in 1854.
3. We are deeply indebted for this analysis to a writer who must remain anonymous. This deplorable state of affairs is itself an excellent illustration of the culturalist control of knowledge in New Zealand.

2

Freedom, Identity Construction and Cultural Closure: The *Taniwha*, the *Hijab* and the *Wiener Schnitzel* as Boundary Markers

Erich Kolig

In early 2001, parts of England erupted in a series of brutal so-called 'race-riots' (better labelled 'ethnic conflict'). Groups of 'ethnic' and 'British' youths battled each other and the police in a baffling show of mutual hostility. Subsequently, the Cantle report (2001), commissioned by the then home secretary, David Blunkett, came up with the finding – put in a nutshell and paraphrasing the complexity of the text – that British multiculturalism and its best intentions of providing a maximum of freedom of cultural choice, and of identity construction, had failed. This policy, conspicuous by an absence of a concerted effort to develop an awareness of common citizenship, had led to the entrenchment of ethnic communities with strongly exclusivist identities. Residential, physical and emotional segregation, and lack of day-to-day interaction with cultural others, led to the formation of 'parallel lives' in which people were rarely confronted with cultural alterity. Single-faith schools and educational segregation, as much as ghettoisation, reinforced pre-existing parochial ethnic identification among immigrant groups. The maintenance of, as one must surmise, mutually hostile, inward-looking, ethnic identities created a powder-keg situation. Little was done to inculcate commonalities such as a sense of common citizenship and of common national interests.[1] One can read this report to mean that the maintenance of strong ethnic and sub-national identifications has led to this crisis.[2]

Not long afterwards, this sobering reflection was further deepened through the traumatic events of the London public transport bombings of July 2005, when it became clear that they were perpetrated by young British Muslims. These were young men, – although of immigrant

descent – who had grown up and been educated in Britain; yet obviously felt that a Muslim identity and loyalty to an (imaginary) Islamic cause was of greater importance than citizenship. The image of Islam – and a sense of belonging to an 'imagined global community' (à la Benedict Anderson) – on which their identity was based, emphasised cultural closure and irreconcilable antagonism vis-à-vis their own society, representing in their view the global 'anti-Islamic' hegemon.

Another impressive example, though on a different scale, of impasses created by a cultural liberalism that supports cultural closure, is supplied through Unni Wikan's (2002) description of how the rights of a Norwegian citizen were trampled on by the Norwegian state in the name of cultural correctness and the rights of immigrants to maintain their culture. A young, underage woman of Moroccan immigrant parentage tried to resist being shipped off to North Africa by her father to be married to an older man. She failed in her bid to enlist the support and protection of Norwegian authorities. The outcome was tantamount to an abrogation of Norwegian law vis-à-vis Moroccan traditional custom, as distinct from Islamic canonical law, *shari'a*, and resulted in a massive violation of the victim's human rights.

Freedom and identity construction in the modern world

The principle of cultural freedom, in itself a high public good, can create unsolvable conundrums in real life. It is not my purpose in referring to these unfortunate episodes to advocate national monoculturalism tantamount to a return to an unmitigated and repressive regime of assimilation. Nor do I want to extol the 'virtues' of patriotism and nationalism – as distinct from an enlightened form of citizenship binding people in an *Interessensgemeinschaft* (community of common interests). As powerful motivators, either separately or in combination, they have frequently led to a political radicalisation that culminated in open and bloody conflict. The coercive cultural nivellisation dictated by a cultural hegemon, as practised in previous decades and centuries, could take many guises; be it the early twentieth-century policy style of requiring immigrants to divorce themselves speedily of their cultural heritage or closing the borders to those considered culturally (or racially) altogether too alien. Not to mention earlier versions of xenophobic suppression, expulsion and extermination of anything considered non-conformist, culturally unacceptable or undesirable (e.g. ethnic and religious minorities such as in Europe the Jews and Roma, religious 'heretics', the so-called witches and the like).

History is full of brutal attempts to break ethnic and cultural separateness by force, compelling separatist identities to be kept as personal secrets and expelling them from public discourse, or forcing them to be conspicuous (through badges, dress or ghettoisation) to facilitate open discrimination.

I see in the English and Norwegian episodes examples of good intentions gone wrong. Rights to culture (including religion) and the freedom of choice of identity are an important public good. But as Max Weber (1968) has pointed out, it is the tragedy of culture that the best and most meritorious social action can have unwanted and totally unforeseen consequences, which may eventually come to negate the best of intentions. Just as freedom of social action and rational choice, within a framework that maximises individual ambition, may lead to the 'iron cage', stagnation, the extinction of the spark of innovation and creativity, and create a moribund society, complete freedom of cultural choice may also have problematic consequences. As the Norwegian example shows, irreconcilable values may, at times, endanger precisely the human rights and civil liberties that should have been protected and that allowed this (minority) identity to exist in the first place. Even worse, a deliberate overemphasis on separateness of culture and an exclusionary identity, reinforced by the rigidity of powerful boundary markers, may create, or underpin, the kind of antagonism that can explode in unmitigated acts of hostility.

The assimilatory powers that nation-states had possessed in the past, enabling them to mould *ad libitum* one standard of citizen and suppress non-conformity, have been replaced (especially in the Western world) by various forms of cultural liberalism, whether officially declared (as multiculturalism) or undeclared but observed in actual socio-political praxis (by recognising and acknowledging cultural plurality). This freedom, if a catalyst of material and power interests is present, allows cultural closure, boundary erection and maintenance of strong boundary markers to avoid the effects of the 'melting pot'. Boundary markers, in themselves representing a justification for separateness (i.e. a stated inability to merge one's identity with another), do not only signal the disinclination to accept the hegemonic identity, but in extreme cases indicate even a refusal to seek a rapprochement in the form of mutual integration.

The principle of cultural freedom and liberalist policies are now no longer based on haphazard laissez-faire tolerance, but are supported by legal instruments and conventions, on both an international and national level, and are deeply grounded in a globalised human rights

ideology. The UN convention on Human Rights and successor legislation guarantee rights to culture, belief and religiously grounded social conduct, indigenous and minority rights, the right of freedom from discrimination, and the like. This is particularly the case with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (especially Article 15) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (especially Article 27). These basic principles are amenable to quite different interpretations and minority rights are quite differently enshrined in national statute (Kymlicka, 1989, 1995; Poulter, 1998). Of particular interest is the distinction Poulter makes between indigenous and immigrant rights. In New Zealand the main national legal instruments supporting cultural minority rights are the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (which protects minority rights in principle and mainly against the state powers) and the Human Rights Act 1993 (which protects mainly against actual discrimination by individuals against individuals). Indigenous rights are additionally also enshrined in principle in the official biculturalism of the nation.

While globalisation has in a juridical sense strengthened, worldwide, the ideology of freedom of cultural choice,[3] ideological globalisation in another sense becomes weakened and undermined by exactly that effect. On a subliminal level, rightly or wrongly, the awareness of globalisation seems to conjure up the 'spectre' of total cultural homogenisation; this process, then, is perceived not as a neutral one of supra-cultural modernisation, but as a process of entrenchment of a particular form of hegemony, which then provokes resistance. (From the stereotypical Muslim point of view, it is the entrenchment of Western and in particular American cultural hegemony – the Muslim world's concept of Westoxification. It is seen to endanger Islam and the traditional Muslim way of life, and unsurprisingly causes a strong reaction in the form of fundamentalism, Islamism, Salafism and the like.)

Thus it turns out that globalisation in effect is not a monolithic, unidirectional process but incorporates a plethora of quite contradictory phenomena: an increased momentum towards homogenisation is offset by an inner ideological weakening of the global hegemon (Friedman, 1994) – by, for instance, strengthening the post-modernist ideology of infinite relativity, cultural liberalisation and above all by provoking processes of cultural closure (Harrison, 1999) spurred by fears of identity annihilation. The interplay of these factors can create quite different scenarios of diverse acuteness and spectacularity.

Forces of human rights derived liberalisation and anti-hegemonic sentiments, ideological softening of the national and international

hegemon, and other factors provide important ingredients in a powerfully causative force field. Human rights based freedoms of culturally based identity formation and maintenance, backed by the absence of assimilationist pressures on a national level, become expedients in ethnic, cultural and religious identity politics. Symbolic representations of boundedness spring up in a situation of one's 'way of life' being seen to be under threat by being drawn into the vortex of hegemonic assimilation. This provokes cultural boundary erection through the iconisation of chosen cultural features to act as distinguishing and exclusionary features signalling discrete identities. Culture closure occurs by way of valorisation of what is seen to be traditional culture. Cultural constructionism, reinvention, and innovation play significant roles in this process. Some of these processes are based on the rationalisation of culture in a Weberian sense: the deliberate construction of cultural identity on instrumental rational grounds and the imaginative manipulation of cultural values and traditions for more or less calculated objectives and effects, to mystify material interests and power aspirations. Failing to recognise that in some cases these symbolic constructions are embedded in and arise out of an adversarial discourse means to misunderstand the essence of contemporary so-called cultural renaissances in indigenous minorities.

The result effectively is a divergence between 'lived' culture (based on an increasingly 'endangered' unself-conscious and 'visceral' cultural reproduction) and an increasing preponderance of 'constructed' culture (Maddock, 2002; Webster, 1998). Political indigeneity, ethnic separateness, neo-traditionalism, religious and cultural fundamentalism are such phenomena in which culture is not a heritage, but a project for a specific, designed future. As a consequence, more or less self-conscious constructivist traditionalisms, rationally designed 'designer identities', spring up and enter the political discourse. '. . . [P]eople are becoming more culturally uniform, but some ethnic groups try at the same time to differentiate themselves by deliberate appeals to traditions . . . and reinterpretations of past history' (Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 114). In various parts of the world phenomena have been observed such as the hardening of Kastom (Babadzan, 2004), imaginative reconstruction of the cultural past (Keesing, 1989, Hanson, 1989), inventions of traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983).

Prima facie, these may seem to be quite unrelated phenomena belonging to quite different orders of social discourse, such as globalisation, decolonisation, nationalism, ethnic resentments, reactions to quite different forms of hegemony, religious reactions of the oppressed

(Lanternari, 1963) with nothing more in common than a certain arbitrariness in choosing anthropological labels. However, I think they show a Wittgensteinian family resemblance in which phenomena when arranged side by side in a serial chain show no total identity, but overlapping similarities in some components and divergence in others. They are phenomena of identity construction in a situation of (perceived) crisis brought about by the real or imaginary impact of a powerful hegemon. The answer to this crisis is seen to lie in a re-definition of identity usually by sharply delineating oneself culturally. The quest for authenticity in identity construction requires strong boundary markers derived from a notion – that owes as much, if not more, to the present as to the past – what the assumed cultural past was essentially like and where it differs essentially from the opposing hegemon.

I will briefly sketch two scenarios of cultural boundary erection through mobilisation of cultural features, by two minority groups embedded in a strongly hegemonic cultural other. One case is the assertion of an indigenous identity, the other a religiously diasporic situation. In a sense both groups are part of global communities – if imagined only (in Benedict Anderson's sense). Muslims in the West and New Zealand's Maori see themselves to be part of larger entities locked in a struggle with a powerful hegemon: one of the global *umma* (worldwide community of Muslims) now rallying in the defence of Islam against the pernicious forces of Western *jahiliya* (in Sayyid Qutb's sense) and Maori partaking of a worldwide identity of indigenous people as victims of European colonisation, now fighting the legacy of historical and persevering injustice and the threat of identity disappearance. Both groups, in contesting the assimilatory powers of a cultural hegemon, are engaged in the construction of oppositional identities based on membership of an 'imagined community' exclusivist towards the surrounding hegemonic culture, be it a national one or a globalising one. An oppositional if not antagonistic ingredient in such symbolic constructions, in particular in the construction of cultural boundary markers, is often conspicuously present. I shall, however, not discuss causes and motives, but rather describe in a phenomenological sense features and devices by which the relevant identities are, or feel themselves to be, strongly delineated against a cultural and hegemonic other.

Maori culturalism and the respiritualisation of the world

Today's, partially at least, 'rational' construction of Maoriness, aided by New Zealand's officially declared policy of biculturalism (see Kolig,

2004b) contains within itself the impetus for boundary creation so as to delineate this identity against the cultural majority. Ethnic Maoriness is defined today as a connectedness with a cultural past whereby the perception of this past is based on both a reconstructive and an innovative process. The issue of the construction of cultural traditions has been a contentious one and being too openly analytical has on occasions run into strong taboos (Hanson, 1989). Opinions about continuity versus discontinuity of Maori cultural constructions diverge sharply and sometimes give rise to acrimonious debate. This is also the case with views which recognise the strongly adversarial character of this cultural construction, embedded as it is in the contemporary ideology of de-colonisation and anti-hegemonism (see Kolig, 2004a), while others perceive the politics of Maoriness as the proud heritage of old continuing to assert itself.

The deliberateness of the construction of traditions in general (Hobsbawm, 1989) has been subject to wide debate and need not be discussed here. Recognising in Maori cultural constructionism its calculated nature – in the sense of utilitarian, rationalist and opportunistic aspects of symbolic constructions – and in terms of its innovative rather than continuous character (Tremewan, 2005; Kolig and Mueckler, 2002) gives rise to vigorous polemic. Here I wish to consider only some features of this construction which are clearly used as boundary markers so as to delineate a *tangata whenua* (original people) identity vis-à-vis that of all later comers.

One of the most obvious boundary markers in the construction of a pan-Maori identity is the process of retribalisation (Rata's neotribalism, 2000) of Maori society. It is based on the resurrection of a practically defunct socio-political unit, the *iwi* (or tribe), both as the beneficiary of restorative policies and as a defining feature of Maoriness. While in some abstract sense undoubtedly continuous with history, modern tribalism is based entirely on a conjectural view of the socio-political significance of this unit in the past. In reality it is uncertain whether it or other social units, such as *hapu* and *whanau*, may have formed the most important socio-politically active factors in the pre-colonial social discourse and may have acted as the predominant identity markers. In its historical precedent having been rather a dividing identity, *iwi*ness *per se* now paradoxically assumes both an exclusivist aspect (vis-à-vis non-Maori and even genetically identifiable Maori without *iwi whakapapa*/descent) and an inclusivist one (incorporating all those who can evidence an *iwi* connection), thus imparting the right to Maoriness. So strong is this delineation that urban Maori, who have lost the ability of linking

themselves with traditional (or historically tangible) *iwi*, face difficulties in being officially recognised as Maori and are reduced to attempting to be recognised as a new construct: urban *iwi*. In other words, the loss of connectedness with *iwi* be recognised as an *iwi* itself; the formation of which is no longer based on kinship but common economic interest. This reveals the paradoxical nature of *iwi*ness, namely that modern economic interests are rationalised in terms of an imaginative revisiting of a past that bears little resemblance to the interests thus expressed.

Another boundary marker is achieved through the reconstruction of what is assumed to have been the traditional Maori worldview, or *matauranga*, containing cognitive patterns considered fundamental to the maintenance of a characteristic Maori epistemology. Befitting its iconic status in modern Maoriness, it is to be inculcated by a separate education system, the *kaupapa* Maori (see Rata, 2004). It demands equal respect and status with Western modernist, scientifically based on forms of world knowledge. An important ingredient in re-constituting and re-entrenching this rival worldview in modern pedagogy is the re-spirtualisation of the world; in other words, reconstructing a *matauranga* (worldview) replete with spiritual meaning which sets it clearly apart of the stereotypically rationalist and 'barren' world perception of Pakeha culture. Propping this worldview up in the state education system and through legislation creates an interesting paradox. Doing so would not only contravene the secularist education agenda because of *matauranga*'s religious connotations, but flies in the face of the government's declaration of the nation's secularist character (Kolig, 2004b). Cognitive concepts such as *atua* (god), *tupua* (demon), *mana* (prestige, spiritual power), *tapu* (sacred), *noa* (mundane) and *mauri* (life force) which harmonise spirituality with environment and empirical reality in a unified vision are not just 'folklorist', but have, traditionally at least, religious connotations.

Matauranga is supposed to be more than an object of study and detached interest; it is to be a legitimate tool of world apperception thus signifying the emancipation (*tino rangatiratanga*) of Maori knowledge. The implementation of *matauranga* in law goes far beyond an in-principle issue whether a pre-modern perception of causality and relevance should be given prominence in public discourse. It has very concrete practical consequences. In a sense, *matauranga* is already supported by statute (for instance, the Resource Management Act and the Local Government Act) that refers to practices of land management and local government and requires consultation with Maori as *kaitiaki*

(spiritual guardians of nature, land and environment), thus creating channels through which this spiritually enhanced worldview intercedes in decisions concerning planning and land management (affecting property rights, nature conservation issues, extraction and utilisation of natural resources, town planning and the like.)

The most important factor affecting land management is the notion of *wahi tapu* (sacred sites), special places dotting the land and imposing restrictions on access, land transformation and use. Other factors are the life forces of *mauri* and *wairua* being present in natural and cultural phenomena. This requires special measures ranging from ceremonious treatment of cultural objects, as evidenced in the *te Maori* exhibition of traditional artefacts, to the demand that rivers not be utilised for hydro-electric extraction. This is closely linked with the perceived presence of personalised spiritual essences, such as the *taniwha* (usually conceptualised as a dragon-like creature with supernatural powers). Public and private projects, such as road works and building projects, believed to interfere with the presence of *taniwha*, or with other special powers contained in the land, become subject to protestation and lengthy processes of consultation, so as to accommodate these beliefs and mitigate impacts on the supernatural beings' existence (Ahdar, 2003). Even more colourfully, this worldview acknowledges the presence of ancestors who are to be consulted in decision-making.

The ubiquitous presence of spiritual forces and entities requires *karakia* and *hikitapu* ceremonies to be performed to assuage spiritual powers and make places safe for the living and for mundane activity to proceed. The overall effect of this worldview is a heavy ceremonialisation of social discourse, often as a pre-condition for normal action and interaction to be able to take its course. Each incident in which the spiritual conception of the world becomes practically active and receives public exposure is able to act as a catalyst in public awareness of the presence of a distinct and separate Maori identity. The re-spiritualisation of culture as counterpoint to pragmatic, rational *Pakeha* culture is underpinned by a particular interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi (in the Maori version) which says that Maori spirituality as a *taonga*/traditional treasure is entitled official recognition in public discourse under the provisions of the Treaty. This has practical consequences for the construction of the officially declared policy of biculturalism. Definitions of what constitutes *taonga* are up to the Maori intellectual elite to define and propagate. Despite some leeway, such definitions of what a *taonga* is have to be reconcilable with the dominant system of law and may not necessarily be correct. Although cannibalism as much as the public discharge of

firearms as part of the enactment of 'Maori cultural tradition' may soon come up against the barriers of criminal law, musings over juridical biculturalism have led in the recent past to the recognition of *makutu*, black magic, as a mitigating circumstance in a criminal case.

Muslims in Europe

The global emergence of extremist Islam and its violent expressions have opened up the problematic of a cultural divide in impressive ways. Worldwide, a conspicuous strengthening of the Islamic identity has been observed, which is predominantly interpreted as a backlash against cultural globalisation (but see Roy, 2004).[4] The popular Islamic perception of globalisation as a form of Western hegemony is based on a reluctance to distinguish between Westernisation and modernisation. This shows remarkable phenomenological similarities with anti-globalisation reactions of other groups trying to counter perceived hegemonic conditions.

Islam's position in the modern world has been characterised as an 'identity crisis' (Esposito, 2002, p. 78; Gellner, 1992, p. 15) and attributed to the relentless process of globalisation, more or less on Western terms, or alternatively as a reaction to the blunt domination in many forms quite obviously exercised by the West. One response is a process of strengthening the Muslim identity, as observed in the West in various forms (for instance, Timmerman, 2000; Afshar, 1998; Kepel, 1997), but is not confined to the West where Muslims constitute a minority. It is usually interpreted as anti-assimilationist and anti-hegemonic. (In the West, Muslim motivation is probably a mixture of anti-assimilationist and solidarity with global Muslimhood and its Islamic agenda. In both senses it is a cultural defence.) In the attempt to preserve a sense of Muslimness, certain features may become iconicised for their easy signalling effect.

Islam is not an 'inner religion', but one in which orthodoxy is co-equal with orthopraxy and which requires daily and emphatic demonstrations of piety in actual social conduct. Orthodox Islam does not recognise a division between faith and social praxis, church and state, belief and conduct. Some of these prescriptions sit uneasily among Western conventions, norms and values. Despite multiculturalist policies and their practical effects of tolerance, the limits have been summed up by Sebastian Poulter (1998, p. 236) with regard to Britain: 'It is inevitable . . . that [British Muslims] will have to accept that . . . Islam can only be followed as a religious faith and not pursued as an all-embracing way

of life.' For devout Muslims this demand is not only a personal diminution but an attack on Islam itself. Their aspirations of manifesting their beliefs in social life inevitably chafes against the notion of having to fit into the British or Western framework of what adherence to a religion may mean.

Islam does not evince a monolithic reaction to hegemonic Western conditions. In France, for instance, partial assimilation has produced the so-called Beur [Arab] culture. It is the culture mostly of second-generation immigrant Muslim youth mainly of Maghreb origin. This identity relies also on a notion of Muslimness, but in the attempt to break down cultural barriers it has abandoned some of the most distinguishing Islamic cultural elements, such as the ban on alcohol consumption, the doctrinal prescription of five prayers a day, payment of *zakat* (charity tithe) and the duty of *haj* (pilgrimage). It has replaced strict observance with a minimalist list of observances such as circumcision, reciting the *fatiha* (marriage vows), burial customs, abstention from pork and a much reduced period of fasting at *ramadan* (usually only three days) (Roy, 1994, p. 59).[5]

France also shows within the European context one of the clearest expressions of Muslims' collective refusal to assimilate, perhaps because Muslims feel that too many cultural concessions have already been made.[6] The Muslim female head covering *hijab* (or *jilbab, niqab*) has recently come to serve for Muslim women as a flamboyant expression of opposition to assimilationist pressures, a gesture of 'defiance, refusal and even provocation' (Roy, 1994, p. 65). France's *affaire du foulard/voile* has attracted world attention, but similar incidents, though on a much smaller scale, happened in several Western countries. Young French Muslim women, some of them wearing headscarfs in the colours of the French national tricolour, expressed symbolically the wish to retain a Muslim identity within a French nationalist one, the *hijab* becoming a very clear boundary marker against the assimilation to the French educational model of *laicité*. Paradoxically, the insistence of wearing the headscarf as a marker of a special identity may not have sent such a strong signal only a few decades ago, when it was common for European women of all cultural and religious backgrounds to cover their heads with a headscarf. But the inclination has been observed among young Muslim women worldwide and of all educational levels and economic backgrounds to use this traditional Islamic garment even if there is no pressure from family or social environment to do so. The reasons are similar – an expression of resistance to the global hegemon perceived to be essentially a Western one.

There are other forms of boundary maintenance and emphasis of Islamic identity through valorisation of traditional religious features. An example from Austria will illustrate the point.[7] A brief investigation among Muslim students at a technical college in Vienna, which I conducted in 1990, revealed a surprising result.[8] This investigation essentially consisted of a lengthy group interview with approximately 20 Muslim students (age group 17–19) who had volunteered for this purpose. They were of quite diverse ethnic origin (but all from the Middle East including Turkey and North Africa, except for two who were from Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively). With two or three exceptions, whose parents had moved to Austria recently, they were linguistically fully enculturated, speaking the Austro-accented version of the German language with total fluency and displaying mannerisms quite like their non-Muslim Austrian peers (with one exception, a young woman who wore the *hijab)*. Most were Austrian citizens, and several were indistinguishable in physical habitus from a rather diverse Viennese population.[9]

Although an underlying, subliminal atmosphere of 'racial' discrimination is ubiquitous in Austria, and on a populist level assimilatory efforts of Muslim immigrants are expected, official policy emphasises integration over assimilation and is respectful of the freedom of cultural and religious choice (anchored in the European Union Human Rights Convention). The college system did not condone any form of (openly noticeable) discrimination that might explain a sense of disenfranchisement of Muslim students. Systemically, Muslim needs were relatively well catered for: *halal* (and vegetarian) food was available in the canteen; Islamic religious tuition and prayer facilities were provided; and religious holidays were respected by the college administration. (Students had no problem getting the day or days off, though it was incumbent on them to catch up with the lessons afterwards.)

It came as somewhat of a surprise when it emerged that the identity of these students' choice was 'as Muslims'. Probing further, it also became clear that for most the second choice would be their parents' ethnic origin such as Jordanian, Turkish, Egyptian and so on. Only as a third choice, almost reluctantly it seemed to me, would they refer to themselves as Austrians. In the course of the interview the reason for this, in the circumstances, somewhat strikingly heavy emphasis on a minority identity became clear as a form of resistance to peer pressure. Dietary issues provided the main barrier for identity integration and enfranchisement. One of the national dishes, enjoying much popularity, is a pork schnitzel washed down with copious amounts of beer. Peer

'culture' in this age group also stresses alcohol consumption in general, smoking and looking at sex magazines, all of which apparently contributed substantially to the Muslim students' discomfort and opened up a social barrier. In Islam the consumption of pork and alcohol as well as the display of human nudity are, unambiguously, subject to strict doctrinal prohibition. While erotic images and tobacco smoking are not expressly forbidden by the Islamic canonical law (*shari'a*), pious Muslims do consider them at least implicitly contrary to the spirit of prescribed ethics.

Observing rules of abstinence for Muslims in a social environment informed by multicultural policy or generally by a populist sense of tolerance, or indifference, may not be a noteworthy issue and may have few perceptible consequences. Among adolescents, however, such observances because of their exclusivist nature do create a boundary, which effectively delineates religio-cultural identities which cannot easily merge into each other. On the extreme end of the spectrum of attitude-formation they erect unsurmountable barriers. The resulting sense of disenfranchisement then leads, as a reaction, to an iconisation of exactly those cultural features which provide this barrier in the first place. While, *prima facie*, the cultural boundary markers are on the side of the hegemonic other, and the barrier seems to be erected by the other identity, it is in fact the emphasis placed on these cultural features and on their rejection that acts as the true boundary marker.

Culture as mission and multicultural disharmonies

'Culture' is a mission – not, as they have often been accused, for anthropologists – but for people who use it for collective self-identity construction. Not only are such productions based on essentialisation, in the attempt of throwing the collective self into sharp relief, culture becomes an expression and a statement of difference, especially with the help of conspicuous boundary markers. What gives this theme special relevance are the cases of deliberate mobilisation of culture, through the valorisation of cultural features, to act as boundary devices deliberately and emphatically marking cultural identity and its distinctiveness off against others. The reason may be not only for the sake of preserving the integrity of culture and of self, but also for oppositional motives, and as expressions of rejection and even provocation.

This relates to the other factor I have touched upon, the political instrumentalisation of culture. In the modern world, culture and politics most often are inseparable (Babadzan, 2000; Grillo, 2003). It stands

to reason that as a worldwide anti-hegemonic phenomenon this is an effect of globalisation (although the arising notion of culturally based opposition and exclusivity are reminiscent of the religious [Christian and Islamic] fervour in medieval times). Politics are made in the name of culture or by rationalising them with culture. Culture is not just an instrument of collective self-awareness, but an activist ingredient driving social discourse, and in keeping with oppositional cultural identification doing so often in an overtly or subliminally oppositional and even antagonistic manner. Sectional differences, disguising economic interests, power aspirations and purely emotive antagonisms are rationalised in cultural terms, and not unusually in terms of cultural irreconcilability and the unenfranchisable strangeness of the cultural other.

Human rights based conventions and legal instruments nowadays guarantee in principle the relatively free exercise of cultural rights and rights of choice, replacing and superseding ancient regimes of intolerance, enforced assimilation, conversion and repression. This certainly must be applauded. While motives of cultural choice in principle can still fairly easily be accommodated under the human rights agenda and the aegis of cultural liberalism, sometimes such initiatives of iconicising cultural difference, accentuating features with an exclusionary effect and entrenching distinctive boundary markers to signal cultural closure contain the seeds of open conflict. Strong boundary markers, as expressions of cultural closure (or the intention to achieve it), may hint at an imbalance between minority rights and the need to promote social unity. In this sense these phenomena do warrant critical analysis and vigilance.

To recognise the significance of cultural boundary erection has important implications for policy making. The best-intentioned vision of biculturalism and multiculturalism and the complete realisation of cultural liberty have their pitfalls. Culturalist policies, based as they are on the specific empowerment, especially when enshrined in law, of specific cultures and their preferment in the social discourse come at the cost of restricting, or infringing on, the liberties of others. Unsurprisingly, multiculturalism chronically is left diffuse, undefined in detail because embracing cultural otherness and granting total freedom to its expression ultimately is a never-completed mission. Self-conscious or implied notions of exclusivity, irreconcilability and even superiority militate against the futuristic vision of complete rapprochement. Given this tendency, multicultural and bicultural policies under a regime of far-reaching cultural liberty must remain a utopian agenda.

Notes

1. Unemployment, drugs and biased newspaper reporting were also blamed, but we leave this aside here. At the time of writing (November 2005), France was facing a similar situation in even more severe form. I consider socio-economic factors (unemployment, discrimination in the economic infrastructure, ghettoisation, crime) as equally important in these cases. However, ethnic-cultural identification and identity distinction do play a significant role in this, especially in exacerbating the sense of alienation and disenfranchisement.
2. Even though Harrison (1999) and others make a distinction between ethnic and cultural identity, for the purposes of this chapter the differentiation is irrelevant. The ethnic identification discussed here is based on cultural criteria.
3. Globalisation has also had the effect of delocalisation of cultures bringing the issues of assimilation and cultural freedom into sharp relief.
4. Roy, in contrast to most other Islamologists, distinguishes between backlash against and consequence of globalisation, and considers the relatively recent global rise in Islamic fervour as related to the latter. The two motivations, although distinguishable on logical grounds, appear indistinguishable in observable reality.
5. *Zakat, haj, salat* (performing ritual prayer five times a day), and *ramadan* (fasting for a whole month) are four of the so-called 'five pillars of Islam', considered the doctrinal cornerstones of Islam.
6. To what extent Beur youths were the main protagonists in recent unrests in France (in November 2005) is unclear at the moment and cannot be discussed here.
7. Austria, a nation of approximately 7 million people, hosts close to half a million Muslims. Islam is now roughly the second largest religion behind Catholicism, having slightly overtaken Protestantism, traditionally a minority religion in Austria. Islam is an officially acknowledged religion and enjoys state support. There are *shari'a* courts for family matters, and Muslims' religious needs are to some extent accommodated in public life, education system and employment law. European Union Human Rights Conventions are supported by national law.
8. This predates the traumatic events of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists throughout the world. These indicate a further radicalisation and polarisation of Muslim attitudes towards assimilationist pressures to which they are exposed in the West (despite multicultural provisions).
9. Vienna having been the capital of an empire before the First World War, comprising many different ethnic groups and extending deep into the Balkans, is home to a wide range of physical and physiognomic types.

3
The Political Strategies of Ethnic and Indigenous Elites

Elizabeth Rata

The worldwide ethnic and indigenous movements of the last three decades of the twentieth century were intended to achieve social justice, economic redistribution and greater political participation for peoples marginalised initially during colonisation, and subsequently by their concentration in the industrial working class. These goals have remained elusive for the vast majority. But why, despite the extravagant rhetoric, has this happened? In this chapter, I refer to examples from four countries: New Zealand (Rata, 1996, 2000), Fiji, Malaysia (Larson and Zalanga, 2003) and the United States (Schroder, 2003), to show the ways in which the politics of ethnicity[1] changed from these initial democratising intentions to become the means for the emergence of ethnicised political, economic and intellectual elites.

The reason for the relative failure of ethnic and indigenous mobilisation to achieve its promised results is due to two main factors. First, in government responses to ethnic mobilisation and, second, the emergence of elites from within the policies and practices of the government responses. Accordingly, the section 'Elite emergence' in this chapter examines government responses in the four countries that have created ethnic socio-political categories within the nation-state and, as a result, have built institutional and permanent boundaries between racial groups. Public policy is a significant contributor to this boundary-making process. It will be argued that, in the process of ethnic boundary making, the brokerage between the leaders of the ethnic and indigenous movements and their respective governments transformed the leaders into a self-interested class elite with economic and political ambitions that are no longer representative of the entire ethnic group's interests.

The section 'Cultural production' discusses two of the strategies used by emergent ethnic elites to entrench ethnicity as a political category

and, with that entrenchment, to cement their own privileged positions. The first strategy was the cultural production of a neotraditionalist ideology which enabled the elite to make a spurious claim for continuity with an 'authentic' tribal past. As a result, the elite claimed economic resources and political partnership as the inheritance of that past. The second strategy was the elite's efforts to ally itself with the democratic rights of the liberal tradition. This alliance was used to make a case for political group rights for ethnic groups while at the same time rejecting the liberal rights tradition as 'Western'. The final section of this chapter discusses the New Zealand neotribal elite's English Common Law strategy. In this approach, the elite is built upon the first two strategies – neotraditionalism and the claim for the political recognition of group rights – to argue that constitutional group rights for indigenous groups are guaranteed under English Common Law.

While the untrammelled ambitions of all elites pose a threat to the liberal-democratic ideals of social justice, fair economic distribution and accountable politics, those of ethnicised elites pose the greater threat. This is the case because ethnic elites advocate foundational groups (i.e. collectives united by non-dissolvable bonds such as kinship or ethnicity and not reducible to individuals)[2] over individual citizenship, along with tribal or ethnic political structures as the framework for the range of regulatory institutions and practices that bind people into the foundational collective. The result is that only those people who share the same racial or ethnic ancestry can belong to the socio-political structure. The creation of these structures does, in fact, make racial divisions permanent as boundaries are erected around ethnicised categories to institutionalise ethnic divisions.

In contrast, the modern nation-state is centred on the individual citizen as the basic political and social unit. Ideally, anyone can belong to the nation, regardless of kinship and ethnic heritage. In addition, the universalist nature of the nation-state allows for the continuing reality of ethnic fluidity.

The institutionalisation of foundational or ethnic groups destabilises the cohesion of the democratic nation-state by altering the meaning and practice of citizenship in that structure from the universal human being to the kin or ethnic group member. Given that the nation-state is the very structure responsible for organising, regulating and protecting the institution of citizenship, and that citizenship is one of its constituent parts, a weakening of one is a weakening of the other. Ethnicising politics, by categorising people within government institutions, policies and practices according to their ethnic or kin heritage,

weakens both citizenship and the nation-state. As a consequence, the free and equal citizen, whose political and legal rights exist only in that the nation-state exists, loses his or her power to challenge the inequalities of the economic system. The decline of citizenship and the weakening of the nation-state as its structuring framework creates greater opportunities for ethnicised elites to seize increased economic and political power. This process is enhanced by the absence of accountability in foundational groups. Even more worrying in such groups, as in fascism, loyalty is to the collective will of the people as embodied in its leaders. In a tragic irony, the outcome of ethnic and indigenous mobilisation is the erosion of the only institutions, those of citizenship and the nation-state, that have historically produced greater social equality, fairer economic distribution and increased political participation.

Elite emergence

Malaysia, Fiji, New Zealand and the United States all provide examples of the process by which economic redistribution to foundational groups leads to elite emergence and to the exclusion of many of the people in whose name the redistribution is initially made. It is a process that began in the late nineteenth century for American Indian tribes. According to Ivor Schroder, 'the tribes have been dominated by new economic and bureaucratic elites that control access to tribal revenues' since the late nineteenth century. In recent decades 'the discourse on tradition and cultural preservation has become the latest currency of representing tribal social relations to the American state and legitimising the political status quo before the local population' (2003, p. 435). He adds that

> although tribal capitalism provides for material benefits for all tribal members, these benefits are not evenly distributed. In practice tribalism has been turned into a powerful instrument in the hands of tribal elites to manipulate the possibility of access to the benefits accorded to tribal members. Additionally, the political structure of the tribe has given local elites in their function as tribal politicians every opportunity to establish and consolidate relations of economic inequality. (p. 449)

Similarly in Fiji and Malaysia, 'the companies have benefited a small percentage of the indigenous populations of Malaysia and Fiji' (Larson and Zalanga, 2003, p. 86), with estimates of 'substantial benefit to

perhaps three percent of the Malay population (Jomo and Shari, 1986)'. 'Roughly 1% of indigenous Fijians who could own shares in the FHL company do own shares' (p. 87). As significant as the low percentage of indigenous populations who have received little or no benefit is the emergence of the elite. 'As a result of the government policies and the operation of the investment companies, a new elite of indigenous capitalists has emerged in Fiji and Malaysia' (p. 87).

The failure of ethnic politics to achieve fair wealth redistribution is the same in New Zealand. Webster (1998) found a threefold increase of Maori among the poorest 20 per cent of New Zealanders between 1984 and 1993, with a small middle class developing among urban Maori while Lashley (2000, pp. 45–6) noted that trend of Maori impoverishment continuing into the 1990s with the elite growing in size. 'Between 1991 and 1996, while 11 per cent of Maori became more impoverished, the small proportion of a relatively prosperous Maori elite increased from 3.4 per cent to 7.7 per cent of the Maori population.' In addition the high proportion of Maori recorded in crime,[3] mental health and educational underachievement statistics has remained high. This is despite nearly four decades of bicultural policies designed to support retribalisation in the misguided belief that colonial detribalisation was the problem; therefore retribalisation must be the solution.

In New Zealand the shift in Maori politics from its initial pan-Maori base to an ideologically driven retribalisation left behind the large numbers of detribalised poor Maori in whose name mobilisation was first justified. This group have benefited little from the successes of mobilisation – particularly the transfer of capital to the tribes. Even the increased contribution of Maori cultural practices to the texture of New Zealand society – in the increased number of Maori words used by New Zealanders, government funded Maori television and various rituals in public life – have done little to improve the lot of those Maori identified by Simon Chapple[4] (2000) as the actual disadvantaged group within the wider Maori population. Instead a retribalised culture, with prescribed gender roles, religious politics and hierarchical birth-status, has demonstrated the irresolvable conflict between traditionalism and New Zealand's universalist, secular culture. This conflict is clearly exemplified in the ongoing case of Josie Bullock, a probation officer fired from her job in 2005 after revealing the probation service's sexist policies in respect to Maori cultural practices. The extensive media coverage of the case shows some rather bizarre new alignments as postmodern feminists supported the sexist practice of women sitting behind men in the probation service's Maori ceremonies (in order to protect the women), while

conservative male commentators, previously known for their criticisms of feminism, rallied in support of anti-sexism.

At the beginning of ethnic mobilisation, in the late 1960s and 1970s, economic redistribution to ethnic and indigenous movements was linked to both political stability and economic productivity. Policies and practices were adopted to transfer capital finance and economic resources to these groups. Larson and Zalanga (2003, pp. 93–4) describe how

> the establishment of indigenous investment companies in Malaysia and Fiji was intended to achieve wealth redistribution toward the economically underrepresented bumiputra and Fijian indigenous populations as part of a larger package of policy initiatives designed to improve the economic status of these populations. Justification for these actions was based on an interpretation of the events leading to political instability having a basis in ethnic-based economic inequality.

Similarly in New Zealand, economic redistribution to disadvantaged Maori was understood in terms of political stability.

Yet the potential for the derailment of a more equitable economic redistribution agenda was there at the outset, in the actual policies and practices of wealth redistribution. In Malaysia, 'more attention was paid to the corporate sector. (A)lthough the goals were framed in terms of promoting ethnic balance, they camouflaged the pursuit of class interest by the Malay bourgeoise' (Larson and Zalanga, 2003, p. 89). In New Zealand, despite the pan-Maori nature of ethnic mobilisation, historical grievances settlements according to the post-1970s' interpretation of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi have established neotribal economies (Rata, 2000) rather than improved the socio-economic circumstances of those Maori in whose name ethnic mobilisation was initially justified.

The actual mechanism for elite emergence and the derailment of mass peoples movement lies in the brokerage politics between the leaders of ethnic mobilisation movements and the governments of a number of democratic nation-states (Rata, 2003a). It was in the brokerage function itself that institutional positions were established for those leaders. Power, influence and economic benefit were acquired by these individuals as finance capital and economic resources were transferred to newly established indigenous and ethnic corporations. By fulfilling the brokerage function the ethnic mobilisation leaders became

a self-interested bourgeoisie, a privileged group whose new class interests were concealed in the discourse of traditional cultural revival or neotraditionalism. In this way, ethnicity became a politicised category.

From a base in both political and economic spheres, the new elites organised ethnicised social environments of production through neotraditionalist regulatory systems such as New Zealand's Maori 'neotribes', Fiji's indigenous investment companies, and the American Indian tribal economies. (The individualising New Economic Policy in Malaysia is the exemption to the tribalism of most indigenous capitalism, although this too is ethnically structured.) Despite their ethnicised membership and indigenous status, these privatised corporations are neotribal modes of regulation. That is, they are contemporary, not revived traditional social structures, in which the relations between people are governed primarily by socio-economic class, rather than by the status relations that characterised tribal societies.

In such ethnic or indigenous political economies, the ethnic face conceals the class character of the new elites. However this is not without tension – a tension described by Larson and Zalanga (2003) in their account of the emergence of the indigenous capitalist class in Malaysia and Fiji – that 'class represents an important change in the intersection of class and ethnic divisions in both countries' (p. 94) because 'indigenous capitalists are in positions in the class structure that do not fit with the structure of ethnic relations. This relatively small group has interests both congruent with and contradictory to both the incumbent capitalist classes and the larger population of their ethnic group.'

Furthermore, Larson and Zalanga (2003, pp. 94–5) describe how 'the tension between class and ethnicity in relation to the emergence of the indigenous capitalists has been managed by downplaying the class-basis for political mobilization'. They explain how 'indigenous investment companies has been justified in terms of advancing the economic standing of the indigenous populations' thereby enabling governments to 'minimize the visibility of the embourgeoisement that accompanies the practices'. In both Malaysia and Fiji economic redistribution has built elites and not decreased poverty for the targeted indigenous population.

The class-ethnic tension is evident in the New Zealand experience. The neotribal elite regard themselves as the inheritors of traditional Maori leadership despite their embourgeoisement as a capitalist elite. Within the new tribal modes of regulation the tension between the emergent elites and proletarianised workers does surface on occasion. It is a division captured by a mobilisation member in her description

of a hui (tribal meeting). 'The so-called "Maori Leaders" hui called at Hopuhopu was little more than a farcical show of privilege' (Pihama, 1999, p. 6), one 'driven by the corporate warrior elite many of whom would struggle to recall their last visit to the poverty stricken realities of almost half of our people' (Pihama, 1999, p. 2)

The indigenous group rights policies promoted by ethnic elites in Malaysia, Fiji, New Zealand and among North American tribes meet Richard Lachmann's (2000) criteria for elite emergence. He argues that 'elites exist only to the extent to which they have an observable effect upon specific structures such as production organizations or political institutions' (p. 14). This is the case in the four examples discussed in this chapter. There are sound reasons for ethnic politics being used as the elite's accumulation strategy despite the tensions inherent in the class-ethnic axis. First,

> if political mobilization were primarily on the basis of class, the privileged class interests would be at risk, given the larger populations of working and underclass indigenous and non-indigenous populations. As a result mobilization is likely to occur along ethnic lines, with governing elites focusing attention on pro-accumulation policies once in power. (Larson and Zalanga, 2003, p. 88)

Public policies entrench ethnicity and indigeneity as an organisational and administrative category. In turn these policies become the structure for pro-accumulation strategies.

Second, ethnic categorisation in the form of group rights is necessarily a major political objective of the emergent ethnic and indigenous elites. It was the recognition and inclusion of ethnic categories into the institutions of the state that made possible the elite's emergence in the first place. This means that it is in the elite's long-term interests to maintain and consolidate ethnicity in the institutional and constitutional arrangements of government while at the same time concealing its class character.

Cultural production

An important aspect of the elite's strategy is to resolve the ethnic-class tension in ethnic and indigenous rhetoric, that is to promote the belief in a revived traditional tribal soci-economic structure. Schroder refers to this strategy as one of 'political legitimization' (2003, p. 436). It serves two important purposes. By representing itself in traditional leadership

terms the ethnic bourgeoisie seeks to justify its brokerage role – the source both of its new economic interests and of its political influence. Furthermore, by representing itself as the direct inheritor of the traditional tribe and not in its real form as a contemporary economic corporation, that is a 'neotribe' (Rata, 2000), the claim for continuity with the past serves as a claim for the inheritance of the past.

However, the presentation of class relations in the new ethnic and indigenous organisations as revived traditional relations ignores the harsh realities of hierarchical social relations. Neotraditionalist ideology presents traditional societies in the gloss of communality, a humane counterpoint to capitalism's inequalities. The 'more subtly exploitative capitalist restructuring' (Webster, 2002, p. 342) portrayed as a romantic arcadia leads to the oxymoron, 'communal capitalism' and 'tribal-citizen' that further conceals the reactionary nature of ethnic group politics. This way of presenting what are, in fact, modern economic corporations helps explain the level of support that many of the left (usually strong critics of capitalist enterprises) have shown to ethnic politics.

In New Zealand the intellectual elite has played a major role both in the cultural production of neotraditionalism and in the commodification of knowledge that is part of the neotribal corporation's economy. The story of the Ngai Tahu tribe's new ownership of pounamu (greenstone or jade) demonstrates this integration of cultural ideology and economic reality. Worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the mineral was calculated at zero dollars in the 1997 Treaty of Waitangi settlement that gave ownership of the resource to the tribe. Since then Ngai Tahu has moved quickly to control, not only the greenstone itself, but also knowledge about the mineral. According to one of the neotribe's elite, 'Communities are interested in influencing the sort of information that's associated with the resource' (Potiki Tahu cited in Ansley, 2004, p. 23). The only post-settlement in-depth media article to analyse the implications of handing over 'an entire mineral resource to a private party in this country' describes how 'tour operators or guides on Department of Conservation-controlled land cannot talk to visitors about Ngai Tahu's association with pounamu without consulting their local runanga (tribal council); scientists wanting to research greenstone have to get the tribe's approval first' (Ansley, 2004, p. 23).

The tribal leaders who negotiated the 1997 Treaty of Waitangi settlement insisted that 'ownership' meant the spiritual dimension of the traditional non-commodity economy. The zero dollars transaction symbolised the government's acceptance of 'ownership' as spiritual

guardianship, not commodity control. However, Ngai Tahu's interest in the international sale of greenstone show that the tribe operates in the real world of market commodities and capitalised resources. It is a private economic corporation like any other, where ownership means the privatised control of commodifiable and capitalised resources by individuals or corporations.

The cultural production of neotraditionalism by intellectuals of the ethnic elite has provided a codified body of knowledge referred to world-wide as 'indigenous knowledge'. In New Zealand education, this 'way of knowing' is regarded as commensurate with modern science, itself regarded as just another cultural way of knowledge. This extreme form of intellectual relativism, adopted by New Zealand's Ministry of Education, claims that there is a 'Maori world, with different Maori realities and Maori intellectual traditions' (MOE, 2003, p. 33). The separately constructed Maori world view 'like those of many indigenous people . . . forms the basis for a knowledge system that is distinctly different from other systems such as science and the Judaeo-Christian philosophies' (M. Durie, 2003, p. 13). There are serious consequences for New Zealand's education system if this faith-based 'way of knowing' becomes widespread in a system that exists in order to create and develop modern scientific thought based upon reason and doubt.

The control of Maori educational policy by the intellectual elite institutionalises and stabilises the cultural production of neotraditionalism, and in doing so consolidates the elite as custodians of Maori policy making. The influence of the elite on policy formation is supported by an ongoing alliance with those on the left who remain committed to ethnic politics despite its failure to achieve the social justice goals. It is a powerful ideological alliance and provides justification for ethnic-based policies in education, health, justice and throughout the public sector. This is despite growing concern that such policies actually create boundaries between ethnic groups as well as failing to assist disadvantaged Maori.

Mobilising strategies of 'rhetoric of indigenous identity' are used by elites 'pursuing policies based on class interest', Larson and Zalanga (2003, p. 77). Policy becomes the instrument of the neotraditionalist ideology as close links between policy and cultural ideology strengthen the elite's political influence. In this ideological climate, 'normative claims present a particular way of defining a problem and its solution, as if these were the only ways possible, while enforcing closure or silence on other ways of thinking or talking' (Shore and Wright, 1997, p. 3). This leads to the doctrinal orthodoxy associated with ethnic politics (often referred to as political correctness), where 'the discussion is over

as soon as someone mentions the word "indigenous" and associates a set of claims with it' (Waldron, 2002, p. 81).

The cultural production of neotraditionalism and its influence of policy formation is one important elite strategy. A second, and equally important strategy, involves the creation of an alliance with the democratic rights of the liberal tradition to justify the concept of indigenous group rights. This strategy creates a fundamental contradiction. In neotraditionalist ideology the liberal concept of political rights that adhere to humans beings is regarded as a Western cultural concept. Despite this, the ethnic elite makes claims for indigenous group rights, drawing on those liberal concepts of human rights. There are other contradictions that surface in the group rights claim. Indigenous group rights are a central strategy in the ethnic elite's ambitions for entrenched institutional, even constitutional power. Because these claims echo the discourse of social justice and participatory democracy of the ethnic mobilisation movements within which the elite first emerged, the group rights case receives enthusiastic support from the liberal left, social scientists, as well as serious consideration from politicians across the political spectrum. Such enthusiasm for group rights by liberals makes sense only in the context of the shift from class to identity politics in the 1970s. It was here that the liberal left aligned with ethnic movements and promoted ethnic politics as the inheritor of democratic freedom movements.

From the beginning, deep contradictions in this alliance undermined the democratic goals of ethnic mobilisation. First, as ethnic and indigenous movements became increasingly interested in re-creating traditional hierarchical systems, they did, in fact, turn away from emancipatory politics to a new reactionary politics. Second, democracy's potentiality for the 'tyranny of the majority', which had initially led to misgivings about democracy by ethnic minorities, is still not addressed by the group rights approach. Group rights were promoted as the solution to the 'failure of parliamentary forms of government to check and balance majority rule and safeguard minority rights and indigenous identity' (van Meijl, 1998, pp. 390–1). The limitations of representative democracy were to be overcome by recognising marginalised groups, often ethnic and indigenous minorities, in active or participatory democracy.

However, that argument initially used to support increased political participation now refers to creating institutional divisions between identified ethnic groups. Such permanent separation of ethnically categorised groups divided by institutional boundaries is in the interests of the ethnic elite because it justifies the elite's continued brokerage role as the representatives of the indigenous group. It is for this reason that

the ethnic group rights approach is a key strategy in the elite's politics. It is a way to ensure that the group for whom the elite claim representation is maintained and its role as the group's representatives is ongoing.

The English Common Law strategy

Given the importance of the ethnic group as a clearly differentiated and institutionalised group to the elite's political ambitions, a strategy to justify and stabilise this state of affairs is of key importance. This section examines the use of English Common Law by the New Zealand indigenous elite as a strategy to justify and stabilise the Maori neotribe at a permanent constitutional level.

The foundational indigenous group already has constitutional recognition in Malaysia and Fiji. In New Zealand, the indigenous elite, with support from culturalist academia, has embarked on a similar strategy, one that would lead to the recognition of the Maori tribal corporations (the neotribes) in the nation's constitutional arrangements. According to the neotribal elite and its supporters, such an arrangement is guaranteed by English Common Law – law which, they argue, predates the associational group of modern democratic politics.

> Most would say individual rights come first, but under our law, even if the treaty was extinguished, Maori rights do hold sway. Aboriginal title of customary rights exist in law separate from the Treaty – arising from a common law doctrine inherited from England and applied in Canada, United States and Australia. 'It is a recognition by the English legal system that the people who were here first gained an interest in property by virtue of that fact'. (Palmer cited in Barton, 2004)

In this argument the 'revived' foundational group has customary rights to constitutional recognition and economic resources. An example of this claim is from a neotribal legal activist and writer, who argues that 'the indigenous have a bundle of distinctive claims that may be seen as the natural consequences of their indigenous status. Indeed for most legal purposes their rights derive not from their culture but from their existence as political entities before the state's establishment' (Durie, 2005, p. 3).

There are a number of problems with this. First, the idea that there is continuity between the traditional and contemporary societies ignores the historical rupture caused when accumulatory capitalism replaced traditional redistributive economies (Rata, 2000). The contemporary neotribal organisation is a privatised economic corporation, not the

inheritor of the traditional tribe as claimed by the neotribal elite. Second, the appeal to English Common Law precedent overlooks the fact that the idea of continuity to ancient legal models is as ideological as the primordialism used in neotraditionalist arguments. In his discussion of Edmund Burke's writings, Hampsher-Monk (1992) points out that in the eighteenth century, appeals to English Common Law were also politically motivated.

> The English Common law argument – used politically since the early seventeenth century – that since precedent has always prevailed in English legal practice, our law, including our constitutional law, must be immemorial, or at least derived from ever more ancient models. (It is) not the fact that the English constitution, as it now stands, actually *is* as old as is claimed, that is the point; it may not even be true. The important point is the propensity of the English to claim their rights by appealing – rightly or wrongly – to past practice. We justify our rights not on abstract principles 'as the rights of men', but 'as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers'. Justification through appeals to antiquity – whether historically tenable or not – are part of English political culture. (Hampsher-Monk, 1992, p. 266)

Similar appeals to legal antiquity to justify political and economic rights is a strategy of the New Zealand neotribal elite. In encouraging 'judge-made constitutional development', Durie argues that 'the concepts of domestic dependent nations, aboriginal autonomy, aboriginal rights and treaty partnership are all from the bench over a period of about 170 years. They turn in effect to principles tracing back to the 15th century' (Durie, 2005). Ironically a group which seeks to differentiate itself from the state and claim rights based upon that differentiation uses a shared ideological strategy. Burke's reference to the continuity and inheritance ideology of the English could equally apply to the ethnic elite.

> The powerful prepossession towards antiquity, with which the minds of all our lawyers and legislators and all of the people whom they wish to influence, have been always filled; and the stationary policy of this kingdom is considering their most sacred rights and franchises as an *inheritance*. (cited in Hampsher-Monk, 1992, p. 267)

Even if one rejects the ideological nature of appeals to legal antiquity as a reason to reject the indigenous group rights argument – that

foundational group rights existed in English Common Law, that these rights have never been extinguished and that they remain the source of customary rights to property and political recognition – there is a third reason to criticise the argument. According to the nineteenth-century legal historian, F.W. Maitland, the foundational group is not, and has never been, part of the English constitution, even in Anglo-Saxon times. Alan Macfarlane's (2002) analysis of Maitland's research draws attention to its convincing evidence that individualism, not foundational grouping, was the distinguishing characteristic of Anglo-Saxon legal, economic and political relations. The individualised legal relation was the defining characteristic of English Common Law from very early times.

> Maitland had shown that not all civilisations had started in a world where individuals were embedded within the community, where contract was entirely subordinate to status, and where hierarchy and patriarchy were universal. (Macfarlane, 2002, p. 83)

Individuals and associations of individuals were recognised in various forms of contract at the beginning of the development of English Common Law. It is the individual (in these various forms of contractual trusts and associations), not the indivisible kin-group organisation, which is the basis of that law.

For these three reasons: the rupture between societies organised according to different socio-economic structures, the ideological nature of appeals to historical legal authority and the incompatibility of the foundational group with nation-states based upon contract not status – the elite's argument for the constitutional inclusion of ethnic and indigenous group rights in the democratic nation-state cannot be sustained without locating its justification in the elite's own self-interest. Yet, despite the contemporary source of ethnic institutionalisation in elite politics and the incompatibility of ethnic group rights with democracy, that constitutional status is already the case in Malaysia and Fiji. In New Zealand the neotribal elite is pursuing a pro-accumulation strategy that will enable the corporate tribes to acquire 'rights of self-government within the state' (Durie, 2005, p. 3).

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the failure of ethnic mobilisation to achieve its democratic goals to the complex and shifting interaction between

governments and ethnic groups in the last four decades of the twentieth century. The consequences of this re-channelling of what ostensibly began as a democratic movement are considerable, with at least three significant outcomes discernible in the current strategies of the ethnic elites. The first is the re-construction of state institutions – at a constitutional level in Fiji and Malaysia, and with the potential for such constitutional change in New Zealand. A second outcome is the way in which the new structures are filled with people categorised legally and politically in ethnic terms. This creates boundaries between each ethnically divided group and leads to ethnicised public policy. Finally, if the strategy of ethnic elites succeeds in institutionalising foundational group rights in democratic nations, the meaning and practice of citizenship in the very institution responsible for organising, regulating and protecting it – the nation-state – becomes severely undermined. Such ethnic politics has serious consequences for the ongoing structural cohesion of the nation-state itself. It also leads to the effective disempowerment of the majority of the very people that ethnic politics was ostensibly supposed to assist. Finally, institutionalised ethnic politics subordinates the individual within a backward-looking worldview, shackling people to an historically dubious concept of traditional collective society.

Notes

1. I use the terms 'ethnic', 'ethnicity' and 'ethnicised' to include 'indigenous', 'indigeneity' and 'indigenised'.
2. Foundational or kinship-based groups are not reducible to individual membership. They are non-divisible entities bound by kinship or ethnic/race bonds that exist outside and beyond the individual's agreement. In groups organised 'according to hereditary kinship and custom' the 'individual who acts is the group, not the organic persons who make it up' (Sharp, 2004, p. 5). By contrast, the associational group is a collective of individuals, bound together by a divisible contract.
3. The newspaper headline, 'Maori crime rate alarms ministry' (NZ Herald, 2005), with its references to domestic violence as well as other types of offending, is a direct echo of the reports that led initially to Maori mobilisation in the 1970s. 'While Maori make up about 15 percent of the population (they) account for 67 percent of all offending and more than half the country's prison population' (Stokes, 2005).
4. This group is 'sole Maori with low literacy, poor education and living in geographical concentrations that have socio-economic problems' (Chapple, 2000, p. 111).

4

Culturalism, Neo-liberalism and the State: The Rise and Fall of Neotraditionalist Ideologies in the South Pacific

Alain Babadzan

Whereas it has become fashionable in recent years to consider most Melanesian states as 'weak' or 'failed states', the time now seems ripe – 30 years after their independence – to review these states' ideological use of the invocation of culture and local traditions, or *kastom*, in a context marked by profound social, political and economic upheavals, coups d'état (two in Fiji, one in the Solomon Islands), a civil war (Bougainville) and Australia's neo-colonial re-engagement in the region. In many respects, the way in which the Melanesian elites have turned culture into a political symbol is strikingly reminiscent of the quasi-sacralisation of the Maori culture in the bi-cultural framework set up by the New Zealand state, albeit in a very different context. It may be enlightening to compare the two cases and to examine relations between state policies and culturalist ideology in a former colonial country, New Zealand and in the island states that the erstwhile colonisers are now declaring bankrupt.

Kastom as state ideology

Many observers have pointed out Melanesian states' failure to forge a national identity. Significantly, this failure concerns only the construction of a supposedly common identity based on an abstract, synthetic 'custom' (*kastom*) transcending ethnic and linguistic divides: the identity promoted by the urban elites in the wake of independence (Babadzan, 1988). Other forms of identification have been established (especially in urban areas) and diffused through schools, the media, popular urban culture, sport and so on (Jourdan, 1995). These may contribute towards

the development of a feeling of belonging to a national community, or even trigger patriotic identification with the state, without reference necessarily being made to the common possession of a *kastom* or to the cultural past in general. What has failed is the typically nationalistic (Western and modern) construction of an ethno-cultural fiction, that of the nation as a community of culture.

From the time of independence (and in some cases even prior to that, as in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu), the local elites that the colonial powers had prepared to govern their countries went to great lengths to diffuse a neotraditionalist ideology and to officialise it as state ideology. *Kastom*, as defined by the nationalists of the Pacific, consists of a rather loose set of features and practices that have been selected to represent the traditional culture and are supposedly peculiar to the nation. These items have the property of generally being a set of concrete objects (art, architecture, sculptures, painting, crafts) or objectifiable practices (songs, dances, ceremonial interactions, rituals, oral traditions), all of which can be exhibited (photographed, recorded) and function as metonymies of a reified traditional culture. As in the conceptions of nineteenth-century European folklorism, this culture is represented as 'a thing made out of things' (Handler, 1984, p. 61). But *kastom* corresponds not only to this great inventory of reified and folklorised productions that have been severed from their original social and cultural context and are exhibited by Pacific arts festivals, museums and cultural centres. It is also defined as the timeless essence of a cultural identity understood as a national collective identity. Hence, the emblems of national culture have taken on one of the crucial characteristics of a religious symbols. As matter that is also spirit, the incarnation of the people's soul (*Volksgeist*), these objects function as mediums for belief in and proof of the existence of the transcendent realities that they reveal. The folkloric reification of custom implemented by the state cannot be dissociated from a symbolic process of essentialisation. This sacralisation of 'identity' and culture (as native, traditional and authentic) is accompanied by a negative symbolisation of Westernisation, represented as cultural decline.

State discourse on *kastom* reflects its authors' internalisation of certain Western values and themes, so that it can be defined as a dominated discourse. We observe, *inter alia*, the (inverted) heritage of missionary representations of the tradition/modernity relationship, as well as that of European ethno-cultural conceptions of culture, the nation (as a community of culture) and the state (as the nation's political roof). But this dominated discourse is also one of domination. Produced by urban elites with the encouragement of numerous international

organisations,[1] it was displayed in the new rituals of the post-independence states: the arts and culture festivals. The role of these festivals was decisive in presenting and stimulating thought on the foundations of national unity by representing it as a set of local differences reduced to simple folkloric variations on a common national model (Babadzan, 1988).

The main purpose of the diffusion of this national mythology was the promotion of national integration via the production of belief in the existence (and transcendence) of a social and political whole based eternally on *kastom*. This goal was particularly difficult to attain since the belief had to be spread among peoples of a wide linguistic diversity and different religious traditions. Moreover, the identity discourse helped to obscure the conditions of the emergence of the new dominant classes by emphasising the irrelevance of internal social divisions and by striving to produce a representation of the past that obliterated the social history of the colonial period and the conditions in which those social classes had appeared. It also contributed towards recognition of the urban elites' domination as legitimate (because 'traditional'), by presenting it as a continuation of forms of pre-European domination. The *kastom* ideology furthermore served to mask the contradiction between a nominal independence and a constantly increasing dependence on former colonial powers, by nurturing the belief in the possibility of a 'customary way' towards modernisation. In this conception, the 'customary genius', of which the depositories were supposed to be the local dominant classes, would know how to make wise choices in the future and reconcile development with custom.

Even though the Melanesian states have certainly failed in their attempt to base national unity on a feeling of common belonging, the state *kastom* ideology has clearly succeeded in having the effect of imposing a problematic on the entire social sphere. All discourses on *kastom*, both nationally and locally, in the religious and political domains, draw on its categories. In the absence of an ideological alternative, the culturalist ideology of custom seems to have reached the status of 'discursive hegemony'. There is not a single Melanesian local leader who does not refer to it, including (and perhaps especially) to question state authority. One of the reasons for the failure of the nation-building enterprise is clearly the fact that its ideology has served to strengthen local particularisms or secessionisms which, whether old or new, all oppose the state. The celebration of the national identity as *kastom* has been at the origin of many misunderstandings (to say the least) at local level, especially due to the fuzziness of its supposedly

official definition. This blanket apology of an abstract national heritage refers to neither a concrete social group nor a specific historical period. (It relates just as easily to the pre-Christian era as to the colonial period marked by the conversion to Christianity, the imposition on local peoples of stereotypical representations of their identity and culture and the adoption of 'traditions' invented by the colonisers.) Such imprecision and ambiguity correspond to the objective of mass diffusion of a representation designed to integrate population groups that are profoundly diverse from a social, cultural and religious point of view. The philo-customary discourse can thus be put to the service of a wide variety of local agendas, from conservatism to modernism, including attempts to deny the contradictions between *kastom* and capitalism 'by making *bisnis* [business] a collective venture of the community' (Keesing, 1982, pp. 371–372).

A new hands-on policy

Above all, this ideology of national unification has ironically made it possible to powerfully relay and reinforce everything that local pro-*kastom* discourses already contained in the form of an anti-colonial subversive charge and a challenge to state authority. The failure of the state's custom-based ideology to bridge internal divisions became evident with the exacerbation of conflict in Bougainville (1988–1998), the military coups in Fiji (1987–2000) and the crisis that drove the Solomon Islands to the brink of civil war (1998–2003). This was also the period in which Australia, the tutelary power in the region, clearly reorientated its approach to the Pacific Island countries and opted for a hands-on policy, including direct military intervention.[2]

This conversion of the relationship that former colonial powers in the region had maintained since the independence of their colonies was prepared by the virulent criticism by influential Australian neo-liberal think tanks against local regimes, their use of international aid and the corruption of their elites. Several Pacific countries were denounced as tax havens sheltered activities ranging from the sale of passports to smuggling and money laundering, through diverse forms of trafficking (Internet pornography, dot.com deals, flag of convenience shipping registries, etc.). An 'arch of instability' was said to stretch from Aceh to Fiji via Ambon, Timor, West Papua, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands (Fry, 2000, p. 296). On the eve of Australian military intervention in the Solomon Islands, several Pacific countries were described as 'weak States' or even 'failed States' by Australian

think tanks. Their decay was supposed to make them probable shelters for international terrorist activities, or likely to become rogue states themselves.[3] This type of analysis served as justification for the military operations launched in the Pacific, in a context marked by Australia's wish to play its part in the 'war on terror' declared by George W. Bush.

But the first signs of Australian re-engagement in the region appeared before 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002. In October 2000, under pressure from Australia and New Zealand, the Pacific Island Forum adopted the Biketawa Declaration authorising interference in the internal affairs of member countries in times of crisis. On his return from a visit to George Bush on his Texan ranch in May 2003, in the wake of the United States' second entry into war against Iraq, Australian Prime Minister John Howard obtained the election of an Australian as secretary general of the Forum. This was contrary to common practice of reserving this position for a Pacific Islander. Australian troops landed on the Solomon Islands on 24 July 2003.

The strengthening of the former colonial powers' grip was also reflected after 2001 in the acceleration of economic aspects of the regional integration process, through the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) and the Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). It was crowned by a 'Pacific Plan' finally adopted by the leaders of the Forum in October 2005. These agreements were in line with the structural adjustment plans (SAP) imposed on countries of the South Pacific by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The 'reforms' involve the application of the standard neo-liberal agenda, officially approved in 1997 in Cairns during the first meeting of the Forum Economic Ministers (FEMM). The agenda includes liberalisation of international trade, abolition of tariffs, 'downsizing' of the state, promotion of 'good governance', privatisation of public services, flexibility of the labour market and development of the private sector and 'civil society'.

The question of aid became particularly sensitive in Australia after the publication of an essay entitled 'Aid has failed the Pacific', by the Centre for Independent Studies (Hugues, 2003), which set out most of the arguments justifying Australian interventionism in the region. Since then, aid provided by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank has been closely bound to the implementation of these 'reform' programmes. After the end of the Cold War, Australian aid to the Pacific Island countries was radically reorientated. Formerly allocated directly to state budgets, and thus contributing towards the growth of the public sector, it now tends to be tied aid-linked to specific projects, including

economic 'reform' and 'governance'. Priority is given to governments 'seen to be addressing structural reforms' (ACFOA, 2002, p. 10).

The convergence of geo-strategic and economic concerns explains why in this new context only one discourse is now heard. It is a discourse common to international funding agencies, regional powers, the media and conservative think tanks – all the heralds of neo-liberal theses presented as panaceas for development, good governance and the struggle against poverty (ADB, 2004, 2004a). Despite their reluctance, Pacific Island leaders have had no alternative but to submit to the new *doxa* imposed by Australia and its allies. Criticising the 'reforms' has become all the more difficult in the context of the supposed connection with 'security' and the 'war on terror'.

War on *kastom*

Neo-liberal analyses of the economic stagnation and political situation of Pacific Island countries often reveal significant differences, especially regarding the nature of international aid, foreign military and police presence, or the degree of political decentralisation to implement. But of interest to us here is the fact that they share the same critical relationship with indigenous cultures of the Pacific.

Large-scale corruption of politicians and hypertrophy of the state and public services are allegedly caused by the cronyism and nepotism (*'wantokism'*) inherent in local political cultures.[4] Customary obligations of reciprocity are said to justify practices ranging from counter-gifts to voters, to the plundering of the state's resources, as in the case of the Solomon Islands crisis where demands for 'customary compensation' resulted in state bankruptcy (Fraenkel, 2004). In this perspective, dysfunctions of Melanesian political systems are presented as the result of the unsuccessful grafting of the state on the multiplicity of traditional political structures (ASPI, 2004, p. 27). The state's failure to build up a feeling of national unity is thus related to the persistence of (supposedly eternal) local ethnicities which, asserted more and more forcefully, are challenging state authority and may even lead to civil unrest, violence and political instability.

Local elites have consequently (for the first time) come under strong criticism from former colonial powers and international funding agencies. The theme of corruption[5] has allowed a facile delegitimisation of their status, whereas for a quarter of a century no one seemed concerned. Access to state power is presented as a way to personal enrichment and the instrument of patronage strategies (Reilly, 2000; Hegarty, 2004).

These elites are thus increasingly accused of either misappropriating the benefits of whatever growth local economies have managed to generate, or opposing the implementation of policies likely to allow growth (Hugues, 2003, p. 1; 2004, p. 10).

Criticism of *kastom* has converged on economic even more than political systems. Although local traditions seem to be an impediment to regional stability and good governance, they are above all considered as an obstacle to 'reforms' (what was formerly called 'an obstacle to development'). Here all the fires are concentrated on traditional land tenure. The communal ownership of land is accused of being an obstacle to agricultural productivity and to the development of exports, in so far as it discourages individual initiatives. These are supposed to be able to flourish only in a 'secure' tenure system, that is one based on individual ownership rights. Impediments to the privatisation of land, due to custom, are also seen as an obstacle to the use of individually owned land as a security (Hugues, 2003, p. 17; ADB, 1999, p. 213). 'Secure access to land' is considered to be one of the necessary conditions to attract foreign direct investment by 'improving the investment climate' (ADB, 1999; ADB, 2004, pp. 89–90). And 'obstacles to reform' are indeed numerous: the threats weighing on traditional land tenure as a result of SAP are a cause of mass protest movements that it would be wrong to interpret as the result of the subversive action of anthropologists concerned to preserve their 'living museums', or of 'urban socialists headed by local and expatriate university staff and their students' (Hugues, 2004, p. 5). In PNG, the 'land mobilisation programme' launched by the World Bank had to be suspended in 1995 after unprecedented popular protest in the country.

The most important economic interests in the region are related to the mining and petroleum industries, and concern mainly PNG. When international financing organisations talk about 'securing access to land', it is the security of those investments that they have in mind, above all. The long conflict in Bougainville around the Panguna copper mine is still fresh in everyone's memory. A gigantic gas pipeline project, estimated at about four billion Australian dollars, is to be built between PNG and Queensland under the aegis of Esso Highlands Ltd (Exxon-Mobil), and the question of access to underground resources needs to be solved as a matter of urgency. The completion of what will be the longest pipeline in the southern hemisphere implies the identification of the customary owners to ensure that no opposition prevents the exploitation of the deposit and the transportation of gas over a distance of some 300 kilometres through the Southern Highlands to the Coral Sea.[6]

From 1992, Chevron Niugini Ltd (Chevron) paved the way by deciding to use legislation passed on the eve of independence (Land Group Incorporation Act, 1974) to allow customary landowners to register as 'land groups' so that they could hold group titles to their lands (Marru, 2002, p. 2). This legislation, initially intended to secure timber rights, was used by Chevron for the distribution of petroleum royalties (Fingleton, 2004). Over 10,000 incorporated land groups were declared, with considerable social repercussions leading to the creation of ad hoc social groups, the reification of traditional 'clans' and the fragmentation of kinship groups into family units and even individuals (Marru, 2002, p. 5).

The sharing of oil royalties has thus led to substantial changes in social organisation and to the appearance of new conflicts and social cleavages. As we will see, this situation is reminiscent of that of the Maoris of New Zealand, whose kinship units, also 'incorporated', have been politically integrated into the state-imposed game of biculturalism, and economically incorporated in what Elizabeth Rata (2000) has called 'neo-tribal capitalism'.

The twilight of state *kastom*

The new context in which international relations and the economic policies imposed on the Pacific Islands countries are defined has triggered a crisis in the political legitimacy of the ruling elites. The post-independence period, characterised by the absence of direct intervention of former colonial powers, is now something of the past. Gone with it are the reification and essentialisation of *kastom* as an emblem of national identity, the celebration of which formerly served the governing elites to legitimise their political authority and social position. The invocation of traditions is henceforth considered as an obstacle to the rationalisation of politics and an encouragement to all those opposed to 'reform'. It is as if political legitimacy could no longer come from anywhere but the outside: international funding agencies and former colonial powers are the only ones authorised to award certificates of 'good governance'.

Kastom is receiving a bad press at a time when corruption, cronyism and *wantokism* are increasingly under attack. The invocation of traditions is accused of spurring ethnic-based mobilisations that result in secession or coups d'état, as for instance in Fiji where the coups led to the exclusion from political life of nearly half of the population of Indian origin. Faced with the threat of dissolution of certain Melanesian States, several studies have highlighted the need to put nation-building back onto the political agenda (e.g. ASPI, 2004; Kabutaulaka, 2005), but the

proposals put forward in this respect seem to be trapped between contradictory injunctions. How can nation-building be promoted without strengthening states claimed to be corrupt and parasitical, and whose downsizing is already planned? How can one be sure not to give free rein to ethno-nationalist ideologies, whose apology for local cultural values as opposed to Western democratic ones has been suspect since the Fiji coups d'état and the eruption of religious fundamentalisms on the international political scene? As in the case of President Mahatir's 'Asian values' (Lawson, 1996), Western policy-makers are now wary of Melanesian *kastom* which 'does not constitute an adequate basis for modern government' (Hegarty, 2004, p. 6). It is therefore both from the bottom-up (decentralisation, privatisation and development of 'civil society') and from the top-down (integration into a supra-regional entity) that the states of the Pacific are being deconstructed by subjecting them directly to the market and the tutelary authority of former colonial powers.

The goal of the Pacific Plan ratified in October 2005, by the leaders of Pacific Islands Forum member countries, is the application of a neo-liberal agenda of economic and political 'reforms'. Until now, the irreversibility of the process, the social cost of the application of the measures imposed and the loss of sovereignty that it implied for each state in the region have triggered very little opposition by local leaders. Significantly, that purely formal protest has not been formulated in the usual register of respect for cultural identities. Note that today Forum declarations make very little reference to culture and even less to the 'Pacific Way' (Graham, 2005, p. 14). At the August 2005 Forum meeting in Apia, the Pacific Way had been replaced by a 'Pacific Vision', the 'main instrument' of which is said to be nothing other than the Pacific Plan itself.

The celebration of culture and traditions can no longer have a political role. That phase is over, at least in the Pacific Islands, and despite appearances it has probably already reached its zenith in New Zealand.

Tribes inc.

In New Zealand, officialisation of biculturalism has impacted decisively on the institutionalisation of Maori claims. After being political in the 1960s, these demands became cultural before referring to an ethnic then tribal identity (Rata, 2005a). The state's introduction of neo-liberal policies and the dismantling of the welfare state from the mid-1980s led to the devolution to Maori organisations of public services concerning Maoris (health, employment, training etc.). This

neo-liberal turn accelerated the transformation of Maori tribes (*iwi*) into bureaucratised social organisations 'defined primarily by [their] economic functions' (Rata, 2003b), that operate as 'service providers' and managers of tribal assets.

This transformation of the traditional *iwi* has been accompanied by the emergence in urban areas of new Maori organisations, nicknamed 'urban *iwi*'. These organisations, in which membership is no longer kinship-related, are demanding recognition as representatives of the Maori people as a whole, independently of tribal affiliations (Sharp, 2003). At an early stage the two types of tribe started to compete for public resources allocated by the state to Maori communities, while traditional *iwi* opposed each other in their struggle over, for example, the fishing quota resource.

As in the Pacific Islands, state intervention has played a decisive part in New Zealand in renewing the political importance of culture. Official (bi)culturalist ideology has institutionalised a Maori ontological peculiarity (based on the European nineteenth-century ethno-cultural model, modified under the influence of campus post-modernism), and ratified the fiction of the direct continuity between pre-modern and modern neo-tribes by presenting social and economic relations within these tribes as anchored in community traditions.

It seems possible to assume that in New Zealand as well, culturalism – still triumphant today – will soon become an impediment to the evolution of these neo-tribal enterprises towards full integration in the globalised market. This integration will involve the transformation into goods or capital of that which is still considered to be the unalienable collective asset of tribes, their land. Certain tribes' call for foreign investment is unquestionably a sign of the change of scale of this process of economic integration, a process which is never compatible with strong cultural particularisms.

Maori neo-tribal elites seem to need culturalism today for two main reasons: First, in the framework of their partnership and negotiation with the state on the subject of a settlement for despoilment from the colonial period, which makes it indispensable for the neo-tribes to be recognised as the direct heirs of the tribes whose chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840; and second, for the purpose of legitimisation of the new inequalities and internal social divisions that have appeared within the process of current change. It is clear that there will soon be nothing left to negotiate under the Treaty of Waitangi since the government is eager to reach a final settlement as soon as possible, precisely so that it can accelerate a process of economic normalisation. In addition

the postulate of the continuity of social and economic organisation of traditional tribes is being undermined from all sides by the evolution of 'neo-tribal capitalism' as well as the conflicts developing within Maoridom. These conflicts include the challenge by urban *iwi* (consisting of urban and often 'detribalised' Maori), to traditional tribes' claims to talk on behalf of the Maori people as a whole.[7]

Is culture likely to fade off the *political* scene in New Zealand as well as in the Pacific Islands? This scenario is plausible in so far as it seems more and more difficult to resort to neotraditionalist ideologies to legitimise the economic, political and social order spawned by globalisation. In both cases the neo-liberal turn plays an essential part. The only place that is now reserved for culture seems to be that of folklore or exotic goods destined for the world market. And in that market, not even the ethnic label will always be necessary. Even if ethnic labels are required in the marketing of products closely associated with a local image (such as tourism, craftwork or organic farm products), the labels are tending to disappear elsewhere. This is the case in leading places of the international art scene where native producers can be fully integrated as international artists only after their works have departed to some extent from signs of exotism and local identity. In any case, culture is currently expected to have broken away from politics, and may even have begun to discard precise references to social places of origin. This is the condition on which indigenous cultures, turned into abstract and interchangeable goods, can still be celebrated at the Pacific Arts Festival and other cultural centres such as the Jean-Marie Tjibaou Cultural Centre in Noumea (New Caledonia). Such a monument, one that can be seen as the unintended cenotaph of the political defeat of the independence movement, is of no interest to anyone and least of all to the Kanaks.

The indigenous societies of the Pacific have already crossed several waves of globalisation, from religious conversion to culturalist nationalism. It is now time to focus on the social and cultural consequences of the new phase that is appearing today, as the celebration of 'identities' and 'differences' seems to have been removed from the neo-liberal agenda.

Notes

1. The historical context in which these ideologies appeared in the region (1970–80), marked by the end of the Vietnam War, is also that of the independences in the Pacific and, more generally, of the upsurge of 'identity' claims. The

nationalisms of the Pacific elites received support from all over, provided that they remained strictly cultural (and anti-communist). The prototype of the genre is the Pacific Way (Mara, Crocombe) and had several local versions: the Melanesian Way (Narokobi) in Papua New Guinea and the Melanesian Socialism (Lini) in Vanuatu (on the latter and for an early critique of the Pacific Way, cf. Howard, 1983).

2. With the assistance of New Zealand and other Pacific countries, and under cover of a regional mandate, Australia headed the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003. In Bougainville, it led the Peace Monitoring Group (May 1998–June 2003) and the Bougainville Transition Team (June 2003–December 2003). Police forces have been deployed since December 2003 in Papua New Guinea under the Enhanced Cooperation Programme.
3. 'Unless there is a sharp change of direction in PNG, the prospect not merely of a failed State but a rogue State (like those of Amin, Mobutu, Bokassa and Mugabe in Africa [. . .]) cannot be lightly dismissed' (Hugues, 2003, p. 2). Cf. also ASPI (2003, p. 16) on 'risks posed by rogue States like Iraq'.
4. Amidst an abundant literature, see Morgan, 2005, p. 4.
5. On the international construction of a new discourse on corruption, see Coeurdray, 2004.
6. The project also has a geo-strategic dimension. In April 2002, Michael Jeffery warned that the Australian oil and mining industry was vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Maritime transport from Singapore 'could be vulnerable to interdiction in a higher threat sense or in a terrorist sense if someone wants to grab a boat or grab a gas tanker or do something like that' (http://www.ogtoday.com/archives/0204/022104/022304b17.html). Prime Minister John Howard appointed Michael Jeffery as Governor General of Australia in June 2003. This ex-general was commander of Australian forces in colonial PNG from 1970 to independence in 1975, then commander of SAS (Special Air Services) from 1975 to 1981 and head of Australian counter-terrorism agency (PSCC, Protective Services Coordinating Centre) from 1981 to 1983.
7. Eighty-three per cent of Maoris were living in urban areas during the 1996 population census and most of them had a very distant relationship with the Maori culture. One in four people of Maori ethnicity spoke the Maori language and 19 per cent said that they did not know which tribe (*iwi*) they belonged to.

5

The Paradox of Indigenous Rights: The Controversy around the Foreshore and the Seabed in New Zealand

Toon van Meijl

The concept of indigenous rights has become subject of international debates as well as of political discussions in nation-states where a significant proportion of the population claims indigenous status in contrast to a majority of migrant settlers. The concept of indigenous rights developed from the human rights discourse after the Second World War, the latter derived from the liberal discourse. The indigenous rights paradox arises from that shared base. Human rights are based on the notion of a universal individual, whereas claims for indigenous rights are invariably argued on behalf of collective groups. This paradox means that special rights for a group of people within a liberal-democratic nation-state, in this case on the basis of their indigeneity, must not contradict or violate the human rights of individuals as embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This chapter is a discussion of the paradox in the context of international legal and anthropological debates about indigeneity and indigenous rights. It is illustrated with a case study about whether New Zealand Maori should be entitled to ownership of New Zealand's beaches, or whether these should belong to the public domain of New Zealand.

Indigenous peoples have emerged over the past thirty years as important subjects of international law and global actors aspiring to the recognition of their collective rights on the basis of their indigeneity. This is remarkable since only a hundred years ago they were considered doomed to extinction. When this belief became increasingly disproved in the course of the twentieth century, policies were developed to assimilate indigenous peoples into the mainstream of newly independent nation-states. Since the 1960s, however, spokespersons for indigenous peoples have articulated a very different view of their destiny.

Not prepared to abandon their culture and identity, they are advocating the right to self-determination. This view is embedded in a Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, first presented for debate when the United Nations (UN) proclaimed the Year of Indigenous Populations in 1993. In 1994 this was extended into an International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples. Since the Draft Declaration was still far from being accepted by the end of the first decade, the UN declared a Second Decade of Indigenous Peoples in the year 2004.

Since indigenous peoples were long the objects of anthropological study, it is unsurprising that the recent attention for indigenous peoples and their rights has also sparked off new debates within anthropology. The discussion focuses mainly on the universal applicability of the term 'indigenous' and its legal implications for the recognition of group-differentiated rights within liberal-democratic nation-states. At the same time, however, the concept of indigenous is considered by some as indefinable and therefore inherently problematic. The latter view was recently argued again forcefully by a reputed anthropologist, Adam Kuper (2003), who claimed that the theoretical and conceptual foundation of the notion of indigenous rights is an essentialist ideology that creates and amplifies the differences among ethnic groups and thus exacerbates ethnic frictions. His provocative paper elicited an interesting debate about the politics of the term 'indigenous', its various interpretations and also its legal implications.[1] Although some critics did not reject Kuper's polemic paper outright, others have accused him of being blind to the suffering of indigenous peoples arguing that his argument serves to reinforce the processes that disempower them and deny their contemporary and historical experiences of dispossession and marginalisation. For that reason, too, they advocate a more relational approach towards indigeneity, to be understood as a response to processes of dispossession and severe discrimination (Kenrick and Lewis, 2004). In this chapter, I contribute to this topical debate in the light of a recent controversy between the indigenous minority and the settler majority in New Zealand.

New Zealand is widely believed to be a country with enviable relations between the indigenous Maori population and immigrant settlers and their descendants, in spite of a colonial history of dispossession and displacement. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi initially functioned mainly as a license for large-scale migration from Britain. Since 1987, New Zealand governments have developed the concept of a Treaty partnership containing mutual obligations and responsibilities. Throughout

the 1990s a process of historical grievances settlements was undertaken with land and resources returned to Maori ownership, supplemented with monetary compensation for those resources since privatised that can no longer be returned. This process, however, was disrupted dramatically in 2003 by what became known as the controversy around the foreshore and the seabed in New Zealand.

This controversy revolved around the legal question whether Maori, as the country's indigenous population, should be granted the right to claim ownership of the country's foreshore and the seabed or whether these should belong to the public domain of New Zealand society. Politically and morally, however, the debate focused on the meaning of the concepts of indigeneity and indigenous rights. I will argue that a relational interpretation of the term indigenous might help to unpack, if not depoliticise, the polarisation of ethnic relationships. A relational approach of indigeneity interprets the term as describing one side in a relationship between certain unequally powerful groups of people and conceptualises indigenous rights as a strategy for resisting historical dispossession. Before illustrating the analytical value of this perspective on indigeneity in a casestudy of the dispute about the foreshore and the seabed in New Zealand, however, it will be useful to elaborate the history of the concepts of indigenous peoples and indigenous rights in more detail.

The rise of indigeneity and human rights

Indigenous identity may be regarded as a product of international law and, in particular, the human rights movement. After all, the use of the term indigenous in reference to a distinct group of people is relatively recent. From its earliest use in the seventeenth century until the mid-twentieth century it did not generally apply to people, but it was used almost exclusively in reference to plants and livestock native to a particular region (Niezen, 2005). Only after the Second World War was it common to use the term 'indigenous' in reference to human societies. This followed the establishment of the UN in 1945 and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees equal rights 'without distinction of any kind' (cited in Chernela, 2005, p. 14). This phrase, among others, initiated a debate about the rights of indigenous populations in the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In 1953 the ILO published the first international report on indigenous peoples, entitled 'Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working conditions of Aboriginal Populations in Independent Countries'. This report marks the

beginning of a process that aims to recognise the special position held by indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. It is also important to note, in terms of the indigenous rights paradox that was to develop, that the recognition process was intimately intertwined with emerging attention for human rights standards.

The human rights effort in respect to indigeneity began modestly, with the adoption by the ILO in 1957 of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention #107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (Niezen, 2005, p. 539). Although this convention was composed without direct consultation with the people concerned, it was the first international juridical instrument to address indigenous peoples and their rights. In the 1970s, however, leaders of indigenous peoples themselves became involved in the international debate about their rights, criticising ILO Convention #107 as encouraging assimilation and integration. These leaders shifted the focus of the debate to the discrimination of indigenous peoples, a concern taken seriously by the UN Commission on Human Rights. In 1982 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established and in 2002 this formal recognition of indigenous peoples as a distinct human rights concern was reinforced with the establishment of the Permanent United Nations Forum for Indigenous Issues.

The emergence of indigenous issues in international discourses about human rights follows the worldwide decline of assimilation policies, which ultimately aimed at the elimination of unwanted minorities within modern nation-states. This is not to say, however, that the logical counterpart of assimilation, which is the right to self-determination or even sovereignty, has meanwhile become a feasible option for indigenous peoples. Even the United Nations continues to limit the scope of political possibilities for indigenous peoples by steadfastly refusing any legal characterisation of them as 'peoples', which in plural form denotes rights in international law to self-determination. This is also the main reason why the recognition of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reached stalemate during the first Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples. The bottleneck in this debate is that indigenous demands for the recognition of difference, including assertions of self-determination and sovereignty, are irreconcilable with the focus on equality within liberal-democratic discourses on human rights. Thus, paradoxically, the rise of indigeneity within human rights discourses is simultaneously hampered by the grounding of human rights in a liberal perspective on equality.

Human rights are now universal in the sense that 'virtually all states have formally endorsed them' and citizens and organisations of all kinds 'invoke them' (Asad, 2000, p. 2), but at the same time indigenous rights remain deeply controversial at national and local levels. Objections to special rights for indigenous groups are ironically also phrased in terms of a so-called 'universal' human rights discourse. Indigenous land rights, for example, are argued to violate the rights of non-indigenous citizens. Thus, both indigenous and non-indigenous people invoke legal arguments to achieve their own ends, and both claim that their human rights are not recognised. Talal Asad (2003) seeks to explain this paradox with reference to the increasing dominance of legal discourses in the emergence of the nation-state, in which even the essence of humans has come to be circumscribed by legal language. 'The human being', he argues, has come to be seen as 'a *sovereign, self-owning agent – essentially suspicious of other – and* not merely a subject conscious of his or her own identity. It is on this basis that the secularist principle of the right to freedom of belief and expression was crafted' (p. 135). It is important to add to this insight that the rights of individual persons can only be enforced by secular states. This is particularly obvious in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that confirms 'the inherent dignity' and 'the equal and inalienable rights of all members of *the human family*' after which it turns immediately to the responsibility of sovereign states to protect human rights (p. 137). The relationship between rights-bearing individuals and states raises, in turn, the inevitable question regarding the precise nature of their association. In this context, Asad refers to Foucault who drew attention to their strained connection with his argument that citizens, or subjects in his terminology, are 'at once the object of the state's care and a means of securing its own power' (p. 137).

The tension between the moral invocation of 'universal humanity' on the one hand and the power of the state to identify, apply and maintain the law on the other hand remains unresolved in contemporary societies. It parallels the imbalanced relationship between universalism and particularism in liberal theory and between individual rights and collective rights, making it one of the most challenging issues in social theory (e.g. Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, 2001; Messer, 1993; Nagengast and Turner, 1997; Taylor, 1992; Thompson, 1997; Turner, 1997; Wilson and Mitchell, 2003). In liberal society, individual rights always take precedence over collective goals. This position is rooted in the philosophy of Immanual Kant, who understood human dignity as founded mainly in the autonomy of individuals. As a consequence, the demand

for equal dignity has become enshrined in the liberal discourse of human rights, which, paradoxically, renders the demand not amenable to difference, because the same discourse insists on a uniform interpretation of these rights. For that reason, too, this discourse considers a society pursuing collective goals by definition as violating the rights of the individual to self-expression and self-determination.

The dichotomy between individual rights and collective rights in liberalism is also reflected in the debate about the struggle of indigenous peoples for the recognition of their difference and their claims to self-government. In recent years, several attempts have been made to break new conceptual ground by developing innovative modes of cultural and political belonging for indigenous minorities within liberal political theory. The volume entitled *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (Ivison, Patton, and Sanders, 2000), for example, tried to review the age-old liberal oppositions between universalism and particularism as vantage points on a political spectrum within which new forms of coexistence among different peoples, indigenous, exogenous and immigrant, must be negotiated. Since the incompatibility of individual rights with their universal application and the intolerance of collective goals in liberal discourse have become particularly problematic within contemporary, increasingly multicultural, societies, some of the more sophisticated contributions to resolving the classic dilemma of 'unity in diversity and diversity in unity' have been made by Canadian philosophers, notably Charles Taylor (1992) and Will Kymlicka (1995, 2000, 2001). Kymlicka, in particular, has written extensively on the relationships between ethnic minorities, particularly indigenous minorities, and liberal-democratic, multicultural nation-states (see also Bowen, 2000). His point of departure is that minority rights cannot be subsumed under the category of human rights. Therefore, group-specific rights are necessary to accommodate structural differences in cultural orientation and economic status between dominant majorities and subordinate minorities. He seeks a solution for the dilemma of liberalism in a combination of universal rights for individuals, irrespective of their group affiliation, and certain group-differentiated rights for ethnic minorities. He recognises that the entrenchment of a 'special status' for minorities has been abused by the Nazis and other apologists of racial segregation, such as the Apartheid Regime in South Africa. This is one reason why, he argues, a liberal theory of minority rights must not only combine minority rights with human rights, but also limit minority rights by the principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 6).

Indigeneity besieged

Kymlicka's subtle arguments do not meet with a sympathetic response across the political spectrum. As mentioned above, Adam Kuper (2003)[2] recently launched a severe attack on the concept of indigeneity precisely because he lumped the demand for indigenous rights together in the same category as the 'blood and soil' argument of the Nazis and other right-wing, anti-immigrant movements in Europe using essentialist and anthropologically obsolete assumptions about culture. By equating indigenous and right-wing arguments and thereby oversimplifying complex relationships and histories, Kuper implicitly rejected Kymlicka's widely acclaimed attempts to transcend the ancient dichotomies between universalism and particularism as well. In view of the debate that was sparked off by Kuper's views, it is useful to examine his arguments and the response he received in more detail.

Kuper's objections to the increasing attention for indigenous rights are threefold. First, he argues that any definition of the term 'indigenous' is by definition elusive. In general, the term indigenous brings to mind minorities of surviving indigenes encapsulated by First World countries, such as North American Indians and Inuit, Australian Aborigines, Polynesian Hawaiians and the New Zealand Maori. Beyond the First World the concept of indigenous peoples is also used in reference to Bushmen of South Africa, South American Indians, the Ainu in Japan and some groupings living in the tropical rainforests in Southeast Asia. The Saami and the Basques, however, make similar claims against the dominant host societies in which they are embedded. Furthermore, claims to indigeneity are also expressed in Britain and Ireland, where the cultural revival of the Welsh, the Gaelic and the Scottish, including the bid for Scottish home rule, are cast in terms of an arguably older cultural disposition than the dominant Anglo-Saxons (cf. Kolig, 2002, p. 15). These wildly different claims to indigeneity from across a broad variety of ethnic minorities in many different countries illustrate, according to Kuper, that it is difficult to define the term 'indigenous' accurately, which makes it in fact a meaningless concept.

The problems with the circumscription of the term 'indigenous' are particularly obvious in a comparison of claims by indigenous peoples who are represented in the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, with claims to indigeneity by right-wing, nationalist Europeans asserting doctrinarily their indigeneity *vis-à-vis* recent immigrants, mainly from the Islamic world and sub-Saharan Africa, fearing for national European cultures to be swamped and eventually lost.

Kuper rejects this so-called 'blood and soil' type of argument for political reasons, but also because it is used to justify indigenous resistance against international embargoes of, for example, whale hunting and the killing of seals for fur trade purposes. The same argument is thus used to legitimise a range of different, sometimes even contradictory, views across the political spectrum. Kuper discusses this variety of viewpoints in the same context since, in his opinion, they all share a common foundation in an essentialist ideology of primitivism. In that sense, Kuper (2003, p. 389) argues, the terms 'native' and 'indigenous' are euphemisms for what used to be labelled 'primitive' in nineteenth-century anthropology (see also Béteille, 1998). Indeed, Kuper contends that the rhetoric of indigenous peoples and indigenous rights is based on premises of cultural continuity that can no longer be maintained in contemporary anthropology.

This point is intertwined with Kuper's third objection to the term 'indigenous', which targets the political implications of the advance of the international movement for indigenous rights. In his opinion, the indigenous peoples' movement sometimes sabotages rational policies of development by effectively proposing a form of 'apartheid' (2003, p. 393). Indigenous demands for special rights are usually made at the expense of the common good of nation-states and therefore create new problems by exacerbating local ethnic frictions. In addition, special rights for indigenous peoples foster not only appeals to racist criteria for favouring or excluding other groupings, but they also invite others to make up new identities in order to be able to claim indigeneity. The best example of the invention of indigeneity for political purposes is, according to Kuper, the indigenous movement itself, which, in his opinion, has been initiated and promoted by the United Nations and other international development agencies.

In view of Kuper's critique of the political use of the concept 'indigenous' and the indigenous peoples' movement, it cannot be surprising that he received an equally critical response in *Current Anthropology*'s Forum on Anthropology in Public, but also elsewhere (see note 1). In the whole range of responses to Kuper's provocative article, two major points have been brought forward by a number of contributors. First, the indigenous peoples' movement may use strategic essentialism in their constructions of community, but the indigenous peoples themselves must not be essentialised either. Since indigenous issues traverse the rural and urban, the pre-modern as well as the post-modern, indigenous peoples cannot be made monolithic, as Kuper does. After all, Kuper does not pay any attention to the multiple responses to systematic disenfranchisement that also operates differently in various indigenous societies

around the globe. Second, Kuper ignores the context of disenfranchisement and, often extreme, discrimination of indigenous peoples and their manifold experiences with dispossession by more powerful groups. Any exploratory analysis of the marginalisation of many indigenous peoples throughout the world cannot avoid the systematic denial of their human rights in the history of colonisation. As Terence Turner pointed out in his 2004 response, Kuper fails to take into account that indigenous people usually attempt to end their economic exploitation and political disempowerment, not simply by defending their cultural differences, but by defending the opposite idea that cultural differences must not be used to justify the marginalisation of indigenous people.

In contrast to Kuper's essentialist definition of 'indigenous', several commentators and critics suggested that the term be understood in a relational rather than an essentialist way. A relational understanding of the concept departs from the fundamental issues of power and dispossession that those calling themselves 'indigenous' are concerned to address. In a relational approach, 'indigenous' describes one side of a relationship, the side which has been dispossessed, rather than some quintessential primitive as Kuper would have it. By the same token, the concept of 'indigenous rights' in a relational perspective is interpreted as a strategy for resisting dispossession that employs a language understood by those wielding power (Kenrick & Lewis, 2004, p. 9). This perspective on indigeneity as a dimension of unequal power relationships has also been incorporated in the working definition of 'indigenous populations' that has been formulated under the auspices of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). The WGIP has outlined four important principles for the definition of indigenous peoples: (1) priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory; (2) the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; (3) self-identification as a distinct collectivity and the recognition as such by other groups and state authorities and (4) an experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist (p. 5). Although these criteria are invariably open to interpretation, strategic use and opportunism, an important conclusion to be drawn from these principles is that the indigenous peoples' movement must necessarily be understood in the context of the complex strands of colonial history that have resulted in their marginalisation throughout the world.

Indeed, any perspective on indigenous peoples that ignores the power dimension of their predicament is inadequate since the movement for

the recognition of indigenous rights is best understood as a response to processes of severe discrimination and dispossession. For that reason, too, claims for special rights made by indigenous peoples do not have the same basis or meaning as claims for equal rights made by non-indigenous people seeking to defend their post-colonial positions of authority of which they fear they are under threat. In order to establish the difference between indigenous and non-indigenous claims, it is inevitable to engage in empirical research at historically specific locations. Since appeals to rights are inherently problematic in view of their universal import, it is also necessary to examine the history of indigenous and non-indigenous claims. Thus, rather than simply criticising indigenous peoples for using essentialist concepts, as Kuper seems to do, it makes more sense to examine empirically how, in specific contexts, 'universal' concepts of rights, equality and belonging reflect complex power relationships and an open space for contradictory claims and identities. Hence I will present a case study of an ethnic dispute between Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand in the next section.

The foreshore[3] and the seabed

The controversy around the foreshore and the seabed in New Zealand revolves around the interpretation of the concept of customary rights, also labelled the doctrine of aboriginal title or native title, which recognises legal continuity in indigenous property rights upon the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over their territory. This domain of law is completely distinct from the Treaty of Waitangi, which in the strict sense of the term did not create or alter Maori property rights. The Treaty of Waitangi did not extinguish Maori customary rights, which are ensured by English Common Law. Native title can be extinguished only through voluntary relinquishment by the indigenous owners when they sell or cede land or other resources to the Crown. Extinguishment can also occur by statute or by abandonment. In New Zealand, native title has largely been extinguished since the Crown exercised its right to purchase Maori customary land and because the Maori Land Court transferred customary land to individual freehold titles (McHugh, 1991).

The interpretation of Maori customary rights, however, is characterised by a rocky history in New Zealand. During the first few decades after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed it was confirmed in several court decisions, but between 1877 and 1986 the treaty failed to exist in the eyes of the New Zealand courts (Ruru, 2004, pp. 59–61). In 1986 the legal situation changed dramatically. A Maori fisherman, Tom Te Weehi,

appealed his conviction of gathering undersized *paua* (a species of shellfish) in a District Court. He claimed that, at the time of committing the alleged offence, he was exercising a customary fishing right, protected by Section 88 (2) of the Fisheries Act 1983, which provides that 'nothing in this act shall affect any Maori fishing right'. Considering the implications of this Act, the High Court judge rejected the restrictive approach to Maori customary fishing rights expressed in earlier judicial decisions, and accepted the view that customary rights based on aboriginal title continue after the transfer of sovereignty until extinguished explicitly by law (McHugh, 1991, pp. 130–1). Needless to say, this ruling represented a revolutionary reversal of judicial attitudes towards Maori customary rights.

The customary rights claimed by Tom Te Weehi were non-territorial, but the ruling in his case also sparked off tribal investigations into territorial titles that could be reclaimed to full ownership. In 1993 the new Maori Land Act (Te Ture Whenua Maori Act) was made to provide for the Maori Land Court to investigate and determine if certain blocks of land hold the status of Maori customary land. The main question in the recent controversy around the foreshore and the seabed, however, concerned whether land under water has remained Maori land protected by the doctrine of aboriginal title. The foreshore is the area between the high water mark and the low water mark or the 'wet' part of the beach that is covered by the ebb and flow of the tides. The seabed is the area from the low water mark to the outer limits of the territorial sea. The question regarding the proprietary status of the foreshore and the seabed emerged among several tribes on the South Island, frustrated in their attempts to establish marine farms on land that they believed was customarily theirs. They submitted their case to the Maori Land Court, but a legal dispute emerged about the question whether aboriginal title can exist in regard to the foreshore and the seabed, and also whether it can exist to the extent of exclusive ownership. Six years of litigation about these questions culminated in a verdict of the Court of Appeal, announced on 19 June 2003, that avoided declaring that such land exists in New Zealand, but it did rule that Maori should be offered the opportunity to proceed with their application to the Maori Land Court.

Since the ruling of the Court of Appeal did not foreclose the possibility of Maori being able to effectively obtain private ownership of the foreshore and the seabed, the New Zealand government immediately responded by proclaiming its intention to enshrine Crown ownership of the foreshore and the seabed in law. The government justified its plan

by arguing that it had a responsibility to regulate the rights and interests of *all* New Zealand citizens, which included guaranteeing public access to the country's beaches for everyone. At the same time, the government made it clear that it would recognise Maori ancestral connections to specific areas in its legislation by offering to protect existing rights to undertake customary activities. Despite the recognition and protection of Maori customary rights in the government's proposal, it met with a public outcry from Maori people throughout the country since they could no longer take their claims to the Maori Land Court. What was initially a local issue soon became a national controversy. The foreshore and the seabed became subject of everyday debates in all dimensions of New Zealand society. It dramatically reinforced ethnic tension between Maori and non-Maori.

The recent polarisation of ethnic groups in New Zealand was deeply rooted in the paradox of indigenous rights and their potential interference with the rights and interests of non-indigenous New Zealanders. The Maori argued that the proposed policy was yet another attempt to confiscate their indigenous rights, while the non-Maori generally supported the government's attempt to secure free access to the beach for all citizens. Strictly speaking, the beach is not part of the foreshore, yet free access to the beach became the main subject of debate. In this context, it should be noted that 'the beach' is an important asset to New Zealanders, who treasure the country's long coastline as one of the main sources of recreation and relaxation. It is also important to point out that the response from the New Zealand public must be situated against the background of recent policies of settling Maori colonial grievances, regarded by many people as excessive. Over the past decade many Maori tribes have been given back land and other natural resources in compensation for violations of the Treaty of Waitangi in the nineteenth century but, rather than creating social justice for dispossessed Maori, this policy seems to be transforming chiefly ranked Maori into a corporate elite since the majority of the Maori population does not seem to benefit directly from the settlement policies (Kolig, 2005; Rata, 2000).

In August 2003 the Government released a consultative paper entitled '*Protecting Public Access and Customary Rights*', concretely proposing the new policy that was to be premised on the principles of access for all New Zealanders and protection of customary rights for 'any group of New Zealanders' that had, since 1840, had exclusive use and occupation of a part of the public foreshore and seabed. It emphasised that New Zealand is one nation and that public access to the beaches had to be protected

for everyone but, at the same time, it enabled the continuation of Maori customary rights in areas where these had been exercised since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Two months after the consultation began, the government had received 2171 written submissions regarding its policy proposal. Some 12 per cent of the submissions were made by Maori people who rejected the proposal almost unanimously on grounds of their indigeneity and the fact that they were no longer offered the opportunity to have their claims examined by the courts. The reception of the government's policy by non-Maori, on the other hand, was mixed, but many clearly dreaded the prospect that freehold ownership might be created over the foreshore and the seabed. Most, therefore, supported the government's proposal to introduce legislation to vest the foreshore and the seabed into the public domain of New Zealand society. Eventually, the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 came into force on 17 January 2005. It provides for 'Crown ownership of the public foreshore and the seabed on behalf of all New Zealanders' while 'protecting existing customary rights and interests' at the same time.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the legal and political details of the debate about the foreshore and the seabed in New Zealand at any length. The main point here concerns the stark polarisation of the debate about the rights of indigenous peoples, which illustrates the paradox of indigenous rights to the extent that they may contradict the universal rights of individual citizens. Prominent lawyers have described the government's move to annul the court's decision as a serious breach of constitutional conventions (Ruru, 2004, p. 66), a viewpoint endorsed in a report by the Waitangi Tribunal (2004). One year later the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2005, p. 2) also stated that the Foreshore and Seabed Act 'appeared . . . on balance, to contain discriminatory aspects against the Maori . . .'. These statements in support of Maori claims to customary title have caused some Maori to condemn the government's policy and the new legislation as another expropriation of Maori property rights, even though legally the situation is somewhat more complicated (Ruru, 2004, p. 67). On the other hand, however, judging by the new victory of the governing Labour Party during the most recent elections in October 2005, the passing of the Foreshore and Seabed Act in January 2005 seems to be supported by the majority of the New Zealand population, mostly non-indigenous, but including sections of the Maori population who also voted Labour again. In some sense, this outcome illustrates that the limitation of group-differentiated rights for Maori, in this case customary rights to the

foreshore and the seabed, by a liberal perspective which also recognises the universal rights of individual New Zealand citizens to have free access to the country's beaches, constitutes a pragmatic solution to a difficult dilemma and does, in essence, parallel Kymlicka's resolution of the paradox of indigenous rights.

Conclusion

The New Zealand government's proposal to protect the interests of the general public against the potential privatisation of the country's beaches invoked a serious outcry among Maori throughout the country. Against the background of a colonial history of dispossession and marginalisation, Maori immediately considered the move to vest the foreshore and the seabed into Crown ownership as a confiscation of their property rights, even though their prospects to secure Maori ownership to the foreshore and the seabed were by no means certain. In the past they only had the possibility to submit a claim about it to the Maori Land Court, which in case it would be upheld by the Court would invariably be subjected to serious limitations of use. Notwithstanding these restrictive parameters of the legal process, the government's policy to check and balance Maori customary rights against the interests of the general public caused Maori to condemn the government's proceedings very vigorously. This, in turn, reinforced the widespread belief among the New Zealand population that, without government intervention, the privatisation of the country's popular beaches, in the name of customary rights, would be inevitable. It could be argued that the combination of customary rights for indigenous people in New Zealand with a universal perspective on the interests of the public at large is an innovative implementation of Kymlicka's theoretical suggestion to tackle the paradox of indigenous rights by combining customary rights for indigenous groups with universal rights for individual citizens.

Notes

1. Comments on Kuper's argument were published with his response directly after his article in *Current Anthropology*, 2003, 44(3), 389–402, but see also *Current Anthropology*, 2004, 45(2), 261–7; Barnard, 2004; Kenrick and Lewis, 2004; Mackey, 2005.

2. Kuper's article was reprinted in the British magazine the *New Humanist* (2003, p. 118(3), 5–8), and illustrated with a cartoon that equated indigenous struggles with European fascism (Kenrick and Lewis, 2004, p. 4).
3. The foreshore is not contested only in New Zealand; for comparative case-studies see Boissevain and Selwyn, 2004.

6

Ethnicity in Business: The Case of New Zealand Maori

Martin Devlin

In New Zealand, especially since the Maori Development Summit Conference of 1984, successive governments have implemented affirmative action policies to encourage and assist Maori (defined as a person descended from a New Zealand Maori) to start new enterprises either collectively or individually. These policies include direct funding, facilitation and advisory services available to Maori only through the Ministry of Maori Development/Te Puni Kokiri (TPK). Training courses in the management and governance of Maori trusts and incorporations are offered by the Ministry of Economic Development. Additionally, there is tax relief and other assistance which is available only to Maori (Gilchrist, 2004; Milne, 2000). Two imperatives underlie this strategy. First, leaving aside difficulties of definition, entrepreneurship is claimed to be 'the prime mover in the process of economic growth and development' (Harper, 2003, p. 3). Second, entrepreneurship is actively promoted by many governments as a means of improving the economic and social status of different ethnic groups (De Bruin and Mataira, 2003, pp. 169–170).

These affirmative action policies and their often-uncontested implementation by various state agencies including universities are, nevertheless, open to serious challenge. Exactly what *is* an ethnic business? Does ethnicity, *per se*, confer advantages or disadvantages upon such businesses? Do ethnically defined businesses perform better or worse than any other type of business? In the case of New Zealand's Maori people, what is a 'Maori' business? Is there such a thing as an 'ethnic economy' and, in New Zealand's case, what specifically is the 'Maori economy' so frequently referred to?

This chapter provides a critical analysis of these questions using Maori as a case study. It will be shown that the concepts of ethnic

economics and ethnic business are actually more about governmental rhetoric designed primarily for political and ideological consumption, than they are about any well thought out, soundly researched strategies with the potential to materially assist marginalised groups. Thus, it is contended that concepts such as Maori business, a Maori economy, Maori management and governance, and Maori entrepreneurship have no real substance and that policies based on these concepts have clearly failed to improve the economic advancement of Maori. Evidence is presented which challenges the notion that successful Maori businesses will inevitably lead to a strong Maori economy and establishes that Maori business is essentially no different from any other business, despite the appearance of a distinctive ethnic character.

Accordingly, the chapter begins by critically examining recent statements by politicians, academics and Maori leaders, who claim that there *is* such a thing as Maori business; that it is possible to identify a Maori economy; that there are definable bodies of knowledge called Maori management and Maori governance and that Maori entrepreneurs lead the world in entrepreneurship rankings. Next, the chapter will discuss the issues of culture and ethnicity in business. It is contended that whilst such issues may give the *appearance* of a distinctly ethnic business, in substance such issues are simply a subset of business generally, are largely irrelevant in business, and may in fact mitigate against successful business performance. Finally, the chapter returns to its initial hypothesis that ethnicity in business is more about ideological and political agendas than it is about the support of a unique and exciting new business paradigm.

Maori business claims: Rhetoric and reality

It should be pointed out that the definition of an 'ethnic' economy is of relatively recent origin (Bonacich and Modell, 1980). Here, ethnicity is most often defined as 'a communalistic form of social affiliation depending, first, on assumptions of a special bond among people of like origin, and second, upon the obverse, a disdain for people of dissimilar origins' (p. 1). An ethnic economy, therefore, is 'any *ethnic* or immigrant group's self-employed, its employers, their co-ethnic employees and their unpaid family workers' (Bonacich and Modell, cited in Light and Gold, 2000, p. 9).

Likewise, interest in ethnic economies is relatively recent (Bates, 1997; De Bruin and Mataira, 2003; Harper, 2003). Has this interest shown that proactive self-employment policies for ethnic groups are successful?

Bates (1997) studied the relative business performance of self-employed Asian immigrants and African-Americans. He found that 'success in self-employment varies little between immigrant groups and non-immigrant groups or across racial-ethnic groups in contemporary America' (p. 1). The people most likely to be successful in self-employment are highly educated and skilled, and often possess significant personal financial resources.

Conversely, those low in human and financial capital (called class resources) have higher rates of failure and exit from self-employment. Bates (1997) defined *social* capital as resources which 'flow from ethnic solidarity [and encompassing] such phenomena as social networks, ethnic ideologies and inclinations, and employer paternalism' (p. 15). He went on, however, to cite research which found that social capital was not proven to be beneficial to successful self-employment. Bates therefore argued that 'social capital is associated with firm weakness because weak firms use social capital, whereas strong firms do not' (p. 256). He concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that social capital is directly linked to better business performance, and that ethnicity in relation to successful self-employment is at best, neutral. Light and Gold (2000), however, contend that social capital *does* contribute positively to successful self-employment. By redefining the Bonacich and Modell ethnic economy model as 'an ethnic-controlled economy', they claim that ethnic firms exhibit market power (through clustering), preferential employment of co-ethnics, successful securing of government procurement programmes and provide upward mobility for ethnic groups (pp. 24–5).

Who then should we believe? With this international research in mind, what is the New Zealand situation? As of February 2004, the total number of enterprises in New Zealand totalled 324,293 (MED, 2005, p. 7). Of this total, a mere 1774 enterprises employed more than 100 people, whilst 86.8 per cent employed five or fewer people, and 64.7 per cent had *no* employees. Within this population, the data for New Zealand Maori (estimated to comprise 15 per cent of the New Zealand population) comprised 3.1 per cent who were employers and 6.5 per cent who were self-employed with no employees (p. 31). Maori are thus clearly and significantly underrepresented, both as employers and as self-employed, compared to their proportion of the New Zealand population.

These statistics not withstanding, a number of claims in recent times have been made about Maori business, including that there is a Maori economy and that it is more profitable than the rest of the New Zealand

economy (TPK/NZIER, 2003); that Maori are significantly more entrepreneurial than other New Zealanders and that, taken alone as a discrete group, are the fourth most entrepreneurial people in the world (UNITEC, 2004, pp. 22–30); that Maori businesses are more innovative than other businesses (*Dominion Post*, 2004, C4); that Maori owner-managers are more innovative and entrepreneurial and that Maori owned and managed businesses are in many respects superior to other businesses (*Dominion Post*, 2004, C4); that a Maori business model or paradigm exists (French, 1998); that Maori management is a subject with a definable body of knowledge and that Maori business is a university-level subject worthy of study and certification as distinct from western business courses. A further study released by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Fredrick, 2005) has revealed that Maori are now the world's *third* most entrepreneurial people. They are not technology shy, they possess high growth expectations and, more than other New Zealanders (71.3–60.5 per cent), they believed that starting a business was a good career choice ('Call for government support for Maori entrepreneurs', 2006). Despite the dubious nature of these claims, they remain uninvestigated and challenged. The purpose of this chapter is to provide that investigation. For ease of discussion, the claims are combined into four groups: the existence of a Maori economy, the concept of Maori business, Maori entrepreneurship and a uniquely Maori management and governance paradigm.

The emergence of a Maori economy

The New Zealand government claims the existence of a specific Maori economy, which is outperforming the general New Zealand economy in some respects. The Maori economy is defined as 'the assets owned by and income earned by Maori including collectivelyowned trusts and incorporations, Maori-owned businesses (e.g. tourism, broadcasting and the self-employed), service providers (especially in health and education) and the housing owned by Maori' (TPK/NZIER, 2003, p. 7). But on virtually every economic measure employed, the Maori economy is performing abjectly poorer than the general economy. On only two measures ('higher rate of savings' and 'profitability') does the Maori economy appear to perform better, but this is because of the non-distribution of income to beneficiaries and the absence of a *government* sector. The report contains a number of serious negative statistics, particularly Maori unemployment, at almost three times the overall New Zealand level; low Maori employment in knowledge-based

industries (only 4–5 per cent); and 22 per cent of the Maori population receiving benefits. According to the Ministry of Maori Development, TPK staff (Personal communication, 2005), one of the reasons for identifying a 'Maori' economy was to show that Maori are actually contributing to the economy, rather than being a drain upon it. The Maori contribution, however, is clearly and negatively disproportionate. Another reason for identifying a Maori economy was to highlight the economic gaps between Maori and the rest of the population.

The concept of Maori business

The concept of Maori business is both confusing and elusive. One definition of a Maori business is a business with 51 per cent or more *ownership* by Maori (TPK Maori Business Facilitation Service, 2005). The term has also been used to describe *any* business activity in which Maori may have any involvement (Durie, 2003a, p. 246). It can mean a business in which Maori cultural values *(tikanga)* play some part, as well as businesses such as Tamaki Tours Ltd where services provide tourists with an authentic Maori cultural experience – or cultural tourism. It can refer to individual, collectively owned or national business activities (De Bruin and Mataira, 2003).

Despite the lack of evidence to support the concept of Maori business as substantially different from business involving people from other ethnic groups, courses in Maori business have simply appeared in a number of New Zealand tertiary institutions and in traditional Maori settings such as marae (Promotional Brochures, 2005). These courses are facilitated by Maori providers and delivered to Maori audiences. In some cases, the content and delivery of such courses does not appear to have received the same rigorous scrutiny as other academic courses. The lack of debate about the existence of a university discipline named Maori business studies is symptomatic of a wider problem in New Zealand society whereby to openly challenge either the ideological bases or the political motives underpinning Maori affirmative action policies or their intellectual and philosophical content is to invite accusations of at best, cultural insensitivity or, worse, racism. Considered academic debate is *not* encouraged (Tremewan, 2005, pp. 4–6).

Only a very small amount of literature on Maori business exists, virtually none of it is empirically based. Dare (cited in Niven, 1993) was one of the earliest commentators to raise the question of a separate, different and distinctly Maori view of business and management. He identified a collective, as opposed to individualistic, ethic; traditional

Maori communitarianism and the guardianship of the environment, as key elements in a Maori approach to business. Henry (1994) took a socio-political view of various Maori-owned organisations that have arisen as a result of legislation enacted 'to address the inequities and weaknesses of previous laws governing Maori activity' (p. 154). She makes no mention of individual Maori businesses. Her study is important, however, because it illustrates and underlines the extent to which collectively owned Maori organisations are funded, controlled and/or directed by government.

French (1998) is the most often-quoted researcher on this specific topic. His survey of 156 'predominantly Maori business people on Poutama Trusts's business database' (p. 4) found that the three most important parameters for defining a Maori business were: degree of Maori ownership, the aims and goals of the business, and management methods and practices. While his results were not able to provide a single definition for a Maori business, French concluded, however, that Maori *ownership* measured through ethnicity questions in census data, similar to the self-identification approach used in the Electoral Amendment Act, would reveal the extent and dynamics, over time, of Maori business.[1]

Light (2002), writing about a successful Maori incorporation (Wakatu), comments that 'Maori business is a unique form of commerce within a cultural and historical context' (p. 16), on the basis that board members are also shareholders, and in a cultural context, take more interest in the activities of the organisation as custodians of land and other assets, than other corporate shareholders. Durie (2003, p. 246) takes a much more generalised approach to defining a Maori business when he states, 'if Maori are involved, then in some way or another it may be considered a Maori business'. He identifies what he calls a 'Maori-centred' business and provides a set of 'guiding principles' to support the concept. Neither the concept nor the guiding principles have been tested empirically.

In the theoretical construct of two distinctive business paradigms, Maori business and Western business, is business success defined differently? For example, Western measures of a successful business include profitability, share price, dividends, rates of return and a host of other measures including more recent approaches to sustainability, triple bottom-line reporting and the increasing involvement of stakeholders. Maori-owned businesses, on the other hand, appear to include success measures such as long-term ownership and sustainability of assets, communalistic processes of discussion and decision-making, different

accountabilities (to the wider social group) and the more widespread involvement of families (whanau). However, a comparative study of success (and failure) factors in general and Maori-owned businesses has not yet been undertaken. The defining claims made by the above writers can be found in the wider 'western' business literature under such sub-disciplines as co-operatives, family business, group processes, consensus decision-making, communalism, ethnic economies and ethnic entrepreneurs, and are not unique to Maori. Consequently, whilst there are plenty of examples of people of Maori descent engaged in business activities, there is no evidence of a uniquely Maori business paradigm and no empirical evidence or serious academic work is available to support the view that Maori-owned and/or operated businesses perform better or worse than any other kind of business. Unfortunately, lack of evidence has not stopped the Minister for Maori Affairs claiming recently that Maori are ranked 'the most entrepreneurial people in the world' (cited in Brown, 2005).

'The most entrepreneurial people in the world'

Such populist slogans found their way into the political arena in the 2005 general election, with Maori Party candidates claiming: 'We [Maori] enjoy the highest level of entrepreneurship and participation in business amongst indigenous peoples' (Poananga, 2005). These claims emanate from the Global Enterprise Monitor (Fredrick, 2005) Reports, which attempted to measure 'entrepreneurship' in New Zealand. GEM uses a very narrow, and in this author's view, inappropriate and inadequate definition of an 'entrepreneur' (Fredrick, 2001, p. 48). It involves the Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) Index, a combination of nascent businesses (not operating but being actively contemplated) and new businesses (less than 42 months old). The TEA rate represents the share of working and adult age individuals (18–64 years old) who are *either* actively trying to start new entrepreneurial companies, or who are currently acting as owner-managers of new entrepreneurial companies. The GEM data do not extend to identifying the proportion of 'entrepreneurs' including Maori, who are still at the nascent stage of business start-ups, compared to current owner-managers. In simple terms, establishing or *attempting* to establish a business automatically defines one as an entrepreneur. There appears to be a major discrepancy between the GEM data of Maori participation in 2001 (19 per cent) and the number of Maori self-employed and employers from the 2001 census at 9.6 per cent (MED, 2005, p. 31). The difference may be partly explained

by the presence of Maori in the GEM data who are 'contemplating' or 'actively trying' to start a business, whereas the Census data measures actual start-ups. Based solely on the claimed level of Maori participation in the 2001 survey (19 per cent), the GEM authors concluded that 'Maori are every bit as entrepreneurial as European New Zealanders' (p. 9). By the time of the 2003–04 survey, the authors were claiming 'the prodigious achievement of Maori entrepreneurs'. Maori were 'more entrepreneurial than the rest of the population. Seventeen per cent had "attempted" to start a business in the past 3 years compared to 13.3 per cent of "non-Maori" ' (Fredrick, 2005, p. 8). Furthermore, 'if Maori were their own country, it would rank as the fourth most entrepreneurial country in the world' (p. 8).

Whilst the GEM Reports are a creditable attempt to measure entrepreneurship on a longitudinal and international scale, the definition of entrepreneurship used is obviously inadequate. There is a substantial literature on the subject of entrepreneurship, in which there are many definitions which go far beyond the definition used in the GEM reports. Cameron and Massey (1999) point out that the terms 'entrepreneur' and 'operator of a small business' are often used interchangeably – as is the case with the GEM reports. 'Broadly speaking, the view that all people in small business are "entrepreneurs" is commonly found in America and Canada, whereas in New Zealand, Australia and Britain, entrepreneurs are regarded as the innovative, opportunistic and risk-taking subset of the SME sector' (p. 39). Entrepreneurship also includes risk-taking, opportunism, innovation, vision and energy. The narrow and simplistic approach taken by GEM is concerned only with an actual or intended *action* and ignores the other elements entirely.

Mataira (2000a) explored 'the ability and capacity of Maori tribal leaders and tribal structures to develop effective business enterprises and account for their use of 'other peoples' money' that belongs to past, current and future tribal beneficiaries' (p. 27). He highlights the tension between traditional tribal tikanga (discussed in greater detail below) and the capitalist profit motive – a tension he believes is almost irreconcilable. However, such tensions are well covered in the existing literature surrounding *family* business. Like the TPK/NZIER Report (2003), Mataira ignores the literature on ethnic economies and ethnic entrepreneurship. In his (very) limited field interviews, virtually all the comments made by respondents refer to their success being achieved in spite of the constraints imposed by cultural factors or by avoiding cultural factors altogether. Only the support of family was generally seen by respondents as a positive and influential factor – a finding already well

documented in the literature on family business. Mataira's study also attempts to portray tribal leadership of significant Maori organisations, such as trusts and incorporations, in an entrepreneurial light (later more fully articulated by De Bruin and Mataira, 2003).

Whilst the entrepreneurship literature is mainly focused on individual entrepreneurs, there is a literature dealing with group entrepreneurship, and 'collective' entrepreneurship, in such areas as cooperatives and buyer groups, demonstrating that Maori 'collective' entrepreneurship described by Mataira is not at all unique or unusual. Harper argues that individualistic cultural values are not categorically superior to group-oriented values in terms of their consequences for entrepreneurial discovery (2003, p. 3). Rather, he says, 'we can expect some group-oriented cultures to exhibit considerable entrepreneurial talent' and uses several Asian economies as examples (pp. 130–131). It is neither uncommon nor unique, therefore, for groups with a common culture to engage in collective entrepreneurial activities.

Zapalska, Perry and Dabb (2003) surveyed 56 Maori entrepreneurial (undefined) firms selected by Trade New Zealand. Their objective was 'to examine the nature of Maori enterprises and to analyse the environment for development and growth of the Maori entrepreneurial firms [*sic*] in the reforming economy of New Zealand' (p. 1). The number of Maori entrepreneurial firms which comprised individuals and/or families, compared to tribal collectives, is not stated. The results show that whilst there is a concentration of businesses in farming and fishing, and a focus on the family, Maori businesses experience the same issues and problems of small and medium enterprises anywhere. Besides some methodological shortcomings, and the lack of a comparative (non-Maori) sample, this study adds little if anything of significance to the literature on Maori entrepreneurs, as does a later paper by the same authors (Zapalska *et al*, 2003).

Claims that Maori are expert and world-leading entrepreneurs is a cynical take on an inadequate definition. There is nothing in the literature which would indicate, or lend support to claims, that Maori in business are any more entrepreneurial than anyone else. On the contrary, a 2004 study by Frederick and Henry suggests Maori may be less entrepreneurial than entrepreneurs generally, because of societal and cultural factors. Exaggerated claims of Maori entrepreneurial abilities could lead to more Maori business start-ups, itself a problem given the high proportion of new ventures that fail (Cameron and Massey, 1999; MED, 2005; Tweed and McGregor, 2004).

Maori management and governance

Various writers and commentators have questioned whether a separate, definable paradigm for Maori management and/or governance exists. N. Love's (cited in Niven, 1993) interviews of managers of Maori descent identified a consensus approach to decision-making as a 'distinctly Maori approach', and held that in order to manage effectively, Maori managers must have total support and respect from their group because the ultimate responsibility of Maori managers is to the people, not necessarily their immediate superior. Similarly Moon (1995) investigated the existence of a uniquely Maori style of management. However, he contended that not only does it not exist, but also that the nature of what is claimed by those as being a 'Maori management style' is so general as to be meaningless. Moon concluded:

> Of course, analysts have been completely unable to put their fingers on this management style and so have had to resort to baffling their audiences with a combination of supporting statistics and the persuasive promise of impending economic success. (p. 24)

Tapsell (1997) argued that Maori managers, like all others, must manage the finance, operations and marketing functions of an organisation. However, she asserted that differences between Maori-managed organisations and other organisations, included the following: Maori have had to be conservative managers due to legislative constraints on organisations such as trusts and incorporations; Maori are managing future generations' inheritance so are unlikely to take entrepreneurial risks and historical connections between *iwi* (tribes) are resulting in increased networking.

Love (2004, p. C4) is more specific, claiming that Maori management employs more caution and consultation with governance characterised by a stronger interaction with employees and clients and a steady commitment to community. He also claims that Maori owners tend to have a long-term strategy and a particular ability to innovate, have a broader vision because of a culture that balances several influences, 'are able to think "out of the box", and that gives them an advantage over competitors'. Maori businesses were not constrained by a permanent drive to maximise assets. Unlike most 'non-Maori' companies, shareholder value generally did not take precedence over sustainable development models, ecological concerns and family needs. Given Love's high profile – as a former Dean of Business at Massey

University, former CEO of the Ministry of Maori Development and a professor at Victoria University's Management School – some credence ought to be ascribed to his comments, which suggest that a significant amount of comparative analysis between Maori business and other businesses has taken place. Unfortunately, he provides no evidence to substantiate these claims. Interestingly, the Wakatu Incorporation, referred to earlier in Light (2002), found it needed to run its commercial operations according to 'western' practices by separating management activities from governance activities. This separation of *tikanga* Maori at a governance level, from operational management, is also apparently quite common in other 'Maori' businesses, according to Love (Personal communication, 2005). One obvious explanation is that wealth *creation* through business activity is quite different from wealth *distribution*, in which cultural factors might well play a prominent part.

A report commissioned by TPK and the Federation of Maori Authorities (FOMA, 2003) surveyed ten successful Maori businesses to gain insights into governance and management. There is nothing in this report to suggest that the management and governance of the sample of successful Maori-owned businesses is different in any significant way from any other business. The success measures used are clearly generic 'western' measures and no attempt is made to either establish uniquely Maori success measures nor the degree to which such measures were either achieved or not achieved. The report is pitched in a way to present these businesses as successful examples of Maori-owned businesses which serve a political purpose as role models for Maori to aspire to and, in the process, act as a counter to the negative stereotyping of Maori businesses found in the New Zealand media. No claim to uniqueness can therefore be made.

If there was to be a claim to Maori uniqueness in business, it might well be found in the area of governance. Modlik (2004), in an article concerning political appointments of Maori directors to government boards, raises several issues which, it is held, form the basis for claims that Maori management and governance differ from 'western' management. Modlik suggests that tension between being responsible to the appointing minister, or to his/her relevant tribal grouping is an issue. He identifies cultural factors including leadership based on *mana* (status), *whakapapa* (genealogy) and *matauranga* (Maori knowledge) as opposed to merit; a lack of differentiation between governance and management roles; consensus versus majority decision-making; engagement rituals and wider cultural influences such as individualism and materialism,

as points of difference. The article is an indicator of a possibly unique New Zealand approach to governance 'Kiwi Style' (Devlin, 2004). The TPK/FOMA report (2003) also identifies a number of governance issues relating to Maori organisations, including the problem of appointing directors according to whakapapa (genealogy) and/or tikanga, at the expense of key skills and business experience. However, these are insufficient grounds for claiming a separate and unique Maori governance paradigm.

Story (2005), writing on Maori governance, suggests that there is a basic problem combining legislative governance requirements and peculiar *iwi* (tribal) situations, particularly the requirements to deal with substantial financial and other resources arising from Treaty of Waitangi monetary settlements, in the absence of skilled, experienced Maori/Iwi directors. Wheeler, an *iwi* Maori adviser and consultant (quoted in Story, 2005), claims that whilst good governance should not be sacrificed for cultural factors, the principles of effective corporate governance must be 'located within the Maori world view'. Notwithstanding, he goes on to say that 'the expectation . . . that Maori governance is fundamentally different is both intellectually bankrupt and fraught with danger' (p. 8).

A further indication of the contradictions that exist in discussions of Maori governance is Story's (2005) assertions 'that Maori organisations, to varying degrees, are flat out learning the fundamentals and application of good governance "*Pakeha-style*" ' (p. 9). Gray, another *iwi* adviser (cited in Story, 2005), posits that Maori organisations misunderstand that Maori culture (*tikanga Maori*) is only a *form of process* while the fundamentals of governance remain unchanged. Comer, TPK's Chief Executive (cited in Story, 2005, p. 9), does not believe that good governance should be 'shanghaied by culture', but he is also quick to refer to (unidentified) international research suggesting collective governance practices based on culture are more successful than those which are not.

There appears to be confusion about whether or not a uniquely Maori approach to corporate governance does exist. Whilst *tikanga Maori* may be practiced by way of protocols, consensus, shareholder engagement and other rituals and protocols at board level, a number of commentators agree that 'western' corporate governance best practice is what is required of Maori organisations. *Tikanga Maori* is 'only a form of process' and not a governance methodology. The clear message is that Maori corporates need to engage in 'Western' corporate governance best practice if they are to be commercially successful.

Maori cultural values (*Tikanga maori*) in business

Throughout the literature covered in this chapter, various inferences are made concerning Maori cultural values in businesses owned and operated by Maori. A comparative study between Maori businesses which incorporate *tikanga Maori* and businesses which do not, setting out relative performance criteria, would enable Maori to claim that embracing *tikanga Maori* in business, all other factors being equal, either enhances, is neutral, or inhibits business performance. The evidence so far suggests that, with the exception of organisations such as *Te Wananga o Raukawa* and Ngati Hine Health Trust in the TPK/FOMA report (2003), *tikanga Maori* may actually be *inhibiting* the economic performance of Maori-owned organisations and businesses. Mead (2003, p. 318) expresses concern about the clash of *tikanga* with 'western' research and the subjection of Maori knowledge and information to outside scrutiny (p. 318).

French's (1998) study assumed that it was essentially the degree of Maori ownership, aims and goals and management methods, which define a Maori business. Testing for the role and importance of *tikanga Maori* in Maori-owned business, he found that only 16 per cent of his Maori respondents saw culture as being sufficient in itself to define a Maori business (p. 45) and it was ranked fifth of eight parameters. In the Wakatu Incorporation example (Light, 2002), the separation of tikanga Maori from the operational side of the business is significant, a point emphasised by N. Love (Personal communication, 2005) as being relatively common practice in Maori-owned businesses. These commentators seem to be saying that *tikanga Maori* 'gets in the way' when operating a business. The work by Bates (1997) on ethnic economies also sees ethnicity and its cultural connotations as a negative or neutral element in successful business performance, findings echoed by Mataira (2001).

From the foregoing, it seems that *tikanga Maori* (which emphasises communalism, shared decision-making, avoidance of risk, interdependence, collective ownership, conservatism and kinship) and entrepreneurialism (which emphasises independence, singular values, risk-taking, innovation and individual passion) are incompatible. So whilst in *appearance*, ethnicity seems to create a uniqueness, in *practice*, ethnicity and cultural values appear to add little or nothing to successful business performance. Cultural factors, however, may play an important part in the way a business is governed and in the way wealth is distributed, as opposed to created. Business activity is primarily concerned with the latter.

Conclusion

The literature on ethnic business and ethnic economics is scarce, as these fields of study and research are still in their infancy. What is acutely lacking is empirical evidence that such policies work in practice. There is evidence to show that large numbers of new enterprises do *not* survive the first few vital years of their existence, which raises the obvious question of why governments continue to encourage ethnic and/or marginalised groups to start businesses. The answer would appear to lie in political considerations. Governments in many countries see self-employment and the start of new business ventures as a means of economic and social advancement for disadvantaged or marginalised groups. However, this approach may not produce the desired results.

There is no evidence to suggest that ethnicity confers distinct advantages on, and results in better performance of, new ventures. There is some evidence, however, which indicates that ethnicity may in fact *inhibit* business success. There is also some evidence which indicates that in the New Zealand situation at least, economic policies based upon self-employment programmes have not been successful in closing the economic gaps between Maori and the rest of New Zealand. If this is the case, governments would do better to confront those issues known to be associated with business failures generally, rather than follow the ideological illusion that somehow, focusing on ethnicity is synonymous with business success, when the evidence so far indicates it is a myth.

Note

1. For the remainder of this chapter, reference to 'Maori' businesses will be on the basis that such businesses are more than 51 per cent *owned* by a person or persons descended from a New Zealand Maori.

7

Re-politicising Race: The Anglican Church in New Zealand

Christopher Tremewan

In 1992, the Anglican Church in New Zealand changed its constitutional structure to divide itself into three racially based organisations: Maori, Pakeha (white) and Polynesian. The change to its constitution raises many issues. Why would the dominant church, with an ideology rooted in the primacy of religious belief and in values based on a common humanity, agree to split itself in this way? At a time when the re-construction and re-politicisation of ethnic boundaries for political purposes was causing horrendous conflicts around the world, what theological or other arguments could persuade the Anglican leadership to subscribe to an ideology which prioritises race as a constitutional distinction in church membership? The 1992 Constitution of the Anglican Church in Aotearoa, New Zealand and Polynesia is so sharply at odds with the traditional ideology and practice of the Church that it requires explanation.

Research into what the Anglican Church has done, through its endorsement of racial division as an organising principle, provides a window into the current dynamics of elite politics in New Zealand and its likely influence on both the state and the society as a whole. The main proponent of the constitutional changes, Professor Whatarangi Winiata, has consistently maintained that the Anglican constitutional formula is a model for the New Zealand state (e.g. Winiata, 2005). He is now leader of the Maori Party which is positioning itself to hold the balance of power in a parliament elected by proportional representation. The 1992 Anglican Constitution is also a radical attempt to revise New Zealand history not simply to illuminate historical injustices but more to incorporate an ideology of cultural incommensurability. This ideology attempts to re-shape both the historical record and the current social

realities according to the political objectives of a small elite, thereby introducing instability and conflict.

This chapter will outline the circumstances of this radical disjunction and also will explore some of its four major implications. First, the constitutional changes entrench not equity but a racially defined elite power, a formal arrangement whereby a racially defined leadership (ideologically represented as being all Maori) is sequestered from full accountability to the whole body but is able to wield supreme influence over it. Second, the contradiction of a re-constructed indigenous elite using the arguments of cultural authenticity to take over a colonial institution, the Church of England, points to deeper political dynamics of ethno-nationalism. Indeed, the following warning by Professor Winiata urging New Zealand to adopt *tino rangatiratanga*, or tribal sovereignty, before extremist elements – the 'true believers' – use violence to achieve this end leaves no doubt that ethno-nationalism is the force behind elite political strategies.

> Failure by our nation to take steps in this direction so as to change the management of our affairs and ways of governing ourselves, will create the circumstances where the fury of *tino rangatiratanga* will produce the true believers, namely, those who will die for the cause. Time is running out. (Winiata, 1998, p. 1)

Third, the constitutional revision is partly a response to a judicial opinion[1] mandating the ideology of Maori–Pakeha partnership which opened a broad arena for re-contestation of 19th-century political settlements in the context of 21st-century social dynamics. Despite romantic notions of partnerships between peoples, politically, partnership for governance is between elites. The residual or imagined Maori aristocracy – in an uneasy alliance of convenience with the *nouveau riche* of an Anglo-Maori urban elite – has seen its chance for elite dominance and for restoration of its dignity. The New Zealand situation was unlike that pertaining in other British colonies where the imperial power needed local traditional elites to assist in state governance and in providing access to resources. In Malaya, the rural Malay aristocracy was intentionally transformed into a capitalist ruling elite. In Fiji, the power of the chiefly elite was extended into state formation. In New Zealand, however, after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 and the settlement of the country by a new wave of immigrants who established and possessed the state for themselves, the New Zealand settler state had minimal need of a Maori elite except for purposes of social regulation

of a dispossessed people. The granting of knighthoods to tribal leaders and the use of the British monarchy – along with the august ceremonial hierarchy of the Anglican Church – were comparatively effective tools for inducing political loyalty for many decades. The recent judicial interpretation and passage of legislation giving weight to the ideology of partnership under the Treaty, assumed to be a racially defined partnership, has negated important legal effects of annexation and conquest and created the need for the state to identify formally such partners in order to access resources and to regulate the whole society.

Fourth, arguments for cultural exclusiveness, which prevent rigorous scrutiny of political motives, are essential to the success of this strategy of re-constructing elite power. The ideology of cultural fundamentalism ascribes the analysis and opinions of any person to their race or culture ensuring there is no neutral ground for critical assessment. This denial of critical space is its core function. However, a critical study of the Anglican Church's constitutional revision makes it necessary to distinguish the several arguments which have been conflated in the ideological orthodoxy of culture and indigenism. The use of culture and race to demand loyalty, deflect criticism and disguise class interest needs close examination. To claim that the right to re-construct an ethnicised power elite is a legitimate response to historical grievance and current socio-economic need is like seeking to justify re-constructing the House of Lords on the grounds that it will benefit the working class. While elite formation may indeed bring benefits, much depends on the nature of the elite and of the benefits and to whom they mainly accrue.

In order to demonstrate how these implications emerge from a study of the constitutional revisions of the Anglican Church, it is necessary first to describe the scope and some detail of the constitutional revisions before returning to an analysis of the politics of the changes.

The road to the 1992 constitution

On 7 May 1984, General Synod, the governing body of the Anglican Church in New Zealand (then officially called the Church of the Province of New Zealand), set up the Bi-cultural Commission on the Treaty of Waitangi under a motion submitted by Professor Whatarangi Winiata and Archdeacon Kingi Ihaka from the Aotearoa Council of the Bishopric of Aotearoa, the Maori bishopric (CPNZ, 1984, p. 34). The Bi-cultural Commission was established for a number of purposes, including 'to advise General Synod on any ways and means to embody the principles of the Treaty in the legislation, institutions and general

life of the Church of the Province of New Zealand' (CPNZ, 1984, p. 34) and in 1986 the Commission recommended constitutional reform (CPNZ, 1986). In 1992, General Synod approved proposals from the Bi-cultural Commission for a new constitution for the now re-named 'Anglican Church in Aotearoa,[2] New Zealand and Polynesia'. The extensive changes wrought by this constitution are based upon the Preamble which reads back into missionary history the view that a racially divided church was the original intention of missionary activity under the Church Missionary Society (CMS) after 1814 and that subsequent development of a settler church established the second cultural stream or *tikanga* (CACANZP, 1992). These ideological interpretations appear as historical justification for the statement in clause 12 of the Preamble that 'the principles of partnership and bi-cultural development require the Church to: (a) organise its affairs with each of the *tikanga* (social organisations, language, laws, principles, and procedure) of each partner' (p. 1).

Clause 13 notes that Te Runanga o Te Pihopatanga o Aotearoa and General Synod, in November 1990, 'covenanted with each other and agreed' to amend the constitution 'to implement and entrench the principles of partnership between Maori and Pakeha and bicultural development and to incorporate and extend the principal provisions of the Church of England Empowering Act, 1928'. In other words, the Anglican Church takes the position in this constitutional document that, because the original intention of the missionary church was to establish a 'native' church and this was separate from the later settler church, this intention, once proven, is unquestionably to be implemented in the present. It is therefore regarded as axiomatic that this separation by race, to a degree that no longer exists, should be re-established.

The provisions of the Constitution were to be implemented by

> dividing the church organisationally into three cultural streams of Maori, Pakeha and Polynesian represented respectively by *Te Pihopatanga o Aotearoa* (The Bishopric of Aotearoa), the existing dioceses in New Zealand (into which New Zealand is geographically divided) and the associated Diocese of Polynesia based in Suva, Fiji, and incorporating many of the island states of Polynesia. (CACANZP, 1992, p. 3)[3]

The distribution of political power mandated by this new Constitution is of the supremacy of the Maori *tikanga*. If the intention originally was to grant some form of equal status to the Maori bishopric, it has

been more than fulfilled. In fact the Maori *tikanga* has acquired far greater than equivalent status to any diocese. It has been made not only equal in constitutional status to the aggregate of all dioceses (which previously constituted the national church) but has been given powers of intervention in their affairs which do not apply to itself. It is constitutionally much less accountable to the dioceses of the Church than these dioceses are to the Maori *tikanga*. This means that the majority of Anglicans are accountable to a minority leadership whose affairs they have little cognisance of and cannot affect without their consent.

Historical opportunity for elite strategy

The confluence of historical trends which made this radical constitutional shift possible lie in both the political and economic crisis in New Zealand in the mid-1980s and in the popularisation of theories of cultural relativism internationally. As the nation was establishing its historic guilt with respect to Maori, it could be expected that the Church, for which guilt is a core business, would also respond as it had already begun to do since the 1970s. The effect of the anti-apartheid movement, to which many of New Zealand's political leaders belonged, was to focus on the causes of institutional racism 'at home' as well as in South Africa. This analysis of New Zealand racism, allied with an emerging indigenism, was to supply an ideology which, paradoxically, led to the rigorous categorisation of the populace by race (often disguised with the euphemisms 'ethnicity' or 'culture' but fundamentally based on blood line) in order to identify those specially aggrieved and to direct compensation towards them. In a multi-racial population in which increasing numbers of people can trace ancestry in multiple directions (e.g. the majority of children classified as Maori have a non-Maori parent) and in which cultural traits and reflexes are increasingly shared and shaped according to context, this inclusion and exclusion on the basis of racial identity had many consequences, by no means all positive (Tremewan, 2005). But it appeared largely benign when it was still seen as a matter of finding ethnic roots rather than of sorting the population in a racial priority order at the level of the state.

It was the Left that provided the ideology for an elite strategy: a mixture of cultural relativism and romanticism. Until the 1980s, these political characteristics were not shared by the traditional Maori leadership including the clergy who were politically and religiously conservative – as were the majority of rural Maori. However, the debate among the urban Left on the status of the Treaty of Waitangi and the gradual

validation of aspects of the Treaty in law led to the traditional leadership taking as its own the rhetoric of cultural exceptionalism and racial entitlement. This ideological appropriation represented the capture of a movement for social reform by a political elite formed by the alliance of Pakeha culturalist intellectuals and lawyers, the *nouveau riche* of the Anglo-Maori urban middle class and the traditional rural tribal leadership, previously mutually antagonistic, but now allied in what Rata (2003a) has termed a brokerage role '. . . to acquire control of historical grievance settlements, to control interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, and to broker a non-democratic neotraditionalist ideology into the institutions of the democratic state' (p. 44).

This elite strategy permeated the Anglican Church, a core social mechanism of the conservative Maori elite, initially from the urgings of activist clergy, and soon connected with the elite's political and economic interests.

> Maori Church leaders had close connections with national Maori organisations and as a result were well informed about the national debate on the Treaty, and Maori issues generally. Judge E T J Durie, Chairman of the Waitangi Tribunal from 1981, and Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court from 1980 to 1989, was a member of the Aotearoa Council of the Maori Bishopric, as was Sir Graham Latimer, President of the New Zealand Maori Council from 1973 and also a lay member of General Synod. Professor Winiata was a member of the New Zealand Maori Council. Maori leaders also had the advantage of a comparatively small group to inform and convince about the proposals. They presented an interpretation of church history which focused on Pakeha injustice and in the contemporary climate was readily accepted by many Maori. (Beatson, 2002, p. 95)

But these dynamics serve only to sharpen the question as to the timing of this confluence of interests. After all, much was being achieved in terms of social reform. Significant shifts in state social policy began to direct more resources towards Maori deprivation, legislation was amended to ensure consultation with Maori on infrastructure projects, sale of state assets, social policy and many other activities. Maori language and culture had begun to achieve its rightful, honoured place in education and in national life. There was a strong sense of progress on redress of historical grievances. In the Anglican Church, the status of the (Maori) Bishopric of Aotearoa was upgraded and the head of the Anglican Church, Archbishop Sir Paul Reeves, was of Maori and British descent

(Bishop of Waiapu 1971–79, Bishop of Auckland 1979–85, Archbishop of New Zealand 1980–85). Reeves was appointed governor-general (1985–90) representing Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State. Thus, 150 years after the Treaty was signed by Maori chiefs and the Crown, a Maori symbolically became the Crown. Why, with these achievements in train, was there additional pressure to change the Anglican Constitution and with such haste? Why bother with such a diminished institution as the Anglican Church?

The politics of Anglican constitutional change

A welter of possibilities emerges in answering these questions and in analysing the politics of these constitutional changes. The first explanation is that announced at the time: that a situation of gratuitous injustice existed in terms of the status of the Maori bishopric within the Anglican Church in New Zealand – an injustice done to all Maori, embedded in historically discriminatory processes, and mitigating against both the redress of past grievances and adequate responses to current Maori socio-economic disadvantage. The argument has often been put in the context of a critique of colonisation and the alienation from traditional cultural values and social organisation that it brought.

Yet with many of these arguments for redress of grievances already accepted in principle and many accommodations being made, why did the reform agenda within the Anglican Church require the splitting of the Church along racial lines? To answer this question, four key issues need to be examined: the constitutional process, the assertion of the need for cultural autonomy, claims of historical legitimacy and, finally, the undemocratic nature of New Zealand's cultural fundamentalism.

The process of constitutional change

In reviewing the archival evidence on the constitutional process the major feature which stands out is the inadequacy of the process in view of its paramount importance. The reports of the two Commissions (on the Treaty of Waitangi and on the Constitution respectively) are wholly unimpressive documents. They lack a cogent structure, supporting evidence or the scoping of the possible implications of what they recommend. More than this, the process was apparently one of the proponents of the constitutional changes touring diocesan synods and other decision-making bodies advocating on their own behalf.

Most of the diocesan bishops at one time or another expressed reservations about the direction of the changes, including the archbishop who was on the Commission (Beatson, 2002, pp. 100–104). Interviewed in 2001, John Paterson, by then elevated from Secretary of the Bishopric of Aotearoa to Bishop of Auckland, stated that Archbishop Brian Davis 'was never "fully on board" ' with what the Commission were doing, 'Brian wanted us to be really clear that anything we did had a sound theological and biblical base to it and he was certainly not convinced about that' (p. 27). But no diocesan bishop marshalled a more thorough process which would genuinely engage their constituencies and which they had the authority to do.

Two church historians, Peter Stuart and K.N. Booth, wrote papers critiquing the accuracy of the history and the logic of the constitutional recommendations. Rev Peter Stuart, at the Wellington Synod in 1988, and in a subsequent submission

> challenged the proposition that the signing of the Treaty in 1840 committed the twentieth century Church to a two sided partnership based on one people/one vote, as defined by the Commission on the Treaty of Waitangi. He suggested the Treaty only committed the Church to encouraging the Crown to observe the Treaty, and only committed Church members to act as good citizens of a nation in which the Treaty, 'exercises moral and legal influence'. Stuart believed linking the Treaty of Waitangi and the Church constitution could not succeed, and he stated a growing unease about the potential separatism of the Commission's proposals, 'We are in great danger of seeking to correct one wrong by committing another'. (Beatson, 2002, p. 75)

Booth noted in his lengthy paper that

> The Pakeha are not the Crown, and nor is General Synod. While some of the debates between the tribes and the Crown over land and other matters have implications for the Church, it is not easy to see a direct application of the Treaty to the internal structures of the Church. (Booth, 1988, p. 11)

He stated that what was offered was not bi-culturalism but separation leading to 'duo-monoculturalism'.[4] By means of a detailed academic analysis he showed why the offered interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi 'is indefensible at the bar of history' (Booth, 1988, pp. 4, 6).

However, these scholarly contributions to the discussion were received by key proponents of the changes as examples of pakeha cultural recidivism. Professor Whatarangi Winiata stated that 'Dr Booth does not have a thorough understanding of tikanga Maori' and notes that he comes to a conclusion in favour a constitutional option 'without any apology for the arguments presented'. He further states that 'Such is the ardour of Dr Booth's opposition that he has forsaken the intellectual integrity which, I suspect, he cherishes greatly' (Winiata, 1988).

In this adversarial context, it is perhaps unsurprising that Beatson notes:

> Although many church members were uncomfortable with the principle [of Treaty partnership] as defined, there was some reluctance to voice criticism. This was due to a lack of adequate knowledge of the Treaty, prevailing attitudes of political correctness, and a fear of being perceived as racist. (Beatson, 2002, p. 78)

Nevertheless, there was significant opposition within the councils of the church. Wellington layman and prominent trade unionist, Norris Collins, spoke strongly against the proposals at a key meeting of the Anglican leadership at the school in Otaki (headed by Professor Winiata) on 10–12 March 1989. He spoke against the compulsion on members to choose whether they were Maori or pakeha when they were both. 'You are going to pull my daughter-in-law apart . . . Is that the way the Church of God should be going? I say, it cannot be that' (Collins, 1989, p. 3). He also drew attention to the implication of a racial veto:

> But if in the constitution put before us now, it says that any proposal must be accepted by both pakeha and Maori, irrespective of numbers, that is a veto, and it cannot proceed. I say that is the wrong way for us to work, we've got to find other ways. Because that will not produce trust. (p. 4)

Beatson (2002, p. 101) also notes that 'only 0.15% of Church members had been involved in what had been considered wide consultation by the Commission on the Treaty of Waitangi'.

It was at the stage when the constitutional proposals were being debated in synods that there were two shifts in strategy. The first is reflected in a letter from Professor Winiata to the Rev John Paterson, Secretary to the Bishopric of Aotearoa, on 4 October 1988, in which he laments the indications of disagreement at the Wellington Synod,

the ignorance, wavering and reluctance of Christchurch Synod, and the pronounced caution of the Standing Committee of General Synod. He notes that the approach of the Commission to raise awareness in anticipation of a subsequent constitutional change is an impossible task. He states that the tenor of the discussions is worthy of a kindergarten and recommends that the Commission change tack. He plumps for unilateral action and then to worry about awareness-raising if at all (Kinder Library Archives ANG 139/1/6(1)).

This letter presaged a shift to a more unilateralist strategy and a harder push for a separate Maori Anglican Church in New Zealand.

The second shift grew from the first and from the 1987 Court of Appeal decision on the principles of Treaty partnership. Until this point there had been an identity of interest between the Provincial Bi-cultural Education Commission (those in the Church who were educating non-Maori about Maori culture and history in order to make all members more cognisant of the indigenous culture and historical sensibility) and the task of the Bi-cultural Commission on the Revision of the Constitution which was viewed as setting in place the constitutional provisions for harmonious collaboration on the basis of an agreed level of cultural autonomy. From this time on, 'Pakeha Church members saw themselves being required to develop a greater understanding of Maori culture, while at the same time Maori appeared to be withdrawing from the Church' (Beatson, 2002, p. 81). To this confusion was added the tactical shift from Professor Winiata who 'thought there was a need to shift the emphasis from bi-culturalism and bi-cultural development to partnership, which involved respect for each other as demonstrated by the recent Court of Appeal hearing in regard to State Owned Enterprises' (p. 82). The perspicacious and perhaps the cynical might also see that the Court's decision potentially allowed ambitions to go beyond mutual cultural understanding to more material outcomes.

It is clear from the record that the Bishopric of Aotearoa drove the process of constitutional revision throughout. It had an agenda and a tight leadership group fully connected with other national developments in legislation and legal cases. The lack of leadership, decisiveness and intellectual acuity of others in the Church enabled it to push through to the result it wanted. This was a highly competent display of political negotiation unmatched by those they sought to convince who generally took the arguments at face value and were concerned to give assurance of their acknowledgement of historical guilt and their lack of racist attitudes. The advantage was fully taken.

But why invest this political energy in the Anglican Church and with such haste? There are several factors to be brought together in positing an answer to this question. The first is that Professor Winiata had worked hard on ensuring adequate funding for the Bishopric of Aotearoa in the early 1980s and, as a former professor in a university commerce faculty, was no doubt fully aware of the ways this could be ensured through constitutional reform. He was also a strong advocate of Maori self-determination and had been the public proponent for a tribal organisation in 1984 of a proposal for a new parliamentary model for New Zealand involving an upper house of equal Maori and Pakeha representation. This model in its various versions was presented to national and international forums for the following 20 years. It was also the basis for the model that the Bishopric proposed for the Anglican Church and 'was the basis of the first draft of the constitution presented to General Synod in 1988' (Beatson, 2002, p. 27). To an extent, therefore, the Anglican Church was a trial run in a bigger game.

But it was also more than this. The Court of Appeal decision meant the Government increasingly had to find formal Maori 'partners' for the Treaty partnership and, as it provided both historical compensation and contemporary economic opportunities, it looked to traditional tribal communities in rural areas as authentic expressions of traditional tribal authority. It is in these communities that the Anglican Church has a strong infrastructure to which the Anglo-Maori urban elite can attach themselves for cultural authenticity, for ideological dominance, for access to funding and to recruit political followers. It could be said that control of this network and the consolidation of it with new funding streams was a prize worth the effort. Perhaps, it could also be said that the haste with which this review was conducted and implemented reflected the urgency of a culturalist elite seeking to entrench constitutional privilege on the basis of racial inheritance in a number of domains before considered opposition and the logic of multi-ethnicity outpaced them.

Cultural autonomy through separation

There are a number of contradictions when an indigenous movement, which wants cultural autonomy and rejects colonial structures, seeks authenticity within, and even control of, the Church of England. This is especially so when those leading the movement are not the disenfranchised and the poor, but have succeeded in their chosen professions and have begun to critique the institutions which brought

them influence and economic security. In what way does their emancipation depend on rejection of and separation from 'colonial' structures and ideas and, simultaneously, on winning a dominant position in the Anglican Church? That question is only partially answered above through the identification of the material political interests of the culturalist elite.

There are also indications of sincerely held beliefs which may indicate a kind of cultural renaissance:

> Bishop Vercoe [the Bishop of Aotearoa and Archbishop of New Zealand] has said he believes there is no incompatibility between Christian teaching that there was one God and Maori beliefs that there were many. 'I think any other gods are emanations from the one God. That's what we are saying in Maoridom'. (*Sunday Star Times*, 2 September, 2001)
>
> I believe in Tangaroa, I talk to Tangaroa out there in the boat, it's the ocean. And Tawhirimatea, that's the wind. And the sky I refer to as Ranginui. (Winiata, cited in Kamsteeg, 2004)

Considering the theological difficulties of squaring conventional Anglican belief with belief in pre-Christian Maori deities, it is important to know not only why, but also how this elite remained with Anglicanism or even Christianity. It is not enough to observe that this is an elite manoeuvre which seeks to re-invent the past for the achievement of specific objectives. Rather it is necessary to identify how the ideology of cultural autonomy actually served the interests of this elite; especially how it contained the contradictions, provided the political initiative and disguised the real social processes at work. This is not to suggest a conspiracy or insincerity on behalf of any person or group. A movement which seeks autonomy on the basis of ethnicity or racial origin and for the purpose of respect in the face of a history of alienation and humiliation is to be taken seriously. But the ideological dynamics need to be understood.

The parameters of the debate in the Anglican Church between 1984 and 1992 were set from the beginning by the characterisation of the Church as consisting of two cultural streams. This hardly seems to have been contested yet it contains basic assumptions which an observer might expect to be extensively debated in an ecclesiastical context on two grounds: first and most importantly, that the Church's essential character is to be defined by cultural difference and, secondly, that the

complexity of the Church's membership is adequately described in terms of only two cultures.

The normalisation of this categorisation in the ensuing debate and its embedding into the formal name of the commissions enquiring into the matters at hand (the 'Bi-cultural' Commissions) established the grounds on which debate would take place. From this point on, the debate revolved around the constitutional relationship between the two 'cultures' said to comprise the Anglican Church and the division of political power and material property between them. The Treaty of Waitangi was said to be signed by two 'cultures' (not the British state and individual chiefs) and therefore governance of New Zealand in all its institutional forms ought to be divided similarly. The introduction of the term *tikanga* reinforced the ideological notion of two cultural streams and disguised the organisational interests of the culturalist elite. Immediately, the dioceses (i.e. all the Church except the Bishopric) became 'Pakeha' and representative of an unlikely unitary entity called 'Pakeha culture'. The Bishopric of Aotearoa, part of the Anglican Church and led by people who all had both Maori and non-Maori ancestry and shared much of the same cultural and religious formation as those of non-Maori ancestry, became the authentic representative of Maori culture and of all Maori people. By means of the assertion of this categorisation, culture then became accepted *de facto* as a proper foundation on which to base constitutional change which would establish racial separation as an organising principle.

Therefore, the ideological under-pinning of the Anglican constitution reforms lies not in theology but in the popularisation of post-modern notions of cultural essentialism: that the most fundamental characteristic of a person is their culture. This is associated with the view that culture is bounded and impermeable rather than what is easily observable: that culture is unbounded and permeable. Ideologies of 'linguistic determinism and cultural incommensurability' (Sharp, 1995, p. 118) have been central to the idea of indigenism. Cultural reconstruction of marginalised and assimilated peoples with a sense of violation and loss and plagued by social malaise commonly arises as a means to address these conditions by marking separation from the greater society.

In New Zealand an ideology of cultural essentialism has achieved the status of orthodoxy and extreme expressions of it have become a routine, if still controversial, part of the national political landscape. Elsewhere I have described this orthodoxy as a form of cultural fundamentalism and it is noteworthy that the Anglican Church is more susceptible to a form of secular fundamentalism than to the theological kind.

> Underlying this antipodean cultural fundamentalism are a number of assumptions in addition to primordial notions of racial origin. They include, despite vast empirical evidence to the contrary, the incompatibility of Pakeha and Maori 'cultures' and thus the need for formal separation followed by formal negotiation between discrete entities. . . . there is an undertone of purification by separation. (Tremewan, 2005, p. 5)

By the 1990s this ideological orthodoxy moved beyond a focus on historical grievances to what could be loosely described as Maori ethno-nationalism.

The claim of historical legitimacy

The ideology of cultural fundamentalism can be better sustained if the historical facts can be seen to support it. In 1986, Professor Winiata stated that 'The Anglican Church in New Zealand will write into its constitution a view of Church history since 1814 that reflects the new insights on this period gained through the work done by the Waitangi Commission' (Winiata, 1986, p. 6).

The 1992 Constitution states in the Preamble

> this Church has developed in New Zealand from its beginnings when Ruatara introduced Samuel Marsden to his people at Oihi in the Bay of Islands in 1814, first in expanding missionary activity as Te Hähi Mihinare in the medium of the Māori language and in the context of tikanga Maori, initially under the guidance of the Church Missionary Society, and secondly after the arrival of George Augustus Selwyn in 1842 as a Bishop of the United Church of England and Ireland spreading amongst the settlers in the medium of the known as the Church of England, so leading to a development along two pathways which found expression within tikanga Māori and tikanga Pakeha . . . (CACANZP, p. 1)

This re-writing of history seeks to establish the chronological primacy of a church established among Maori by the Church Missionary Society and to connect this fact with a claim for the legitimacy of an autonomous Maori Anglican Church separate from the later Pakeha settler church. In order to assist the contemporary argument, it introduces the word 'tikanga' to refer to this missionary effort amongst Maori and differentiates on the basis of language. However, the Preamble erects a thin

argument on which to base a modern institution in the vastly different circumstances of 1992 because it promotes a partial history (see Beatson for a detailed discussion, 2002, p. 97) and, in the process, omits powerful and, arguably, culturally and politically liberative outcomes from the interplay of the various social forces at work in the early 19th century.

Christianity and the education brought by missionaries undermined the stratification of Maori society. Maori seized the opportunities not for religious conversion initially, but for literacy, for freedom from their destinies within their tribal society and access to a wider world. Until 1830, there had been very few conversions. 'The most effective transmitters of Christianity and literacy were the prisoners taken by the Ngapuhi and allies – the lowest of the low, the slaves – who embraced the new religion with the greatest fervour, and then, as the wars waned and they were freed, returned home bringing the Word with them' (Crosby, 2004, p. 246). Bishop Muru Walters, in an address in 1996, noted that Maori in the early 19th century fell into three main classes: those chiefly ranked were called *rangatira*, the commoners (*ware* or *tutua*) and a slave class (*taurekareka*) (Walters, 1998, p. 69). He continued:

> There is no doubt that the Maori during the early 1800s experienced the impact of Pakeha innovations that seriously challenged the Maori political and social structure. The plight of Maori slaves was saved by a political and social transformation that was bound to weaken tino rangatiratanga. The tutua and taurekareka class of which there were many, must have deeply appreciated their liberation from, in some cases, certain death to a life indwelt in Christ. (Walters, 1998, p. 71)

The Constitution's historical Preamble was not constructed to reflect a key biblical theme – the liberative aspects of the early Maori Church with the slave class providing religious leadership. It provided for the opposite: the restoration of a *rangatira* class and its ideological control of the Maori 'commoner' through revivifying such deeply undemocratic notions as *tino rangatiratanga*, now expressed as the claim of indigenous sovereignty over New Zealand, the form of ethno-nationalism pursued by Winiata's parliamentary Maori Party.

The anti-democratic character of New Zealand cultural fundamentalism

The anti-democratic nature of cultural fundamentalism within the Anglican Church, revealed during the constitutional debate, consists of

three major components of *tino rangatiratanga*: the attempted erection of a class or elite based on re-interpreted traditional ideas of chieftainship, the recruitment of followers and the dispensation of patronage on the basis of blood line, and direct attacks on universal suffrage. Accommodation by the wider society to these norms is a threat to democracy. Such cultural fundamentalism in New Zealand posits a biological basis to culture and determines membership on the basis of biological descent.

> Whether the person of Maori ancestry is full, 1/2, 1/4, . . . or . . . 1/1024, it is possible to whakapapa [trace ancestry] back to every waka [legendary ancestral migratory canoe]. Indeed a person who is 1/1024 requires only nine or ten generations ancestry to be identified with a full Maori. By contrast, a person who does not have one dot of Maori ancestry is unable to do this. Whakapapa is vital in Maori organisational arrangements and, of course, they are central together with whakapapa per se to tikanga Maori. (Winiata, 1988)

It is, as Winiata notes, a key element to reconstruction of tribal entities and an ethnicised church over which the culturalist elite can wield influence. To the extent that this affiliation removes individuals from the protections and processes of the democratic state making them beholden to the largesse of the elite, this is deeply problematic. Of course, since all Maori also have Pakeha or other ancestry, it is also confusing and destructively divisive when implemented over against the wider society.

Throughout the constitutional review process, the democratic process has been routinely misrepresented (one culture, one vote is better than one person, one vote) in a manner which disguised the class interest of the culturalist elite to become the principal partner of the Crown in an apparent call for cultural equity for all Maori. There have been indications that this combination of anti-democratic tendencies is under thoughtful review. Dr Jenny Plane-Te Paa, the head of the Maori theological college, Te Whare Wananga o Te Rau Kahikatea, has observed that Maori nationalists have been able 'to maintain an unacceptable silence on the question of class' (Te Paa, 1998, p. 63). Furthermore,

> That very male and very authoritarian discourse [of tino rangatiratanga] is also, in my view, utterly inconsistent with any credible theological understanding of human relationships, of human interdependency, of the equal value of all within God's creative order. What is needed is a new vocabulary, one that does not allow racial rhetoric to override moral reasoning. Either we are all part of a global

> humanity or we are not. The way to rid our communities of structural injustice is not simply to replace one set of unequal power relations with a slightly more tanned version. (Te Paa, 1998, p. 59)

In addition, the Wellington Synod in 2005 considered a motion to recommend the three tikanga constitution be revoked, a motion which passed overwhelmingly in the lay house but failed by two votes in the house of clergy. However, the new Anglican constitution was passed in 1992 and now has its own momentum with elite interests consolidated behind its prioritisation of ethnicity. These will not surrender on the basis of rational argument or appeals to theological integrity.

Conclusion

The Anglican constitutional changes reflect a carefully placed strategy to entrench the divine right of a re-invented chiefly class to determine and monopolise the political and religious ideas of all Maori and to establish a sufficient political and material base from which to advance other national political objectives of ethno-nationalism. The apparent haste to insert into the Constitution's Preamble a contrived synthesis of an unsettled historical debate indicates such a strategy. Many of those who were engaged in the constitutional review process will have done so from the highest of motives and with a keen eye to righting past wrongs. This, of course, did not forestall such a strategy and may even have assisted it owing to the reluctance to sit in judgement on the motives of those regarded to have been historically wronged.

The emergence of an elite to take up partnership with another or to replace it is hardly a novel historical process. Yet, the Anglican Church may also wish to examine what it has lost in this reform process in terms of autonomy from entrenched interests. As a similar trend occurs in New Zealand parliamentary politics, it becomes clearer that the appropriation of a social justice movement by conservative ethnic interests will make them natural allies of the political right. The Anglican Church will need to decide if this is where it wishes to be.

Notes

1. Without specifying what they were, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 1987 ruled that the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi override the specifics of past legislation and require Maori and Pakeha to act in good faith as partners to the Treaty (King, 2003, p. 500–01).

2. Aotearoa is now widely used as the 'indigenous' name for New Zealand (a name of Dutch origin) and the use of the two names together implies the same country seen in two different and separate dimensions each with its own people, governance and culture. The implication is that Aotearoa is Maori, geographically co-terminus with the national territory and of equal status and legitimacy with the nation-state of New Zealand, the latter being characterised as ethnically white (*Pakeha*).
3. Debate on the status of Polynesia was fraught as some in the Maori leadership sought to prevent its continuing inclusion in the New Zealand church apparently because it was a body which did not fit the bi-cultural paradigm, it being a multi-national, multicultural diocese and, perhaps embarrassingly for the Maori elite, including Pacific states whose traditional elites still wielded state power. Some opposed to the constitutional revision frequently raised Polynesia in order to demonstrate the limitations of bi-culturalism. The Bishop of Polynesia asked both sides to stop using his Diocese as a political lever (Kinder Library Archives, ANG 139/1/6 (2), p. 4).
4. This has subsequently been confirmed by Bishop John Paterson, Bishop of Auckland, who was then working for the Bishopric of Aotearoa. He 'has subsequently described the Commission on the Revision of the Constitution's understanding of bi-cultural development as two railway tracks going together in the same direction but, 'separated by sleepers, so always apart' (Beatson, 2002, p. 79).

8

Putting Ethnicity into Policy: A New Zealand Case Study

Roger Openshaw

Post-Second World War tertiary educated professionals in Western societies belong to a distinctive new middle class in an environment where technological expertise and cultural credentials have become primary forms of capital (Hunter and Fessenden, 1992). Faced with the contradiction between its idealistic universalism and its economic particularism, this class suffers from a 'goodness and power' paradox (Gouldner, 1979). Building on these analyses, Rata (1996) has argued that biculturalism, the New Zealand version of cultural essentialism, was developed as a political movement by new middle class educators as a means to establish themselves politically, and to develop a Pakeha identity discourse in support of this positioning. Accordingly, rather than using the term 'Pakeha' in a strictly descriptive sense to refer to a New Zealand born descendant of British settlers, biculturalists embraced an overtly ideological and largely exclusionary definition. This sharply delineated those who sought to atone for the colonial past and to promote the unique cultural identity of Maori, from those who chose to reject such tenets.

This chapter critically examines the process whereby many post-Second World War 'new class' Pakeha educators became committed biculturalists. It argues that, beginning in the late 1960s, Pakeha biculturalism rapidly became a symbol of the new middle class's desire to alleviate the conflict between its educative ideals and the increasingly harsh realities of a small, vulnerable economy. In some respects, New Zealand was hardly unique in experiencing this phenomenon. Kuper (2001) has traced the origins of cultural essentialism to a major project in post-war American cultural anthropology which saw the definition of culture shift from something to be described, interpreted and perhaps explained, to being a source of explanation in itself. The outcome was an authentic, local way of being different that both resisted globalisation

and materialism, whilst rendering the generalisation of human experience impossible (Barry, 2001; Kuper, 2001).

This reorientation to the cultural essentialism of ethnic politics that Kuper describes is clearly exemplified in New Zealand, where a combination of size, isolation and susceptibility to overseas influences permits relatively small groups of academics and educationalists to exert a disproportionate influence. Thus, beginning with a few key individuals, biculturalism reached out far beyond the relative confines of academia, to exert a major and lasting influence on educational policy and practice. Webster (1998) has traced the decisive influence of Professor Ralph Piddington, Foundation Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Auckland (1950–71). Piddington established the first Maori Studies Department in New Zealand in 1952, subsequently training a whole generation of Pakeha social anthropologists and recruiting many of the senior Maori scholars now leading Maori Studies Departments throughout the country. Networks of crucial importance in spreading Piddington's message to Pakeha new class educators were therefore established that, in turn, spread the culturalist doctrine throughout the education system.

Piddington and his successors, however, subscribed to an essentialist, ahistorical and romanticised conception of culture as a means to social reform. This mission was to be sharpened by a further factor. Robbins (1988) has seen the upsurge of counterculture and protest amongst American youth from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s as symptomatic of a religious and cultural crisis in which dominant values such as utilitarianism and individualism were challenged. From its outset, Pakeha new class conversion to biculturalism from the 1980s assumed a similar quasi-religious quality that resonated with the crisis over its faltering mission during an age of economic contraction, impelling it to embark upon a process of cultural redefinition as an aspect of new nationhood identity.

Ironically, Pakeha new class educators rejected their Western heritage, only to be captivated by the symbolism and ritual of traditional Maori culture; a process entailing the assumption of personal guilt through confession that marked conversion to biculturalism. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1986) have examined the central role of confession in encouraging individuals within modern societies to monitor themselves through just such a conscience of guilt. Given New Zealand's strong historical links with the Christian missionary endeavour, the confessional provides a direct link between God and the believer in which the confession of sin becomes highly personalised. An additional attraction

for Pakeha educators lay in the implicit challenge, such a process offered to what Hummel has described as the tendency of modern Western bureaucracies (such as state education systems), to relieve employees of personal conscience and guilt (Hummel, 1987). Indeed, in a recent paper that resonates with Christian religious imagery, Bell (2004) has recently warned against Pakeha assuming guilt for the colonial past, if it is primarily motivated by the desire for innocence. For Bell, as for other committed biculturalists, Pakeha responsibility for dealing with injustice must be accompanied by a sense of agency and willingness to act.

The above factors can be seen in the influence of key Pakeha social anthropologists, supported by in-service courses for educators, and by curriculum initiatives. Furthermore, the marae induction experience for Department of Education managers, curriculum officers, school principals, deputy principals, inspectors and teachers furnished an ideal site from which their political and cultural shortcomings could be starkly contrasted with a carefully marketed alternative, indeed oppositional perspective on the world. The reality, however, was that whilst biculturalist educators believed that they were embracing the means to liberation, they were in fact uncritically accepting many of the qualities one normally associates with religious conversion: militant zeal, a frightening intolerance for other (heretical) views (often labelled 'racist') and a personal assumption of the legacy of guilt (Original Sin) that could only be partially expiated by political action.

Oppositional cultures: Forging new class biculturalisms

The views of Maori culture presented to early post-war state schools reflected both the concerns of Pakeha educators to accommodate perceived Maori sensibilities, and their growing conviction that Maori communalism and spirituality could contribute to the nation's 'common culture' by providing a counterweight to the selfish individualism and rampant materialism of 'pakeha society' (Murdoch, 1944; Openshaw, 2005). From the late 1960s through the late 1980s, however, Pakeha educators increasingly turned to the new radicalised politics of culturalism (termed 'biculturalism' in New Zealand), which subsequently became the dominant ideology in New Zealand education.

Whilst a key factor in this phenomenon was undoubtedly Maori activism and its contribution to what has been termed the 'Maori Renaissance' (Walker, 1992), a decisive but little examined influence on New Zealand educational policy during this period was the biculturalism

actively promoted by key Pakeha educators. Confronted with a growing contradiction between their perceived mission as educators and the reality of an increasingly unequal society, this grouping was to prove highly receptive both to the particular brand of culturalism being promoted by Pakeha social anthropologists and to a new generation of Maori activists within teachers' colleges and the Department of Education. Hence, analysing its rapidly spreading influence is of crucial importance in appreciating how policy, especially in education, is a main vehicle within liberal democracies for organised and determined political groups to acquire ideological influence.

As early as 1961, the New Zealand Council for Educational Research (NZCER) prepared a handbook on Maori culture for teachers. Although a Departmental memo of June 1966 suggested that this handbook make reference to Maori values and customs, the Department's nominated writer, Myrtle Simpson, extended this to include a critical discussion of Pakeha agencies, from a Maori point of view. Influenced by her reading of anthropologist Joan Metge's book, *The New Maori Migration* (1964), her awareness of Ranginui Walker's work at Auckland Teachers' College and her own recent experience in schools, Simpson radically re-evaluated her own attitudes:

> I was most interested in a contribution made by a very shy Maori mother at Ohakune. She told how her small boy had come home one day after a history lesson and said, 'Mother, did the Maoris eat the pakehas?' She said he was very upset and kept repeating 'Then I don't want to be a Maori.' And then I remembered a comment made by Rangi Walker of the Auckland Teachers' College staff that teachers often offended through lack of sensitivity or even lack of knowledge. He mentioned that, in dealing with the Maori wars, teachers might not always state the issues fairly and that they might put undue stress on the cannibalistic practices of some Maori warriors. Though I had noted this comment I had not thought of this as being a serious possibility, but here was definite support for his contention that teachers needed some advice even on matters such as this. (Simpson, c. July 1967)

In this revealing passage of how individuals become believers, Simpson epitomises the early role conscientisation was to play in the transformation of new class educators. In turn, this process was to impel many educators over the next two decades to actively seek the conscientisation of others. Garfield Johnson's work at Otara College (later, Hillary

College), from 1966, his mentoring by Maori such as John Rangihau and Hiwi Tauroa and his later chairmanship of the controversial Johnson Committee are outstanding examples of this process (Bowler, 2004). Another factor in conscientisation was the dissemination of key academic texts by Pakeha social anthropologists such as Metge's *The Maoris of New Zealand* (1967), and *Child Rearing Patterns in New Zealand* (1970), the latter one of numerous books written jointly or separately by James and Jane Ritchie.

The adoption by Pakeha new class educators of biculturalism as the sole legitimate national expression of culturalism occurred at a relatively early date. In 1968, with the escalating Vietnam War and the Paris student uprising being hailed as defining moments for educators, Eric Schwimmer became one of the first Pakeha academic commentators to reject the concept of integration and instead popularise the term 'biculturalism' in his widely read edited collection, *The Maori People in the Nineteen Sixties* (Schwimmer, 1968; Metge, 1976). Drawing upon Piddington's work (Piddington having contributed a key essay to the collection), Schwimmer defined biculturalism as being similar to pluralism, but going beyond mere tolerance and mutual encouragement, becoming a reality only when both Pakeha and Maori cultures possessed characteristic superstructures of institutions, values and symbols (Schwimmer, 1968, pp. 14–15). Accordingly, he argued that New Zealand would only become truly 'bicultural' when influential Pakeha, including educators, possessed a degree of familiarity with Maori culture that accepted the existence of two *conflicting* and equally 'correct' value systems (Schwimmer, 1968, p. 13). This latter claim clearly demonstrates the beginnings of the shift from the limited confines of the academy to the wider, more politicised environment of policy and teaching.

The stage was now set for the next stage of biculturalism's march into the institutions. Early pressure for this level of recognition for Maori culture was to come from the National Advisory Committee on Maori Education (NACME). At its inaugural meeting in 1955, the NACME had recommended that Maori education be a special concern in teachers college pre-service courses. NACME's political effectiveness sharply increased after April 1969, the Hon J.R. Hanan ensuring that henceforth at least half its membership was Maori. Hanan also widened the NACME's representation by appointing representatives from three organisations directly concerned with Maori education: the New Zealand Maori Council, the Maori Education Foundation and the Secondary School Boards Association (J.L. Hunter, c.1969).

By the end of the 1960s, therefore, the key themes underpinning biculturalism amongst Pakeha new class educators were already present. At the beginning of the new decade, the reorganised NACME's 1970 report, 'Priorities for development', containing 46 recommendations, was already advocating the creation of a bicultural society. Published the following year, the report created widespread interest in the press, teachers' organisations, the universities and teachers colleges, effectively providing a blueprint for the Department of Education over the next few years. The report argued that it was:

> particularly important that the non-Maori element, particularly the children and the teachers, be made more aware of the cultural values that form an essential part of the Maori way of life in a changing cultural pattern, and that the Maori child's self image be enhanced by his knowledge that these cultural differences are understood, accepted and respected by all with whom he associates. (NACME, 1970)

One outcome was the creation of a special NZCER Research Unit on Maori education. Another was the increasingly widespread involvement of Departmental officers in training and in-service courses on Maori needs for teachers, guidance counsellors and vocational guidance officers. In his report, the Officer for Maori and Island Education A.F. Smith warned that there was likely to be little success for Maori children 'unless the differing interests, values and backgrounds of Maori children (were) provided for in the programmes'. Noting that NACME had emphasised the role of the teacher in dealing with Maori children, Smith called particular attention to the need for teachers to have 'an understanding of how a child of another culture perceives and acts in the classroom; to know how to use the strengths of Maori children; how to draw on their experience and use teaching method(s) most suited to their needs' (Smith, 1971).

The NACME report also received an enthusiastic response from a key education conference in September 1971, attended by both teachers college staff and Departmental officers, the outcome of which was that Maori Studies should form part of initial training for all teachers:

> Members agreed that in terms of teacher training and indeed of social progress for all New Zealanders, it was of the utmost importance to appreciate that we have in this country a culture that has both European and Polynesian origins. It is of equal importance that in

> our schools both teachers and pupils identify and understand these cultural strands and their origins. There should be an appreciation of cultural differences and of the fact that there are alternative ways of looking at human relationships and at life. (Report on the Primary National Course Lopdell House, 1971)

Increasingly, these 'alternative ways' could compensate for what was considered to be a fundamentally flawed Pakeha society. In 1971, Maori scholar Ranginui Walker claimed that 'Urban neurosis resulting from a breakdown of family life and the loss of a sense of community constitute(d) one of the gravest problems of modern times. The Maori sense of community of involvement and sharing with others could very well be emulated by the Pakeha to counter the individualism and anonymity of city life' (Walker, 1971, p. 37). In contrasting two distinct cultures in this way, Walker was able to both draw on a well-established educational tradition and capitalise on the support of Pakeha educators willing to promote what was in effect a reversed theory of cultural deficit.

The election of a left-wing Labour Government in 1972 further intensified the political pressure on the Department of Education concerning the role Maoritanga might play in radically changing attitudes. One of the earliest indications of change was the publication by the Department of *Parent School Communication* (1973), which recommended that Pakeha school principals and inspectors experience total immersion in Maori culture through signal experiences such as marae visits (Bowler, 2004). Universities, too, were experiencing the new mood. In 1972 the University of Waikato established the Centre for Maori Studies and Research which was destined in future years to become a major centre for the dissemination of biculturalism. In 1973 the Minister of Education, Phil Amos, approved a cooperative research venture between the University of Waikato Centre for Maori Studies and the Department of Education, establishing Te Kohanga, a pre-school for Maori children on the university campus under the directorship of Dr Jane Ritchie. Although the programme set out to evaluate several American-developed language programmes and was delivered in English rather than Maori, Ritchie admitted in her 1974 report to having initially had little clear idea of a Maori curriculum, and to being humbled by parents who sang and spoke in Maori (University of Waikato, 1974). Henceforth, the programme was to drastically change to emphasise Maori culture. As her partner, James Ritchie, was later to record, this research was to have a direct impact on subsequent policy with the institution of kohanga reo under the auspices of the Department of Maori Affairs (Ritchie, 1992).

In common with their northern hemisphere counterparts, many Pakeha new class educators during the 1970s rejected the Enlightenment universalism that had previously underpinned schooling, emphasising instead, cultural relativism and ethnic particularism (Barry, 2001). Aimed at assisting Pakeha in understanding Maori society, the first edition of Metge's widely read book *The Maoris of New Zealand* (1967) acknowledged the debt she owed to Piddington, her former anthropology professor, whilst criticising him for failing to integrate the two ideas of 'emergent development' and cultural symbiosis into a single theory. The second edition of this book was a still more emphatic response to 'the climate of world opinion, to growing disillusion with international culture built on the idea of progress' (Metge, 1976, p. 329). Moreover, in publicly admitting her failure in the first edition to properly address the spirituality of *Maoritanga*, Metge was acknowledging both her own inadequacies and the indispensable assistance of Maori in mentoring her to a better understanding of Maori beliefs and values. Accordingly, she found it 'impossible to separate the personal and intuitive aspects of my understanding of Maori-Pakeha relations from the more objective and theoretical' (Metge, 1976, p. 318). Written in similar vein is Anne Salmond's popular book *Hui. A Study of Maori Ceremonial Gatherings* (1975), followed by a second edition (1976) and a reprint in 1983. In her preface to *Hui*, Salmond, also an anthropologist, expressed her gratitude to Metge, and to the students of Maori Studies courses at Auckland University during 1970–71 (Salmond, 1975, p. x).

An indication of the extent to which senior Department of Education staff had come to embrace bicultural ideals by the mid-1970s is indicated in a Department Head Office submission to NACME, in early 1976. The submission conceded that schools had been used as an important element in assimilation (the original draft submission went further and claimed that schools had been a political tool). It went on to argue that whilst the Department had moved from a policy of assimilation towards inclusion and a recognition of Maori culture, there were still unanswered questions. These were:

> The degree to which we have encouraged Pakeha people to do some movement.
>
> The degree to which we expect Maori pupils to match expectations of school on school terms without requiring school to match expectations of people who are their clients.

> The degree to which we still persist on patching up such grafting on Maori language teaching without making any fundamental changes in school itself.
>
> The degree to which schools change by inclusion of Maori art and culture, and providing an administrative structure based on the *whanau* (family) concept. (Head Office Submission to NACME, c.1976)

The period from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s witnessed a new urgency in the adoption of bicultural perspectives by Pakeha new class educators. Left- and right-wing critics blamed the state education system for society's socio-economic problems; the 1981 Springbok tour and anti-nuclear issues divided the country. The Te Kooti Project, directed by Frank Davis of Palmerston North Teachers College and jointly funded by the College and the Department of Education, reflected the concerns of contemporary educators to redress historical injustices and omissions whilst at the same time creating a new bicultural heritage for future generations. Initiated in 1978 and completed in 1981 the Te Kooti Project collected written and oral material from Maori sources relating to Te Kooti, founder of the *Ringatu* faith ('Te Kooti Project', 1978). Explaining his motivation for the project, Davis drew attention to his studies of New Zealand art that had led him to focus on the vexed problem of a New Zealand identity. His consequent exposure to an 'alternative viewpoint' of New Zealand history seemed to suggest . . . 'a need for a new bi-cultural mythology and its heroes, with which we can all identify' ('Te Kooti Project', 1978). This practice of inventing tradition in order to establish continuity with the past has been critically interrogated in the United Kingdom by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). The Te Kooti Project, and indeed other attempts to rewrite New Zealand history during this period, illustrates that new middle class educators were actively engaged in a broadly analogous process, with the added aim of creating a new sense of nationhood involving a radical redefinition of cultural relationships.

For Pakeha educators, the pace and depth of exposure to biculturalism was to rapidly increase during the 1970s, after regular *marae*-based courses were introduced for Department of Education officers, school inspectors, school principals, deputy principals and senior teachers on the grounds that they largely determined the policy of the school, its organisation and climate (Smith, 1978). Surviving letters of excuses for non-attendance still on file suggest that among the few valid excuses

for exemption were prior engagements, which could not be altered, and ill-health. Perhaps one reason for the effort to secure consistently high attendances was that marae-based courses were from the outset, designed to serve political as well as cultural ends. An address to the Hauiti marae-based course in April 1977 was formally opened by Jim Ross, Assistant Secretary, Schools and Development. The first four points in his speech were recorded as:

> Multiculturalism is out and assimilation is out.
>
> We must find a New Zealand identity.
>
> Many Maoris can't cope with New Zealand society which is Pakeha based.
>
> Must have positive discrimination. (Hauiti Marae Programme, 1977).

Another *marae*-based course (Mangamuka, 1977) for senior Departmental administrators and inspectors of primary and secondary schools constituted a rite of passage that, in addition to the formal rituals of protocol and conduct, featured a bibliography that included books by Metge (*The Maoris of New Zealand*), Salmond (*Hui*), Michael King (*Aspects of Maoritanga*) and V.B. Penfold, Inspector of Maori and Island Education (*New Zealanders: One People?*), together with lectures by Garfield Johnson, Alan Smith, Hiwi Tauroa, the then Principal of Tuakau College, and John Rangitau, Research Fellow, Centre for Maori Studies and Research at the University of Waikato. All this provides a further illustration of the way academic influence was taken up by professional educators, to be transmitted both upwards into policy and downwards to the classroom teacher.

Once again, the links with religious conversion are clear. Although there was opportunity for participant dissent, the intensity of group feeling and the environment itself probably served to discourage it. Thus, a letter of thanks from one participant to the organisers of a course at Te Wai Pounamu College, Dunedin, claimed without irony that 'it was I think most significant that there were no dissenting voices, and considering the composition of the course this was in itself remarkable. Well done indeed' (Participant letter, 1977). In fact, it represents an outstanding example of new convert zeal which was (and remains) an outstanding feature of Pakeha biculturalism.

By the early 1980s, professional Maori facilitators were regularly inducting Departmental curriculum officers into a selective and highly

gendered Maori protocol that included *whaikorero* (selected male officers), reply to *karanga* (welcoming call) (selected women officers), *mihimihi* (greetings) (all officers) and *poroporoaki* (farewell) (selected officers), together with morning and evening prayers. One facilitator noted: 'if the task that has been entrusted to me is to ensure that ALL CURRICULUM OFFICERS acknowledge, support and are committed to reflecting our multicultural society THEN there is no better way than using a bi-cultural base as a starting point' (Taha Maori across the Curriculum, 1983). Notes produced by the Curriculum Development Division to accompany the *Hui Whakamatatau* at Taurua Marae, Rotoiti, in November 1984 attempted to define for Pakeha, the elusive fifth element 'Quintessence', as:

> An all pervading element, the overall intangible bond that holds it all together. *Taha Wairua – Wairua Maori* perhaps. The things that cause Maori life to remain a totality. A sense of unity. Pakeha life often seems to lack that totality. (Taurua Marae, 1984, p. 1)

Moreover, for Pakeha educators venturing overseas, Maori culture was to provide a unique identity as New Zealanders. The booklet, *Te Kete Timatatanga. A Teacher Guide to Taha Maori in Social Studies*, was prepared by members of the Auckland District Social Studies Committee with assistance from the Auckland inspectors, the Maori Studies Department at Auckland Teachers College, the Department's Curriculum Development Division, and the Maori and Pacific Island Advisory Team. In response to the hypothetical question 'why teach Taha Maori when the school has few Maori children', the writers argued that 'New Zealanders need to know, understand and identify with the uniqueness of their own cultures. For people travelling overseas *tikanga Maori* provides them with a unique identity – it contributes to our wholeness of experience as New Zealanders' (*Te Kete Timatatanga*, 1985). It followed that any teacher's lack of involvement in *Taha Maori* was 'a very strong statement in itself' (*Te Kete Timatatanga*, 1985, p. 6). Turning to definitions of culture, the booklet cited Metge's (1976) view that 'what is distinctive about a culture is not its elements taken separately but the way they are related to each other – their arrangement is a unique configuration', along with Greeley's 1975 definition of an ethnic group as 'a large collectivity, based on a presumed common origin, which is at least on occasion, part of a self-definition of a person, and which also acts as a bearer of cultural traits' (cited in *Te Kete Timatatanga*, 1985, p. 7).

The final and arguably the most important aspect of the conversion of Pakeha new class educators to biculturalism was a commitment to collective action. This element can be seen at its most urgent in *Taha Maori and Change*, a report on the proceedings of a National Residential In-service Course held at the Lopdell Centre in July 1986. Directed by Wally Penetito from the Department of Education, the course was attended by Departmental officers and teachers. It aimed to select strategies for change, consider how change could be effected and identify who was to benefit from that change. It was asserted that:

> This report is written from the pain and anger felt by the members of this course – pain, because we see the continuing oppression of Maori people in Aotearoa and the tragic results this has; anger, because those who hold power in the education system already know well what must be done, but have not yet made significant *public commitment* to real power-sharing, and challenging of racism. (*Taha Maori and Change*. Report from National Inservice Course, 1986)

The first recommendation demanded:

> That the Department of Education 'management plan' give absolute priority to funding programmes for equity for the next five years ie. All funding for recruitment, selection and training (pre-service and in-service) of all staff; for curriculum development; for assessment and examination methods; should be given only to programmes that are committed to equity in education. In practice this should mean that any programme requiring funding would have to prove the involvement of and benefit to Maori and other groups disadvantaged by the system. (*Taha Maori and Change*, 1986)

Further recommendations called for the establishment of a Maori-nominated group to be called *Nga Kaitutei o Te Haeata* (The pioneers of the new dawn) to determine spending priorities for next five years. This group was to receive a clear undertaking by the Government and the Department of Education that its decisions would be binding for a defined proportion of the Departmental budget; that the senior management of the Department be extended to include the numerical representation of Maori people 'and that teacher classification and promotion procedures require proven cultural sensitivity and appropriate management practices' (*Taha Maori and Change*, 1986).

Thus, by the mid-1980s, New Zealand's state school system had largely accepted biculturalism as its central mission. In addition, biculturalism could be readily utilised to provide powerful support for the promotion of constructivist curricula and teaching methods. In turn, constructivism's support for both cultural relativism and cultural essentialism made it the ideal vehicle for the dissemination of the bicultural message. The *de facto* alliance between biculturalism and constructivism can be clearly demonstrated in the literature that accompanied the Curriculum Review in Science (CRIS) project, itself part of the government's wider 1986 curriculum review process initiated under Labour's Minister of Education, Russell Marshall. Discussion Paper 8, Multicultural Science, was the outcome of collaboration between the Science Education Research Unit at the University of Waikato, and the Department of Education (CRIS, c.1986). The paper sought teacher's views on ways to incorporate things Maori into science curriculum, rather than the mere adding on of Maori modules to an existing framework. The articles for reading included Walker's article, 'Opening up Communication' (*NZ Listener*, January 4, 1986, p. 76); Hiwi Tauroa's publication, *Maoritanga in Practice* (Office of Race Relations Conciliator) and G. Milbank's article, 'Taha Maori and the Physical Sciences' (*Chem NZ*, no. 24, 1984) (CRIS, c.1986).

The reasons for incorporating things Maori into science included not just making science more interesting and relevant for Maori students, but in actively combating accusations of racism and monoculturalism, raising the status of things Maori in the education process, giving all pupils an identity with the indigenous culture of New Zealand, with the aim of moving towards multiculturalism, through biculturalism (CRIS, c.1986). Accordingly, the topics for discussion included 'the monocultural nature of science in its reflection of European society's values'; 'the place of Maori values. e.g. *Wairua* (respect for environment)'; the conflict between ways of working of scientists and things Maori'; and 'the different ways of making sense or explaining one's world, e.g. scientific explanations, myths and legends, biculturalism' (CRIS, c.1986).

Intellectual relativism of this type was a feature both of biculturalism and its parent, cultural essentialism. It is perhaps noteworthy that there were no university science representatives originally involved in the multicultural science project. Only a short time later, a series of fierce debates over constructivism in New Zealand science education, including the nature and place of Maori science, were to take place (Matthews, 1995). However, the biculturalism–constructivism alliance ensured that both ideologies were entrenched. By the early twenty-first

century what remained was a rigidly enforced political correctness exemplified by a continuing hostility towards any research that critiqued the underlying ideology of new class biculturalism.

Conclusion

In 1983, Joan Metge, by then attached to the Maori and Island Division of the New Zealand Department of Education, confessed to being 'unhappy and disturbed' with the monoculturalism of her fellow Pakeha. In a key policy document exemplifying the key ideas which underlay the development and spread of culturalist ideology into schools, Metge turned the cultural deficit theory upside down. It was now Pakeha rather that Maori, who were disadvantaged – hence, to 'know who we are' required an experience of 'culture shock to jolt us out of our cultural ruts'. Metge used the passage, 'not in spite of but because of its personal tone and the fact that it reveals my own stand and strong feelings about ethnic group relations in New Zealand' (1983, p. 3). The rest of Metge's paper emphatically rejected 'the view that as scholars we should be detached and objective in our approach to subject matter' (p. 3). She called upon educators to recognise the uniqueness of New Zealand, reject cultural deficit theories as these applied to Maori and pass on an understanding of the concept of culture that embraced the whole range of human experience (p. 34). Whilst Metge viewed culture as being inseparably linked with social action, she rejected the opposition between culture and society being promoted by contemporary neo-Marxist scholars, emphasising instead that cultural factors existed independently of social inequalities (p. 36).

Metge's convictions constituted the heart of the bicultural mission. She typified those educators who embraced biculturalism as their perceived mission sharing many of the attributes commonly ascribed to new religious movements. The underlying paradox was that biculturalism became a faith that, through its very anti-intellectualism, sought to rekindle faltering idealism. Moreover, for post-war New Zealand educators from the late 1960s onwards, Maori culture held multiple attractions. It could simultaneously foster pride in a supposedly unique national identity, absolve colonial guilt, defuse urban Maori tensions and provide a palliative to problems associated with urbanisation, whilst enriching a perceived spiritually impoverished Pakeha culture. Biculturalism was an effective policy lever enabling a new middle class to resolve the conflict between their political ideals and the socio-economic realities of a small dependent economy in a volatile global market. For all

these reasons, an idea originally shaped in another continent a half-century before gained an influence over educational policy and practice that not only exemplified but ultimately exceeded global trends, whilst remaining resistant to criticism and change.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of Archives New Zealand (Wellington) and Archives New Zealand (Auckland) in the preparation of this research.

9

Race and Ethnicity in United Kingdom Public Policy: Education and Health

Lorraine Culley and Jack Demaine

> No sooner do we mention 'race' than we are caught in a treacherous bind. To say 'race' seems to imply that 'race' is real; but it also means that differentiation by race is racist and unjustifiable on scientific, theoretical, moral, and political grounds. We find ourselves in a classic Nietzschean double bind: 'race' has been the history of an untruth, of an untruth that unfortunately is our history . . . The challenge here is to generate, from such a past and a present, a future where race will have been put to rest forever. (Radhakrishnan, 1996, cited in Gunaratnam, 2003)

The idea that there are groups of people so distinct that they form separate races has long been discredited by biologists (Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza, 1976; Gribbin, 1985 and others). Genetic variation within a supposed racial group will be greater than that commonly found between groups (Hirst and Woolley, 1982; Washburn, 1980). Mindful of this, sociologists have turned to concepts of ethnicity which refer to socially constructed differences grounded in cultural processes, ancestry and language (Fenton, 1999).[1] However, this manoeuvre does not obviate all the difficulties associated with biological race; over forty years ago Franz Fanon (1962) saw ethnicity as the 'new racism' (see Gillborn, 1999 for a more recent account).

Indeed, an essentialist concept of ethnicity, which constructs ethnic groups as fixed, homogenous, cultural groups characterised by sets of immutable characteristics, has often been employed to 'rationalise difference, enact stereotyping and justify discrimination' (Ellison, 2005, p. 68). Nevertheless, such a notion of ethnicity, derived from classical anthropology, underpins much of the discussion of cultural diversity and ethnic difference within the discourses of both education and healthcare

(May, 1999; Culley, 2001a). Although subjected to extensive theoretical challenge from new approaches that stress the dynamic, fluid and contextual nature of ethnic identifications, and the importance of understanding the intersectionality of ethnicity with other dimensions of difference (gender, class, sexuality), cultural essentialist concepts of ethnicity still dominate much 'professional discourse' (Gustafson, 2005) and are to be found in official policy documentation. However, most policy documents fail to discuss the conceptual basis of the terminology they deploy. In education and health policy documents, and debate, the terms race and ethnic group are frequently used interchangeably (Bradby, 1995; Fenton, 1999). The terms race, ethnicity, culture, multicultural, multiethnic, multiracial and, as we shall see, several others are used to denote alleged group difference and/or coherence. These terms coexist in legal, academic and public policy documents; often on the same page and even in the same paragraph. Sometimes terms are placed in inverted commas as a way of acknowledging their problematical character. More often, conceptual problems as such are simply ignored.

Some of the terminology deployed in policy debate and documentation is the legacy of a process of legislative development in the UK dating back to the 1960s. A largely untheorised discourse of 'race relations' (rather than ethnic relations) was enshrined in the 1965 Race Relations Act and maintained in subsequent updating of legislation. This has been further reinforced by recent legal changes following the 'watershed' publication of the report of the inquiry into the death of black teenager Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999). The Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) puts public authorities under a statutory duty 'actively to promote race equality' through all policies, practices and procedures, commonly referred to as 'the race equality duty'. This duty entails three distinct parts: to work to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, to promote equality of opportunity and to promote good race relations. The promotion of 'race equality' has become an important political objective in new Labour's modernising agenda and the public sector is required to 'set the pace in the drive for equality' and to 'lead by example'. All government departments including the Department for Education and Skills and the Department of Health, as well as individual healthcare Trusts and specific education institutions, have a mandatory requirement to publish a 'race equality scheme' (referred to as a race equality policy in schools, colleges and universities) summarising each public authority's overall approach to racial equality and saying how this links to its corporate aims and objectives. If a public authority does not meet the general duty to promote race equality, its

actions, or failure to act, can be challenged in a High Court (or Court of Session in Scotland) for judicial review. The Commission for Racial Equality has powers under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) to issue a compliance notice to a public body which it believes is not fulfilling its duties to promote race relations.

Education, race and ethnicity

Education practice and policy debate have developed over many years (there is insufficient space to report a full history here but see May, 1999 inter alios) during which time the terms ethnicity, ethnic background, multiethnic and multicultural have gained strong currency in reference to supposed differences thought to be associated with distinct 'culture, learning and socialisation'. In addressing the exigencies of a 'multicultural society', teachers are required to have 'better awareness' of their pupils' interests and needs, although precisely how the latter are calculated is rarely, if ever, clearly delineated. Nevertheless, official and unofficial discourse in education usually constructs teachers as caring professionals who are 'aware of difference' but nevertheless even-handed, fair or even 'colour-blind'. This latter term is frowned upon since its criticism over twenty years ago by the Swann Report (1985). However, it probably represents the outlook of the majority of teachers in England, although there is no reliable evidence on the matter.[2]

In 2005, in compliance with the requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000), the Department for Education and Skills published its Race Equality Scheme (2005b). The document makes use of a plethora of terms. Within the space of a few pages the reader can find ethnic groups, Asian backgrounds, Chinese and Indian (in the UK), White British, ethnic minority groups, Black Caribbean pupils, Black and Asian students, Black British, Asian British (all on the same page), minority ethnic groups, pupils from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds, BME which is explained in a Glossary at the end of the document as meaning Black and Minority Ethnic, BEMG which is said to refer to Black Ethnic Minority Group, Traveller, Irish heritage, Gypsy/Roma, individual minority ethnic groups, Black young people, White British young people, Black young males, Ethnic Minority and ethnic diversity, Black, Asian and people of mixed ethnic origin (Department for Education and Skills, 2005b). The Department for Education and Skills encourages its partners (schools, colleges and universities) 'to meet the needs of all minority ethnic groups and uses both formal and informal contact to pursue this' (ibid.).

The 'needs of all minority ethnic groups' is a very broad remit but it does not fall into an ideological vacuum. The dominant theme in education policy debate in the UK continues to be the concern over differences in the achievement rates of identified 'ethnic' groups. This theme was given public voice a quarter of a century ago by the Rampton Report (1981) and was firmly established by the subsequent Swann Report (1985). Today the theme of 'ethnic differences in achievement' is well established as an important aspect of public policy debate (Department for Education and Skills, 2005a). It is a focus of investigation by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) which records and publishes data on the achievement of pupils aged 16 and 18 in public examinations. This shows that whilst there is variation within and between individual schools, and also between local education authorities, significant overall differences are reported between children from different ethnic backgrounds; with Chinese and Indian girls performing best and African-Caribbean boys least well. Moreover, although recorded achievement rates have varied over time, Gillborn and Mirza (2000) reported that 'available evidence suggests that the inequalities of attainment for African-Caribbean pupils become progressively greater as they move through the school system; such differences become more pronounced between the end of primary school and the end of secondary education'. Similar conclusions were reached five years later in a report by the Department for Education and Skills (2005a). There is also longitudinal evidence of difference in rates of school exclusions with those whom the Department for Education and Skills (2005c) refers to as Black boys topping the charts (also see Gillborn, 2005; Crozier, 2005).

It is in this context that teachers in England are, at least formally, required to 'take account of the varying interests, experiences and achievements of boys and girls, and pupils from different cultural and ethnic groups, to help pupils make good progress' (Teacher Training Agency, 2003, p. S3.3.6). Teachers are sometimes urged to 'address racism' or to promote 'anti-racism' in academic texts which form part of their 'required reading' during their training and by some of their tutors. Following the publication of the Macpherson Report in 1999, the Teacher Training Agency has supported an online initiative called 'Multiverse' (www.multiverse.ac.uk) which addresses racism. The Agency has funded a 'school-based research agenda' on a range of issues including racism in schools. Nevertheless, in official pronouncements, in the collection of data and in the presentation of official statistics, it is the notion of 'minority ethnic groups' that prevails. However, the notion of ethnicity is seldom theorised; rather, notions of 'ethnic groups'

and people from 'minority ethnic backgrounds' have become proxies for race. Such notions sometimes bring with them stereotypes that teachers are not always required to challenge in their training or in their day-to-day work in schools (see Gillborn, 2005; Crozier, 2004). Whilst there are those who are willing to challenge racism and racialised categories, others insist on their culture and/or 'colour blindness' and are content with uncontested and unchallenged notions of ethnicity.

Teacher recruitment

In common with other professions and quasi-professions, recruitment is regarded as an important issue to be addressed. The recruitment of more teachers from 'minority ethnic backgrounds' is promoted by the UK government via its Teacher Training Agency, renamed the Teaching and Development Agency for Schools (TDA) in September 2005. The Agency has responsibility for the oversight of teacher recruitment although most of the actual recruitment is carried out by university education departments and a handful of other specialist organisations. One of the Agency's stated policies is to increase the recruitment of trainees from minority ethnic backgrounds to 9% (Teacher Training Agency, 2003) so as to create a more 'representative workforce' in schools.

Leaving aside more general issues associated with reported difficulties of teacher recruitment, and the fact that the Agency as such is not directly involved, there are several matters that require scrutiny; not least the question of 'representation'. According to the Department for Education and Skills (2005a), the UK school population includes 17 per cent of pupils categorised as from minority ethnic backgrounds. The 2001 census had found 7.9 per cent of the UK population as a whole willing to categorise themselves as from minority ethnic backgrounds. There are, of course, significant differences between school populations in different geographical locations both within specific towns and cities and across the different regions of the UK. It is not clear what percentage of teachers from specific minority ethnic backgrounds is imagined to be appropriate in any specific school, college or university. There is no suggestion of policy-makers imagining that there should or could be any attempt at 'matching' the ethnic background of school teachers to pupils. Given that no agency is responsible for the direction of labour, it is not clear how teachers from specific backgrounds would come to find themselves working in particular schools. During the course of a recent research project on minority ethnic teacher recruitment (Carrington *et al.*, 2001), it was found that teachers-in-training did not necessarily see themselves taking up posts in schools

where the pupil population somehow 'matched' their own particular ethnic background. Neither was there strong evidence that new teachers from minority ethnic backgrounds saw their future careers in terms of work in 'multicultural' schools. Furthermore, even if it were thought desirable or possible to achieve, there is no evidence that a policy of attempting to match teachers and pupils, in terms of their ethnicity, would be welcomed by many schools or by the teachers currently working in them. There is anecdotal evidence to the contrary. For example, Abbas (2004) reports a 'senior Indian teacher' contemplating new appointments referring to 'having an Asian teacher' but going on to say that 'maybe we should have a teacher from the West Indian community as well'. However, he concludes that 'You shouldn't just appoint someone because of their colour' (p. 125).

Apart from its 9 per cent of workforce policy, the recording of rates of pupil achievement on the one hand and rate of exclusions from schools on the other, and calls for 'better awareness' of the needs of pupils from 'different ethnic backgrounds', there is little else that the UK government and its education-related agencies has to offer that is specific to minority ethnic education. Of course, the UK government has plenty of other policies that affect the educational opportunities of its citizens. We will return to the question of how these might affect pupils from different ethnic backgrounds towards the end of this chapter.

Health, race and ethnicity

As with education, health policy manifests an 'uncomfortable mix' of ethnic and racial terms (Aspinall, 2002). The terms ethnic minority, minority ethnic, black and minority ethnic, black and ethnic minority, Asian, Black and other minority ethnic, 'non-white' are all deployed. As Apsinall argues, this largely reflects the changing political ideology of the State. The racialised categories that were enshrined in the Race Relations legislation of the 1960s and 1970s were defined in the context of race and colour rather than multiculturalism. More recently, government health reports have used the language of diversity and refer to 'multicultural' and 'multiethnic' Britain. Nevertheless, the term race is to be found in the titles of most of the major strategy and policy documents, and their texts interchange the language of race and ethnic diversity in a similar way to the education documents discussed earlier.

This failure to consistently and adequately theorise ethnicity is reflected in health research. Here too, confusion between race and ethnicity is not uncommon. Racialised notions have been deployed in the past to explain health differences (in terms of inherent genetic traits)

and while now eschewed, similar ideas exist in a revised form. Unlike the situation in education, there is still an unresolved debate about the relative significance of genetic and social factors as contributors to ill health. 'While few would publicly argue [against the evidence], for instance, that, as a people, the Chinese are genetically predisposed to poor academic performance, they may be prepared to argue that there is some connection between the genetic inheritance of an ethnic minority and their patterns of ill health' (Bradby, 1995, p. 408). Bradby argues that the latter is considered a more acceptable assertion because it is evidently true, to some degree, in some circumstances. Karslen and Nazroo (2002a) demonstrate that in current epidemiological research, in particular, there remains an assumption that ethnic differentials in health are at least in part a consequence of innate characteristics; whether these are explicitly described as 'ethnic' or 'racial' differences.

However, relationships between the social, genetic and environmental patterning of health and ethnicity are complex and still somewhat obscure (Sudanoa and Baker, 2006). Whilst there is abundant 'evidence' of ethnic differences in morbidity and mortality, the precise effectivity of ethnicity remains unclear. However, the work of James Nazroo and others has demonstrated that, in order to understand ethnic inequalities in health, researchers must take account of the relationship between ethnic minority status and structural disadvantage (Nazroo, 1998; Cooper, 2002; Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002a; Nazroo, 2003). The ethnic groups with the worst health status are those who suffer the greatest socio-economic disadvantage (Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in the UK context), while the health status of some other minority ethnic groups is on a par with that of the white population (Nazroo, 1997). There is a clear socio-economic effect in the relationship between ethnicity and health which suggests that to understand ethnic inequalities in health researchers need to explore the mechanisms by which ethnic minority status leads to socio-economic disadvantage (Smith, 2000). Recently, researchers have begun to explore the impact of experienced and perceived racism on health and it has been suggested that racism (rather than culture or biology) may well be a key route through which social structure influences inequalities in health (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002b; Krieger, 2003; Sudanoa and Baker, 2006).

Race and health policy

While such debates continue in the sociological and epidemiological literature, they do not commonly surface in the policy arena. The

Department of Health's Race Equality Strategy (Department of Health, 2005a) is predicated on the assumption that 'minority ethnic groups' experience 'disadvantage' which is expressed in terms of key health outcomes such as general levels of ill health, cardiovascular disease and diabetes. There is seldom any discussion of the potential impact of socio-economic status on the relationship between ethnicity and ill health. Indeed, perhaps surprisingly, questions of causality rarely feature in policy documents; despite the obvious importance of the need to understand mechanisms of inequality before devising policies. Given the prevalence of essentialist discussions in the epidemiological literature, it is not unreasonable to suggest that underlying the failure of government policy documents to discuss explanations of ethnic inequalities in health is an assumption that these arise as a result of genetic or cultural characteristics of minority ethnic groups, rather than their socio-economic location. As several authors have pointed out, this arises from the use of ethnic classifications that 'allow ethnicity to be treated as a natural and fixed division between social groups, and the description of ethnic variations in health to become their explanation' (Nazroo, 1998, p. 717). There remains a heavy concentration on studies which describe differences in measured health status or service use. Moreover, many studies refer to high-level group categories such as 'Asian', combining sub-groups with distinctive socio-cultural features and thereby losing explanatory power. There are very few studies that describe and evaluate effectively the effects of risk factors on health. At the level of service planning and delivery, health policy for 'black and ethnic minorities' thus becomes directed towards assessing the needs of (racialised) fixed and homogenous ethnic groups, which might variously have their origin in genetic, cultural, religious or lifestyle 'differences' from an allegedly homogenous 'white' population. Once 'needs' are uncovered, health agencies are expected to respond in a way which 'meets these needs'.

Notwithstanding the theoretical limitations underlying such an approach, it is clear that despite over twenty years of such 'policy', the most basic and obvious 'needs' of some members of some minority groups are a long way from being met by the UK National Health Service (NHS). The clearest example of this is in the area of communication support. 'Language barriers' have long been identified as a major obstacle to some members of minority ethnic communities receiving appropriate healthcare in the UK. While the ability to understand English varies widely across and within ethnic groups, there are substantial numbers of people who are not fluent in English (Attwood *et al.*, 2003). This has repeatedly been shown to create difficulties in accessing care and

to affect the quality of healthcare received (Rhodes and Nocon, 2003; Gerrish, Chau, Sobowale and Birks, 2004; Szczsepura, Johnson, Gumber, Jones, Clay and Shaw, 2005). Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the standard of provision of NHS interpretation and translation services in many parts of country remains poor (Alexander *et al*., 2004; Gerrish *et al*., 2004). Despite the range of language groups in the UK (evident since 1948), it was only in 2004 that a policy for comprehensive communication support was proposed (Department of Health, 2004) and this is yet to be implemented.

Several studies have demonstrated marked variation in health care utilisation across ethnic groups in the UK, with minority groups having lower use of secondary services, despite a higher use of primary care, although interpretation of such data is difficult because of a number of confounding variables (Smaje and Le Grand, 1997). A recent methodologically sophisticated analysis which takes account of both need and local supply variables does suggest inequity of utilisation (i.e. people with the same needs consume different amounts of care). However, the complex pattern of variation, both by ethnic group and by stage in the health care process, makes devising policies to correct such inequity very difficult (Morris, Sutton and Gravelle, 2005).

Over the last ten years there has been a growth of projects and interventions, many at a local level, in relation to coronary heart disease, cancer care, diabetes, mental health and screening in particular, directed to improving access to care and reducing ethnic health inequalities. Much of the most innovative work has taken place in the voluntary sector rather than through the NHS. Very few interventions have been subjected to effective evaluation of outcome or impact. Many initiatives in both sectors suffer from the lack of ongoing funding and commitment of staff and projects often close without significant impact on mainstream service provision (Johnson, 2004). It remains to be seen whether the provisions of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) result in an improvement in the sustainability of what are currently pockets of 'good practice'.

Under the provisions of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) every NHS Health Trust (hospitals and primary care organisations) must have in place a Race Equality Scheme which 'promotes race equality'. Trusts are obliged to monitor all policies for their impact on promoting race equality through a 'Race Equality Impact Assessment'. No definition of race equality is provided. Despite a plethora of exhortations about the significance of 'valuing diversity', guides to the implementation of race equality schemes and codes of practice, it remains to be

seen whether the latest policies on race and health will have any noticeable impact on ethnic health inequalities. A pessimistic, though possibly realistic, assessment would suggest a minimal impact is likely. The attribution of all ethnic difference in health to socio-economic factors *per se* is untenable, not least because of the intertwining of racism and socio-economic status (Karslen and Nazroo, 2002b). However, if, as we have argued, ethnic inequalities are related in complex but fundamental ways to wider social and economic inequalities, the prospects are not promising. Current public health policies (Department of Health, 2004) which attempt to address adverse health behaviours may be laudable, and may improve health for all groups, but they are likely to result in only modest decreases in ethnic health disparities.

The evidence on general health inequalities suggests that despite a government with an unprecedented explicit commitment to reducing health inequalities, the gap between the health of the rich and the poor is growing. A Department of Health-commissioned report found the gap in life expectancy between the bottom fifth and the population as a whole had widened by 2 per cent for males and 5 per cent for females between 1997–99 and 2001–03. This shift means the life expectancy in the wealthiest areas is seven to eight years longer than the poorest areas. The gap in the infant mortality rate between the poorest ('routine and manual groups') and the total population, was 19 per cent higher in 2001–03 compared to 13 per cent higher in 1997–99 (Department of Health, 2005b).

Employment initiatives in the National Health Service

The NHS is the biggest UK employer of individuals from minority ethnic groups. The Department of Health race equality strategy is also concerned with the status and advancement of minority ethnic workers. In the UK there is a long history of largely ineffective public sector equal opportunities employment policies (Johns, 2005). Since the election of a Labour government in 1997 with a more determined approach to tackling disadvantage and discrimination in employment, the Department of Health has announced a disparate collection of policy documents and initiatives. A general strategy document on diversity issues was published in 2000 which included a consideration both of employment issues and service delivery issues (Department of Health, 2000). Since 2000, there has been a series of initiatives and national development programmes with the objective of recruiting and promoting people from minority ethnic communities within the NHS, with the aim of 'ensuring that the NHS workforce at all levels, represents Britain's

multiethnic society'. Indeed, several government documents make an explicit connection between the recruitment of a diverse workforce and the provision of services to minority ethnic communities, arguing that the improvement of the latter will occur as an inevitable consequence of the achievement of the former; a position which has been challenged both on theoretical and on empirical grounds (Gerrish *et al.*, 1996; Culley, 2000; Iganski and Mason, 2002). The race and employment agenda includes initiatives such as setting targets to increase the minority ethnic representation on Trust Boards; leadership development programmes for minority ethnic employees; policies on racial harassment and the implementation of ethnic monitoring for both staff and patients.

The impact of these new employment policies is yet to be evaluated. However, the under-representation of ethnic minorities at the higher levels of employment in the NHS and in the more prestigious specialities has been acknowledged for many years. There have been many previous policy pronouncements designed to address these issues with relatively little success to date (Iganski and Mason, 2002). The NHS has, by its own admission, failed to implement the minimum employment standards required for compliance with the 1976 Race Relations Act and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000). In the twenty years since the Commission for Racial Equality first issued guidelines on good practice for employees, NHS organisations have consistently failed to comply with them (Esmail *et al.*, 2005; Wrench, 2005). Research has continually demonstrated the unwillingness of many NHS employers to engage fully with equal opportunity policies; particularly those that require any form of positive action (Carter, 2000; Culley, 2001b; Johns, 2005). There is little evidence that such resistance has diminished. However, as with the case of education, while there are strong social justice arguments for ensuring 'fair treatment' of minority ethnic employees, it is not clear how this would necessarily translate into better health outcomes for minority ethnic patients.

Marketisation in health and education

The policy implications of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) and associated initiatives in education and health are best seen in the context of broader UK government policy on the growing marketisation of the public sector and the 'commodification' of public services. To some extent covertly in education, but much more explicitly in health policy, the current policy direction is towards stronger market

incentives and decentralisation of budgetary power. In the case of health policy, for example, despite initially rejecting the notion of an internal market in the NHS (a central plank of Conservative Party policy), the Labour government has re-introduced competition into health services since the start of its second term of office in 2001. The health market now emerging is the product of a series of separate policy developments, including expanding the role of the private sector, increasing the autonomy of local healthcare providers from central control, introducing payment by results and extending choice of provider (Lewis and Dixon, 2005).

This restructuring of healthcare under the rubric of promoting 'patient choice' may further entrench social inequalities in a number of ways. Effective patient choice requires empowering and involving patients through improved access to health information. Patients' understanding of health information varies considerably and is hard to predict. However, there is evidence that lower health literacy is more common in some minority ethnic groups and this has been identified as a major problem in accessing services at the present time. It is possible then that 'patient choice' initiatives could have the effect of exacerbating existing health inequalities, including those related to ethnicity (Ellins, 2005). Furthermore, the possible introduction of private commissioning of NHS services provokes some important legal questions for the implementation of race equality policies and may present the prospect of two-tier rights in the NHS. Patients who are subject to private commissioners may not enjoy identical rights to those within statutory primary care trusts since private sector companies are not subject to judicial review and there are important differences in the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act and the Human Rights Act in the public and private sectors (Newdick and Danbury, 2006).

In education, aspects of the quasi-market left by the outgoing Conservative administration have been retained by New Labour and other non-market initiatives have been introduced (Demaine, 2005). However, during late 2005 and early 2006 'parent choice' was once again at the forefront of Labour's agenda with critics from within the party arguing that Labour's policy could well have the effect of exacerbating existing educational inequalities (see Demaine, 2006). Critics argued that proposals set out for the reform of secondary education in the 2005 White Paper, *Higher Standards, Better Schools For All: More Choice for Parents and Pupils*, and subsequently presented to parliament in the Education and Inspections Bill (2006) will have the capacity, despite government assertions to the contrary, to increase inequality

of educational opportunity, inequality of educational attainment, pupil disaffection, pupil absenteeism and school exclusion. If this turns out to be so, it is hard to see how the interests of pupils from most minority ethnic communities would be advanced. Indeed, labour backbench members of parliament published a document titled *Shaping the Education Bill: Reaching for Consensus*, setting out objections and making alternative proposals (Abbot *et al*., 2006). Labour Party members, including former Secretaries of State for Education and a former Leader of the Labour Party Neil (now Lord) Kinnock, expressed their surprise and criticised Blair's policy. Critics argued that the central ideas delineated in the Education and Inspections Bill (2006) could lead to better schools for some (not all) and more choice for schools rather than for parents and pupils. To many observers on the political right, as well as those on the left, Blair's education policy looked remarkably similar to right wing policy proposed in the 1980s with all the questions as to whom it would benefit (see Demaine, 1990, 1999). It is significant that no Conservative member of parliament voted against the second reading of the Bill whilst 52 Labour members voted against. Critics inside and outside parliament argued that those who usually benefit from markets will be the ones who will have most to gain from an enhanced market in education.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown how 'race' and 'ethnicity' are invoked in policy discourse. We have criticised essentialist concepts of ethnicity which construct 'ethnic groups' as fixed homogenous cultural groups characterised by sets of immutable characteristics. Such notions have been the subject of extensive theoretical challenge from newer approaches that stress the dynamic, fluid and contextual character of ethnic identifications. We have shown how essentialist concepts of ethnicity still dominate UK legislation, social policy documentation and professional discourse on cultural diversity and ethnic difference in education and healthcare. Nevertheless, we recognise that the British Labour Party's policy in implementing the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000), which puts public authorities under a statutory duty to promote race equality, is well intentioned. The positive effects include several prosecutions for 'racially motivated' crimes often involving attacks on citizens for no other reason than the colour of their skin. These prosecutions have been given a high profile in the media which in itself is a positive thing. However, the policy implications of the Race Relations

(Amendment) Act (2000) and the associated initiatives in education and health are best seen in the context of other government policy.

Despite initially rejecting the notion of an internal NHS market when it came to power in 1997, the British Labour Government re-introduced competition into health services at the start of its second term of office from 2001. The health market now emerging is the product of a series of separate policy developments, including extending choice of provider, expanding the role of the private sector and introducing 'payment by results'. In education, the quasi-market introduced initially by the Conservatives has been retained alongside other non-market initiatives. Legislation making its way through parliament during 2006 will further enhance the education market and has the capacity to increase inequality of educational opportunity. Whilst there have been some successes in reducing child poverty and improvements in housing for the worst off, there is little evidence of effective interventions to address social inequalities in Britain and, indeed, many wider economic policies have had the effect of increasing the income and wealth gap. The marketisation of education and healthcare, and the promotion of the idea of parent and patient 'choice' may further entrench social inequalities. Effective parent and patient choice presupposes the 'empowerment' of parents and patients through improved access to health and education information. Parents' and patients' understanding of education and health information varies considerably and it is possible that choice initiatives could have the effect of exacerbating existing inequalities. The rhetoric of race equality is unlikely to provide an effective mask for the racialised effects of public policy.

Notes

1. Although there are no races, the idea of race is still socially and politically significant. Race is not real but racism is. Evidence abounds of the persistence of ideas about racial categories in everyday discourse and their very real effects in many forms of racist exclusion (Goldberg, 1993).
2. The evidence on teacher ideology is not reliable (see Foster, Gomm and Hammersley, 1996). Citing the latter does not imply taking sides with those authors in the debate over alleged racism in English schools. The lack of reliable evidence does not imply one thing or the other. For other arguments see the work of Gillborn, passim and Crozier, 2005, for example.

10
Ethnic Measurement as a Policy Making Tool

Paul Callister

Ethnicity (or race) is considered to be a very significant dimensional variable in social science research and policy making in most, but not all, countries. Yet, ethnicity is not a human characteristic that can be easily identified or measured. As a result in many countries, including New Zealand, there is an ongoing debate as to the best way of measuring and reporting race or ethnicity data. In turn, these discussions raise difficult questions about the use of ethnicity in the development and delivery of social policy, particularly in the light of an increasing recognition that ethnic boundaries are often 'leaky'.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of why a country might collect information on ethnicity. Some of the historical debates around the collection and reporting of race, then ethnicity, data in New Zealand are then explored. While there are many dimensions to debates about the collection and reportage of ethnicity data, I focus particularly on how those people who belong to more than one ethnic group have been recorded and classified in official surveys.

One reason for people recording more than one ethnic group is that they are children of either recent or distant ethnic intermarriages. Historically, there have been, and continue to be, at least three potential impacts of ethnic intermarriage: genetic mixing, cultural mixing and resource mixing. Each form of mixing has the potential to affect social, economic and health outcomes of individuals. Such mixing can also give some people more choice as to their ethnic identity. With these issues in mind, the chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the social policy implications of historical and current ethnic intermarriage and the growing proportion of New Zealanders who claim multi-ethnic

affiliations. This discussion includes a summary of recent New Zealand debates about ethnicity and disadvantage.[1]

Why collect ethnicity data?

Morning (2005) argues that it is important for governments to have a clear idea as to why ethnicity data are collected. In some European countries where ethnicity data are not gathered, the potential collection of these data has been vigorously debated. Morning suggests that while supporters believe such collections are necessary to identify and combat discrimination, opponents fear that such data would divide the nation, stigmatise some groups and generally bolster concepts of difference that have been closely associated with prejudice.[2]

Rallu, Piché and Simon (2001) propose four approaches to ethnic enumeration by governments:

- Enumeration for political control
- Non-enumeration in the name of national integration
- Discourse of national hybridity
- Enumeration for antidiscrimination.

Rallu *et al.* identify colonial census administration with the first category, such as apartheid-era South Africa where the ethnic categories formed the basis for exclusionary policies. Historically, New Zealand might have been seen to fit somewhat into this category. However, it is possible that currently New Zealand best fits in the fourth category. Examples within this group include England, Canada and the United States. In these countries, ethnic census data serve as tools for combating discrimination and fostering economic and social development. The third category is largely associated with some Latin American countries, where mixed ethnicity or hybridity is supported in public discourse. New Zealand could potentially move towards this approach.

The history of each country is important in determining whether ethnicity data should be collected. For example, questions relating to race, ethnicity, ancestry and country of birth have not been asked in Germany since 1945 (Allan, 2001). In New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 between Maori chiefs and representatives of the British monarchy, creates a special need for definitions as to who is part of the indigenous Maori group and who is not. In addition, in 1867 the Franchise Act also made a count of the Maori population based on ancestry imperative for electoral purposes.

The classification of individuals in New Zealand

New Zealand has experienced a number of waves of migration. The first was by Maori who became New Zealand's indigenous population. While there remains debate over the exact timing of the arrival of the first Maori settlers in New Zealand, generally it is agreed that this occurred less than 1000 years ago (King, 2003). The first recorded European visit to New Zealand was by Abel Tasman and his crew in 1642. Over 100 years later, James Cook arrived in 1769 from Britain. In contrast to Tasman, Cook and his crew had numerous contacts with Maori (Salmond, 1991). Cook was soon followed by small groups of whalers, sealers and traders who set up bases around New Zealand. From the earliest days of contact there has been a high level of intermarriage, both formal and informal, between Maori and the new arrivals (Belich, 1996; Wanhalla, 2003). When Cook arrived estimates of the New Zealand population varied from around 86,000 (Belich, 1996, p. 178) through to around 100,000 (Pool, 1991). The ethnic composition (or race, as then measured) was, by definition, 100 per cent Maori. It has been estimated that disease and other factors subsequently halved the Maori population by the late 1880s. In the period of Maori population decline, the settler population was rapidly increasing from fewer than a thousand to half a million between 1831 and 1881 (Belich, 1996, p. 278). Following this migration-driven population expansion, births in New Zealand took over in the mid-1880s (King, 2003)

Around the turn of the 20th century, the Maori population began to increase again. Post-Second World War there was a significant migration from the Pacific, with this population growing quite rapidly during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The fourth major group, Asians, predates the Pacific migration. There have been people of Asian ethnicity living in New Zealand from the early days of European settlement, although in very small numbers and often predominated by males. However, a century later in the 1980s and 1990s the number of people of Asian ethnicity grew rapidly. A more recent component of migration comprises refugees and other settlers from Africa and the Middle East. However, this group is still relatively small. Internal migration has also been an important aspect of the changing ethnic mix of New Zealand. In 1945, 26 per cent of the Maori population lived in the towns and cities but had reached nearly 80 per cent by 1986. With more contact between Maori, Europeans and new Pacific migrants, intermarriage opportunities increased significantly during the 1960s.

As the population has changed in New Zealand, so too the thinking about how to classify people. In common with other countries, race, based on ancestry, was the foundation of most early New Zealand statistical collections (Statistics New Zealand, 2004). Although use of descriptors such as 'black' and 'white' have not been used in New Zealand, notions of blood quantity have been applied. While only one ancestral group was collected per person in early New Zealand censuses, the category Maori-European half-caste was one of the choices. Nineteenth-century New Zealand census data identified and separated out 'half-castes', an official indication that a mixed Maori-European population was becoming important. The 1936 Census question introduced a new complexity by allowing respondents to record fractions such as one quarter European, three quarters Maori. The term 'race' was used until 1951, but then there was a switch made to 'descent' related terms. The concept of ethnicity, or more specifically 'ethnic origin', was first introduced in the 1970s. The term 'ethnic origin' then became 'ethnic group' in the early 1990s. At this time there was also a separate question added on Maori ancestry in the five yearly censuses of population and this has been repeated in subsequent censuses.

While the term race continues to be used in a small number of countries, including the United States, Morning (2005) shows that it is almost exclusively nations with a history of African slavery that still use the language of 'race'. Stephan and Stephan (2000) suggest that race is now more properly viewed as a social rather than a biological construct, even if biology still plays a role in the phenotypic expression of some physical characteristics. While the majority of social scientists share this view, there remains intense debate amongst other scientists, including medical researchers, as to the existence of identifiable races. This debate has been rekindled by the human genome project and related research. For example, a January 2005 special issue of the *American Psychologist* drew heavily on the human genome project to present a variety of views about the use of 'race' in health and social science research.

In New Zealand, while politicians continue to use the term 'race' and there are some agencies with the title 'race' (such as Race Relations Office), social scientists and policy makers no longer do so. Instead ethnicity is the preferred term. Much has been written about how ethnicity is, or should be, in New Zealand (e.g. Didham, 2004; Kukutai, 2003, 2004; Pearson, 2001; Statistics New Zealand, 2004). As a result of its latest review of ethnicity statistics, Statistics New Zealand (2004) sets out a

number of factors that may contribute to, or influence, a person's ethnicity. As they note, many of these are interrelated. This list is:

- name
- ancestry
- culture
- where a person lives and the social context
- race
- country of birth and/or nationality
- citizenship
- religion and language.

The social context can include economic or social incentives (or disincentives) for belonging to a particular ethnic group. For example, in Canada a census taken during the Second World War showed that very few people classified themselves as German when compared with censuses taken prior to the war (Ryder, 1955). Equally, ethnic-based scholarships may encourage people to emphasise particular ethnic affiliations. It is always important to keep in mind that various 'others', such as employers, landlords, teachers, funeral directors and the police, will also be constructing a person's ethnicity. Often this construction of ethnicity will be constrained or influenced by observable characteristics (Brunsma and Rockquemore, 2001; Mason, 2001), hence the term 'visible' minority is used in places like Canada. Observable characteristics include phenotypic expression of particular physical features, such as skin colour or, at times, surnames. Yet, physical characteristics and surnames can be misleading. For instance, when announcing a top female Maori scholar, *Mana* magazine (2002, p. 22) focuses initially on physical characteristics, but notes, 'Don't be fooled by the blond hair and the green eyes. She's Maori, really, and is our top scholar for the year.' That a top all-round female Maori scholar in 2003 had a stereotypical Asian surname is another New Zealand example (NZQA, 2003).

High-level groupings of ethnicity

Five ethnic groupings are commonly used in New Zealand social science and policy making. These are based on geographical location or origin, perceived cultural similarities, and the size of the group in New Zealand. Some have similarities to groups used in other countries while others do not. The groups are European, Maori, Pacific Island Peoples, Asian

and 'Other'.[3] However, a sixth 'non-response' group is important at just under 4 per cent of responses in 2001. For some people, ethnicity may not be important. Language used in official forms and in discussions about ethnic groups has been the subject of much debate in New Zealand. At times the Maori word 'Pakeha' has been used as a label for European settlers or their descendents. However, this is a word not universally accepted (Bedggood, 1997; Pearson and Sissons, 1997). In fact, one of the most common complaints to Race Relations Office has been from people objecting to being labelled 'Pakeha' (Barnard, 2001). There remains a problem in finding a name for New Zealand's largest ethnic group. For many people, the term 'European' is not an ethnic group. The search for a 'New Zealand' identity has meant just under 2 per cent of census respondents, including some who have Maori ancestry, are recording 'New Zealander' as a response to ethnic survey questions (Potter *et al*., 2003).

Ethnic intermarriage and complex ethnicity

Throughout history when previously isolated ethnic groups have come into contact with each other, there is some amount of ethnic intermarriage (Leroi, 2005). The complexity of constructing ethnicity when there has been historical ethnic intermarriage, as well as ethnic conflict, can be seen in New Zealand literature. In a poem entitled 'Race relations', Colquhoun (1999) lays out a complex set of components of ancestry, kinship and country of origin for the individual the poem is about. This background includes Australian, English, Scottish, German, Jewish and Maori roots. He notes that historically many of these groups have been in conflict with each other. Referring to his English and German background, he remarks that 'One half of me lost a war the other half won' (p. 38). Similarly, describing Scottish and Maori connections, he writes, 'Somewhere along the line/I have managed to colonise myself.' Recording and reporting multiple ethnic groups in official data collections often reflects such complexity.

In the United States, the 2000 census was the first time that respondents could record more than one racial group. The decision to allow this in the United States was not without controversy, with some groups concerned that it might 'dilute' the counts of some important minority groups (Korgen, 1998). While in New Zealand there was little public debate over the collection of more than one ethnic group, there was some concern expressed amongst the policy-making community about

the change. Part of this focused on the inability to develop consistent time series. There was, however, more debate on how these data should be reported.

In New Zealand, while recording more than one group in the five yearly censuses was first possible in 1936, because of changes in concept, dual or multi-ethnic group data was first collected in 1991.[4] In 2001, just under 8 per cent of the population recorded more than one main ethnic group (Table 10.1). As a comparison, data on race drawn from the 2000 US census indicates that 2.4 per cent of the population recorded more than one racial group. Amongst US whites, only 2 per cent recorded other than white only, for Asians it was 14 per cent, while for Native Americans/Alaska Natives it was 40, similar to Maori in New Zealand (Allan, 2001).

When more than one group started to be collected, reporting group membership became more complex. In the early period during which more than one group was recorded, Statistics New Zealand (as well as most government agencies and researchers) relied primarily on the prioritisation of ethnic groups in order to simplify the presentation of the data. Under this system, Maori had priority coding, followed by Pacific peoples, then Asian, other ethnic groups besides European, followed by 'Other European' and, finally, New Zealand European. There were, however, more disadvantages than advantages in this process of prioritisation (Callister, 2004). After considering a range of alternatives, Statistics New Zealand (2004) recommended abandoning this practice.

Table 10.1 Dual or multiple ethnicity responses by each ethnic group, 2001

Ethnic group	**Response (total per cent with more than one response)**
European	9
Maori	44
Pacific peoples	29
Asian	10
Other	22
Total	8

Note: People that 'only identify with that ethnic group' would include the following examples: a Pacific person that self-identified as both Samoan and Cook Island ethnic groups and an Asian person that self-identified as both Chinese and Korean ethnic groups.
Source: Census of Population and Dwellings, Statistics New Zealand.

Table 10.2 Changing ethnic mix of the total Maori, Pacific Peoples and European ethnic groups by age, 2001

	Age				
	0–14	**15–24**	**25–44**	**45–64**	**65–74**
Total Maori ethnic group					
Maori only	45.8	51.9	62.0	71.9	76.4
Maori/European	42.1	40.2	34.5	25.8	21.8
Maori/Pacific peoples	5.0	3.7	1.4	0	0
Maori/Pacific/European	5.0	2.6	1.4	0	0
Other combinations	2.1	1.6	0.7	2.2	1.8
Total Pacific peoples ethnic group					
Pacific only	59.1	68.2	80.3	88.9	91.3
Pacific/Maori	10.9	8.2	3.3	0	0
Pacific/European	16.4	15.3	11.5	5.6	4.3
Pacific/Maori/European	10.9	5.9	3.3	0	0
Other combinations	2.7	2.4	1.6	5.6	4.3
Total European ethnic group					
European only	80.6	86.0	92.2	96.8	98.4
European/Maori	13.4	10.4	6.2	2.7	1.3
European/Pacific	2.4	1.8	0.8	0.2	0.1
European/Asian	1.2	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.1
European/Maori/Pacific	1.6	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.0
Other combinations	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1

Source: Census of Population and Dwellings, Statistics New Zealand.

Instead, they recommended an expansion of the reportage of non-prioritised multi-ethnic data with the standard output for ethnicity data being single and combination responses as well as total response data.

Using some of these single/combination data, the complex mix of ethnicities among young Maori, Pacific peoples and to a lesser degree Europeans in New Zealand can be seen in Table 10.2. For example, among young New Zealanders (0–14) who belong to the total European ethnic group, 13 per cent recorded both Maori and European ethnic groups. Amongst young Maori, 42 per cent recorded both Maori and European ethnic groups.

Ethnic boundaries and social policy

The relatively high level of dual and multiple ethnicity in New Zealand primarily reflect comparatively high rates of ethnic intermarriage, particularly between Maori and Europeans (Callister *et al.*, 2005).

Rates of intermarriage are especially high for well-educated Maori and Pacific peoples. Historically, there have been and continue to be at least three potential impacts of this intermarriage: intergenerational genetic mixing, intergenerational cultural mixing and intergenerational resource mixing. One potential outcome of genetic mixing can be a reduction or loss of distinctive physical characteristics. Cultural mixing can and does occur with or without intermarriage. In a discussion of biculturalism in New Zealand, Sharp (1995, p. 118) notes that 'although the autonomy and incommensurability of cultures is asserted often enough, cultures are actually leaky vessels, created, renewed and transformed in endless contact with others. While this contact with others can occur in a variety of ways, intermarriage provides a particularly intense and intimate site for potential cultural exchange.'

While a common view is that intermarriage will lead to a dissipation of cultural practice of the partner who is from the minority culture, outcomes can be more complex. In a history of changing ideology in relation to the counting of Maori in the Census of Population and Dwellings, Riddell (2000) demonstrates that historical intermarriage between Maori and non-Maori has not, as some commentators had predicted, resulted in the disappearance of a once 'dying race'. Instead, Riddell asserts that intermarriage has added directly to the numbers of those who can define themselves as Maori and of Maori descent.

Given the high historic and ongoing rates of intermarriage, while a minority of New Zealanders currently have Maori ancestors, in the future far more will have descendents who can claim Maori ancestry and may want to claim Maori ethnicity. This means there needs to be room for policy-related research to acknowledge dual or multi-ethnicities, and the mixing of cultural practices, rather than focusing on groups as being very separate and having distinct cultural characteristics. A number of examples can be found in New Zealand research literature where a non-overlapping 'two worlds' view is portrayed (Rata, 2000). For example, Tolich (2002) divides researchers into two distinct groups: Maori and Pakeha. But lacking from his discussion of 'who can research Maori' samples were complications that some in the samples record both Maori and European ethnic groups or Maori and Pacific peoples, some record Maori ancestry but not Maori ethnicity, or some respondents simply call themselves 'New Zealanders', including those 12 per cent of sole 'New Zealanders' who also recorded Maori ancestry in the 2001 census (Potter *et al.*, 2003).

Past and present ethnic intermarriage, dual and multiple ethnicity, and the leaky boundaries of culture do not undermine the need for

a range of perspectives in policy discussions and research. However, intermarriage does mean that 'both worlds' (or more realistically 'many worlds') will, at times, influence what is commonly seen in policy debates as 'a Maori perspective'. Intermarriage, dual and multiple ethnicity and other potential ways of sharing cultural values will also, of course, sometimes influence what might be seen as a 'European perspective' or perhaps a 'Pacific perspective'.

Another critical policy question is whether the new complex ethnic data will help in identifying factors that influence disadvantage. Just as importantly, can they help in overcoming these disadvantages? While outcomes for Maori and Pacific peoples have improved since the mid-1990s in many areas including life expectancy, rates of participation in early childhood and tertiary education, and unemployment, indicators of well-being for Maori and Pacific peoples are still relatively poor in a number of areas (Ministry of Social Development, 2005). Yet, at the same time researchers are also starting to consider increasing within-group differences in economic and social outcomes (Dixon and Maré, 2005). For example, while there are clearly disadvantaged Maori there is also a growing Maori (and, perhaps to a lesser degree, Pacific peoples) middle class. The heterogeneity among ethnic groups, including amongst the dominant New Zealand European population, is often not acknowledged by political activists.

When analysing heterogeneity of outcomes among the wider Maori ethnic group in New Zealand, researchers have made some limited use of multi-ethnic responses.[5] Based on data collected in the Waikato, Kukutai (2003) shows that individuals who describe themselves as mixed Maori and non-Maori, and who identify more strongly with the latter, tend to be socially and economically much better off than all other Maori. In contrast, those who identify more strongly as Maori had socio-economic and demographic attributes similar to those who only record Maori as their ethnic group. In a later paper, Kukutai (2004, pp. 100–101) suggests that still little is known as to:

> . . . why orientation towards the European mainstream confers benefits in terms of better outcomes. Or, alternatively, why those who are committed to a Maori ethnic identity incur certain costs, net of the benefits that might come with being part of a cultural community.

Other researchers have also puzzled about this (e.g. Gould, 2000, p. 13). Chapple (2000) has proposed that the disadvantage among Maori is, in fact, concentrated in a particular subset: that is, those who identify

only as Maori have no educational qualifications and live outside of major urban centres. For reasons that are unclear, health disadvantages are also concentrated among those who identify only as Maori (Callister and Blakely, 2004). As Baehler (2002) notes, the idea that a particular subgroup are 'truly disadvantaged' parallels the work of Wilson (1987) in the United States.

So what sort of programmes might help disadvantaged groups in New Zealand and particularly disadvantaged Maori? One is affirmative action programmes.[6] Affirmative action involves positive steps being taken to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in areas of employment, education and positions of political influence from which they have been historically excluded. In New Zealand it has often been assumed that when members of disadvantaged groups occupy positions of power and influence, they not only serve as role models but they have a better understanding of the problems affecting those groups. Their participation is also considered to help dissipate stereotypical assumptions about those groups. Based on this theory, it is assumed that having more Maori working in the health system and in teaching jobs would enable these sectors to better serve Maori patients or students. Equally, it is often assumed that Maori researchers would automatically undertake research in the best interests of their Maori research subjects.

Regardless of the theoretical merits or otherwise of ethnic targeting, intermarriage and complex ethnicity creates some challenges for implementation of any policies. When reviewing changes in American data collections, Hirschman, Alba and Farley (2000) argue that changes to include multi-race categories is likely to influence both litigation and legislation, more particularly with regards to affirmative action policies. While Kukutai (2001, p. 29) argues that, unlike the United States, in New Zealand there is no statutory basis for granting preferential treatment to Maori, historic and current examples can be found in New Zealand of targeted scholarships for Maori and Pacific Peoples. These emphasise ancestry, although cultural ties, such as through involvement in Maori communities and culture, are also sometimes seen as important (e.g. Maori Education Trust, 2005).

However, some social policy targeting in New Zealand has been based on self-defined ethnicity measures. For example, until mid-2005 additional funding could be provided to schools based on ethnic data rather than ancestral measures. For instance, a school-based funding measure included single-group Maori and Pacific peoples' ethnicity variables. This type of group-based measure did not provide additional support to particular Maori individuals but instead to all the children attending

low socio-economic schools. In addition within the funding formula, all those recording Maori ethnicity were treated equally despite the data indicating that, on average, those recording Maori only are more disadvantaged. It was therefore a blunt targeting measure.

Prompted by criticism of 'race-based' policies by the main opposition political party, a review of ethnic-based programmes and targeting was undertaken by the New Zealand government in 2004–05 (Brash, 2004; Mallard, 2005). The review considered that ethnic-based targeting was appropriate where:

- A need is clearly established and those in need identified
- Ethnicity helps identify those in need better than other available information
- People in need are not excluded from the services because of their ethnicity
- Tailoring of the delivery of a programme for particular groups is likely to help reach those in need or increase the effectiveness of the programme
- There is clear evidence of effectiveness

As a result of this review, some programmes are being phased out, some have been modified, others are to be investigated further, while a further set of programmes were seen to be justified. However, there is a wide range of opinions in New Zealand about the value of ethnically based policies and it is likely there will be an ongoing debate about their costs and benefits.

Conclusion

Ethnicity (or race) data is collected in most, but not all, countries. Policy makers need to think carefully about both the costs and the benefits of collecting such data and, if collected, how it is used. Ethnic data collections can be used positively to help identify and overcome disadvantages. However, they can also create negative stereotypes and an emphasis on broad ethnic-based disparities can disguise wider, but more complex, class-based inequalities.

In those countries where such data is collected, concepts of ethnicity are undergoing continuous transformation. In New Zealand, official definitions of ethnicity now generally revolve around culture. Yet, for many New Zealanders, factors including nationality, descent, country

of birth, religion and the expression of distinctive physical characteristics, including skin colour, continue to influence the definition of ethnicity among individuals and groups. In addition, where there are costs or, alternatively, benefits in aligning with particular ethnic groups, this is likely to also influence ethnic choices. Reflecting historic and recent ethnic intermarriage, it is now acknowledged that, based on their ancestry, many New Zealanders have the potential to affiliate with more than one ethnic group. However, given the shift to a cultural construction of ethnicity, there is also now the potential for New Zealanders to align with particular ethnic groups regardless of their ancestry.

New Zealand has been one of the first countries to allow respondents to choose more than one ethnic group when completing official surveys, including the five yearly censuses. When more than one ethnic group response was first collected in the Census of Population and Dwellings, Statistics New Zealand introduced a system of prioritising the ethnicity of multi-ethnic people. It is now recognised that ethnic prioritisation hid, rather than brought to the fore, important social facts. Statistics New Zealand has now abandoned this practice. Instead, ethnic reportage is generally based on total responses in each ethnic group.

The rise of a multi-ethnic New Zealand provides a major challenge for the design of social policy aimed at helping overcome disadvantage among particular groups. New Zealand ethnicity data needs to be carefully scrutinised by policy makers, and the media, in order to better assess what factors may result in individuals facing disadvantage and how policy should be designed to overcome such disadvantage. Analysing more complex multi-ethnic data is likely to help in this process. However, growing within-group differences also suggest that researchers and policy makers need to consider a wide range of other possible factors when examining disadvantage. Given the considerable problems in creating clear ethnic group boundaries as well as increasing within-group heterogeneity, there is a danger in relying too much on ethnicity data in social policy analysis and social policy delivery.

Finally, increasing numbers of dual-ethnicity and multi-ethnicity New Zealanders in the longer term add complexity to discussions of biculturalism and partnership between Maori and other New Zealanders. Concepts of partnership are more straightforward if the partners are separate, impermeable ethnic groups. Yet, ongoing and increasingly complex intermarriage means that, for a significant proportion of New Zealanders, ancestral roots currently include, and will so more in the

future, representatives of both partners. While images of impermeable ethnic groups may be useful for political purposes, they disguise the true complexity of New Zealand society.

Notes

1. This chapter draws heavily on a paper published in the *New Zealand Social Policy Journal* (Callister, 2004). I would like to thank the editor, Marlene Levine, for permission to draw on this article.
2. One result of some European countries not collecting ethnicity data, the OECD does not routinely consider ethnicity as a factor in country comparisons.
3. Pacific is the only group that also has 'peoples' as part of the label. While not the original intention of this label, it nevertheless indicates some diversity within the group. There is debate in New Zealand whether 'peoples' should be added to the other groups as well.
4. The 1986 census asked a question about ethnic origin rather than ethnic group. In this census it was possible to tick more than one box for origin and/or record an additional ethnic group.
5. In contrast, little attention has been given to dual or multiple ethnicities among the wider Pacific peoples ethnic group when investigating disadvantage among Pacific communities.
6. The role of affirmative action policies in New Zealand is discussed more fully in Boston, Callister and Wolf (2006).

11

Challenging Ethnic Explanations for Educational Failure

Roy Nash

This chapter provides a critical study of the explanations used in education research to justify ethnic-based policies. New Zealand is used as an example of what has been termed the international 'culture wars' (Kuper, 2001) because it is in this country that we see policymakers, supported by some influential academics (Bishop and Glynn, 1999; L.T. Smith, 1999; Bishop *et al.*, 2003; Durie, 2003a, 2005), employing an extreme version of the dominance of cultural theory to explain educational differences between social groups. Its adherents emphatically reject any other explanations and frequently accuse those using class approaches of being culturally insensitive and even racist to a degree that has served to discourage those interested in researching question fundamental to educational sociology, namely: What are the causes of mean differences in the educational achievements of social groups within a given society?

The disparity we are concerned with here is that between Maori and non-Maori. Research here is badly needed. Maori students continue to leave school with lower levels of achievement than Pakeha (European descent) students and so give rise to a disparity, regarded as a fundamental and unjust form of inequality, ever present to the consciousness of policymakers in education (Chapple, Jefferies and Walker, 1997). The relatively poor educational achievement of Maori students are rightly a matter of great concern to all those dedicated to making New Zealand a fairer society. As one widely used textbook (Jones *et al.*, 1995, p. 23) observes:

> Arguably, the most significant crisis within New Zealand education at the present time relates to the continued inability to deliver on the promise of equity or equality as an educational outcome for Maori students.

Those involved with the educational system have a legitimate right, even a duty, to put their minds to the causes of Maori–Pakeha disparities and to consider how their effects might be reduced. This poses an initial difficulty, because the politics of ethnicity is apt to get in the way of legitimate research. For instance, any serious explanation of educational disparities between Maori and non-Maori necessarily requires that a comparison be made between the attainments of these sections of the population. Some commentators, however, accept this prerequisite only under protest. It is as if they feel that the principle of Maori autonomy is in some regard compromised by the endless recitation of invidious comparisons with Pakeha in which Maori are almost invariably placed second. Durie (2003), for example, declares in this context that '[t]he tendency has been to compare Maori with non-Maori, but such an approach presupposes that Maori are aiming to be as good as Pakeha when they might well aspire to be better, or different, or even markedly superior' (p. 202). Many will share his sentiments. Durie sees no contradiction, however, in expressing this view himself and noting that '[i]t is unacceptable for Maori students to leave kohanga (Maori early childhood centres), primary school, or high school without achieving the best possible outcome', or insisting that the 'system has failed them if they don't make progress towards these goals' (p. 202). To proclaim, moreover, that, 'if for one reason or another more resources are needed to prevent such high levels of human wastage then the nation must be prepared to act' (p. 203), is to echo a discourse entirely consistent with the social democratic traditions of the sociology of education. Indeed, Durie, as I will show, actually grounds his case on the most conventional argument that Maori potential is largely unrealised.

It is a matter of fact that variance in educational achievement is associated with family resources and practices. In the conventions of statistical modelling these associations are expressed in the statement that an estimated proportion of the variance has been 'explained'. The true relations of causality are, however, somewhat more difficult to establish. I have argued, on the basis of an extensive programme of theoretically informed empirical research, that notwithstanding the deficiencies of the orthodox positivist approach to statistical modelling, a plausible account of social variance in educational achievement, what I have called 'inequality/difference', must include some reference to family resources and practices. Research conducted within a family resource framework, moreover, leads to the conclusion that it is, in fact, within the family that the principal sources of variance in educational achievement are located (Nash, 1993, 1997). Other sites of practice, most of all

the school, do not have the primacy of the home. However, it is not my purpose here to outline the family resource framework that guides our research (undertaken in part with Richard Harker (Harker and Nash, 1990), or to present again the evidence that has lead to this substantive conclusion, but to respond to those who reject it as a 'deficit theory'. The criticism from those who align themselves with a Maori 'culturalist' perspective is the most uncompromising and it will be appropriate to respond their challenge in view of the fact that this uncompromising position is a main contributor to ethnic boundary making.

The critics of 'deficit theory'

For New Zealand educators, family resource accounts provide the major focus for the culture wars that have taken various forms in other sectors. The domination of culturalists is such that the anti-deficit approach has become the orthodoxy. Bishop and Glynn (1999) are particularly stringent critics of family resource accounts. Their critique is actually directed at a report on Maori participation and performance in education to the Ministry of Education prepared by Chapple, Jeffries, and Walker (1997), but these authors find support in our research and for the purposes of this discussion their report, in this respect, may be taken as an expression of our thesis. Harker and Nash (1990) are, in any event, duly labelled by Bishop and Glynn as deficit theorists in their own right. Bishop and Glynn state their opponents' position:

> Chapple *et al*. (1997), suggest that there is strong evidence 'that the relative family resource position of Maori is a significant and substantial cause of educational disparities' (p. x). They suggest factors such as fewer material resources in Maori homes, larger numbers of children and lower levels of parental education and literacy levels as evidence of SES deprivation. (Bishop and Glynn, p. 68)

The leap of faith required to believe that such resources affect the well-being of non-Maori children while leaving Maori children unaffected, so readily made by Bishop and Glynn, apparently remains beyond the powers of Chapple, Jeffries, and Walker. It cannot seriously be denied that Maori and Pakeha households have different access to material resources. The thesis that household material resources and levels of parental education are allocated basically as a consequence of class relations is both theoretically supported and established as an empirical fact. That these properties, when measured by indicator variables, are

shown to be causes of variance in educational achievement is a conclusion reached within the terms of statistical modelling. It is well known to statistical analysts in this field that differences in the patterns of Maori and non-Maori behaviour in education, the labour market, and so on, when complex multivariate models are employed, are often negligible. This is of no interest, however, to Bishop and Glynn who charge Chapple, Jeffries, and Walker with 'deficit theorising' and, somewhat extending the boundaries of academic critique, of practicing a form of 'cultural abuse':

> Chapple *et al*. persist in locating the problem and entire responsibility for the solutions with the 'victims'. They are perpetuating the deficit focus . . . the report continues down the cul-de-sac of deficit theorising. It perpetuates research that may be viewed as cultural abuse through research processes that render culture invisible. (Bishop and Glynn, pp. 68–9)

Chapple, Jeffries, and Walker might fairly protest that to report a statistical model in which two-thirds of the difference is due to family resource variables is not to locate the problem and the 'entire responsibility' for it 'with the victims'. Even when charged with this 'abuse' they would no doubt 'persist' in expressing their view – note how Bishop and Glynn attempt to position their actions as wilful defiance – because the assumptions behind their equations are unscathed by this political critique. The estimate, which so offends Bishop and Glynn, of the relative importance of family resources to the Maori–Pakeha difference – the 'gap' – is critiqued without reference to its foundation in empirical research:

> Chapple, *et al*. (1997) 'conservatively' estimate that 'currently perhaps a minimum of two thirds of the gap can be put down to family resource factors, leaving other explanations – the most plausible of which is the interaction of peer pressures and the influence of the school system – to deal with the balance' (p. xi). The fundamental flaw in this approach is that it ignores Maori aspirations of Maori language, culture and identity as a means of creating new power relationships based on self-determination. The net effect of such an analysis maintaining prescience in New Zealand research will be the continuation of the mission of marginalisation and the eventual annihilation of Maori culture within our public education system. (Bishop and Glynn, p. 71)

This is actually more of a protest than a critique. It is clear that Bishop and Glynn do not attempt to refute the statistical estimates given by Chapple, which would require some informed attention to the models, but merely dismiss them as unsound – 'unsafe' perhaps – on the grounds that their effect will be to exclude Maori culture from state schools. Such an investigation is apparently redundant as it is clear enough that the message is perceived as a threat to the success of their proposals for Maori educational reform. The statement that cognitive development and access to education is affected by the material and symbolic resources of families is in itself, according to Bishop and Glynn, an expression of 'deficit theory', and when applied to Maori families can simply be rejected out of hand. Their case is not so much that Chapple, Jeffries, and Walker's models are technically inadequate, only that these findings should be rejected as incompatible with the execution of the collective project for Maori autonomy in education. Although Bishop and Glynn suggest that narratives of class are 'simplistic' and that quantitative studies can be 'biased', the research they object to is dismissed in those rhetorical terms with not the briefest examination. Bishop and Glynn can scarcely bring themselves, in fact, to discuss the causes of educational disparities between Maori and non-Maori with reference to the studies of those not 'connected' to Maori in the only way they are willing to accept:

> Those of us involved in Maori education are greatly concerned about the assumptions made by researchers who are not connected and accountable to Maori people. These are researchers who work *on* rather than *with* Maori people. (Bishop and Glynn, p. 70)

What counts as 'being connected' to Maori people is not specified, but the connections of common citizenship, an engagement with the education of Maori people, and a concern for educational equality, criteria almost every educational researcher in this country could met, are presumably not sufficient. Nor is it clear what criteria must be met for educational researchers to be accountable to Maori people. The context suggests that something more is demanded than conformity to the requirements of professional ethics committees and the conduct of research in accordance with the public standards of science. Bishop and Glynn, nevertheless, suggest that those who are not connected and accountable in the way they have in mind, even if that is left open to interpretation (presumably these terms are not a racist code for non-Maori), are 'less likely to realise that it is within Maori culture that

the answers lie' (p. 70). Such researchers, they say, 'persist with modifying a mainstream education academy that is incapable of meaningful reform' (p. 70). It seems that those who understand that the answers to the problems of Maori failure in education lie in Maori culture patently know better than to attempt to reform educational practice in the 'mainstream' state system. This position actually seems incompatible not only with Bishop *et al.*'s (2003) own research – which presents evidence, albeit of a very questionable kind, that pedagogy in mainstream schools can rather easily be transformed by professional development programmes to the significant benefit of Maori students – but also with Bishop and Glynn's rejection of the concept of socio-economic status (SES) 'deficit theory' as 'depressing' in as much that it 'implies that schools cannot really do much to help Maori students' (p. 71). In this respect, their critique seems to maintain the contradictory positions that to suppose that 'mainstream' schools can be transformed is to fail to recognise the importance of Maori culture, *and* that to argue that these schools cannot help Maori children is a pessimistic expression of deficit theory.

Bishop and Glynn thus severely castigate researchers who, perhaps because they are not connected to and accountable to Maori, do not realise that Maori culture has the answers and insist 'on not going beyond seeing SES as a major determinant of success in school' (p. 70). It seems that statistical models that present family resources as the major determinant of disparity are regarded as inadequate on the grounds that they do not include reference to those cultural processes known by those connected in the right way to Maori to be the real mechanisms of its generation. This argument has many weaknesses, not least that relative failure in education might be due to social class *and* be capable of being overcome by ethnic cultural initiatives. It is worth considering why the argument that a model that gives major importance to social class is held to be incompatible with a programme of cultural mobilisation for educational reform. There seems to be no logical reason for this assumption, and the political ones are not shared by all Maori advocates for educational self-development.

Durie (2003), for example, is convinced that '[e]ducation policies by themselves will not overcome the effects of poor housing, unsafe streets, alienation from customary land, low incomes, polluted environments, or physical and mental abuse' (p. 202). Outlining different pathways to educational reform, Durie argues that all are predicated on 'greater co-operation between institutions such as homes and schools', and points out in this context that '[s]imply blaming the home, the *whanau*, (family) or the school will do little more than produce stand-off when

what is needed is a joint resolution that failure will not be tolerated'. For Bishop and Glynn, merely to recognise social class as a structural cause of variance in Maori educational achievement is an expression of deficit theory. This interpretation cannot be placed, however, on Durie's text. Durie rejects accounts that blame the home or the school, recognising these as deficit theories, and yet goes out of his way to emphasise the importance of material resources distributed by class relations. All workers with the concept of class ascribe the allocation of housing, income, and the quality of environment to that property of the social formation. That is not to say, of course, that the class structure of a society might not be organised by racial or ethnic criteria; indeed, such arrangements are more common than otherwise. It is also theoretically justified to regard unsafe streets – unsafe in respect of traffic flows and danger to the person from criminal acts – and certain practices of the home, practices that might well include physical and mental abuse, as among those derived from the structural relations of social class. In any event, it is certainly within the family that most physical and mental abuse is found, and Durie's remarks in this respect may fairly be located in the discourse of mental health to which he contributes as a qualified practitioner. No matter how these comments are read, they cannot be read without reference to the family, but whether one should take them as placing the blame on the family and 'blaming the victim' is a matter that merits discussion.

Bishop and Glynn make no distinction between a scientific model that attempts to describe and explain the nature of the social world and the moral attribution of culpability for its state. As Durie implicitly recognises, however, this distinction is vital to the development of a consensus on the pathways to meaningful educational reform. It is one thing to argue that, for example, low income and low levels of education, regarded as resources of class allocated to families, are causally associated with educational achievement, and quite another to hold families necessarily responsible for the resources they possess. Contemporary sociology does not blame the poor for being poor, even if it has a tendency to blame the rich for being rich. Bishop and Glynn, however, are particularly opposed to the discourse of social class because they associate it with a theory of genetic intelligence. The hypothesis that SES is the major determinant of educational success is actually glossed over in their text as the idea that 'a student's individual ability on entering school will largely determine their educational outcomes' (p. 70). These authors thus manage, contrary to the entire history of the sociology of education, to conflate narratives of class oppression with a determinist

theory of intelligence (Nash, 2001). There is no reason to accept this argument, which they do not defend, but it may help to explain their resistance to the application to Maori students of theories that include reference to the resources and practices of class-located families. This move can be countered, of course, with little difficulty: the hypothesis that children develop specific cognitive skills as a consequence of early socialisation within the family and the hypothesis that intelligence is largely determined by genetic endowment are not in the least identical.

Of course, the relationship of early cognitive socialisation and subsequent educational achievement presents great difficulties for accounts of social disparities in education by educationists who prefer not to engage with intelligence theory. In this context, it will be particularly interesting to interrogate a statement made by Durie: 'It has been estimated that the index of potential for Maori youth is well below sixty percent' (pp. 202–3). The social and economic expense caused by the wastage of human potential has long been offered in support of reforms designed to remove barriers to effective educational opportunity. This assertion, in any event, leads Durie to argue that the educational system fails to meet the needs of Maori students. The text gives no reference, but Professor Durie has provided an explanation in response to an email enquiry, and it seems that the Maori youth potential index was an initial attempt to estimate Maori potential using three sets of data: (i) percentages of Màori youth leaving school without any qualification, (ii) Maori youth mortality data (especially youth suicides), and (iii) Maori youth unemployment. He notes that the final index should have been weighted, death being more drastic than school failure, acknowledges that the 'index' has yet to be fully developed, and notes that the paper was really an attempt to introduce the notion of potential as an alternate to 'failure'. This gives the 'index', to use Durie's own distancing inverted commas, its proper status. The text, nevertheless, might be given a quite different interpretation. It might be taken as a reference to psychological assessments of scholastic potential, and as such has the potential to mislead. The implication that Maori students underachieve in relation to their performance on tests with some claim to indicate potential for educational achievement is a matter of real significance. Anyone who accepts on this authority, that Maori children fail to reach the levels of educational achievement indicated by their scores on tests conventionally regarded as providing assessments of educational potential, has been led seriously astray.

Given Durie's frequent references to the importance of evidence-based research – 'making sure that the measures of progress actually quantify

an outcome' (p. 202) – an unwary reader might be forgiven for the assumption that it is based on an accepted indicator of educational progress (p. 202). For the benefit of students at risk to this misunderstanding, who are likely to be no small in number, it may be useful to point out that the available assessment data do not support that interpretation. The Competent Children study, held in high esteem by the Ministry of Education, shows the Maori–Pakeha difference in mean scores on tests of cognitive skills to be 0.39 standard deviations (SD) at age 5, when children have been at school no more than a few weeks (Thompson, Hendricks and Wylie, 1997). This sample, from the Wellington area, is very small, just 23 Maori children, but the finding is indicative. Fergusson, Lloyd, and Horwood (1991) report a difference of 0.49 SD in the mean verbal IQ scores of Maori and Pakeha at age 8. This is a Christchurch study with a Maori sample of 86. Nash and Harker (1998) tested Year 9 students on entry to secondary school and followed their progress to School Certificate, usually in Year 11. At the beginning of Year 9, when students are aged 12–13, the mean Maori–Pakeha difference on an index of school-related skills is 0.57 SD. The index used was derived from scores on two NZCER (New Zealand Council for Educational Research) tests, TOSCA (Test of Scholastic Abilities) and PAT (Progressive Achievement Test) in reading comprehension. The Maori–Pakeha differences observed in the main School Certificate (SC) subjects are for English 0.52 SD and for mathematics 0.59 SD. The Maori sample size varies from 1160 (Year 9) to 535 (SC mathematics), and may be accepted as representative of these students in 'mainstream' schools.

These data, taken together, from 5 to 16 years, do not support the contention that Maori students fail to reach their educational potential, at least as that property is assessed by standardised tests of academic competence. And the only professionally accepted indicators of 'potential' in this sense are standardised tests of educational attainment, 'scholastic ability', or intelligence. It might be noted in passing, that the reference to 'potential' makes an implicit comparison with non-Maori, because the standardisation groups for all scholastic ability tests are predominantly non-Maori, but that may be a minor point. The vital point is that the data actually suggest that the relative difference between Maori and Pakeha students on tests designed to assess 'intelligence' or 'scholastic ability' is more or less constant throughout schooling, and similar in magnitude to that observed with respect to examination performance. It is also more or less what one would expect given the social-class distribution of the Maori population. The implications of this are left to the reader: I have argued elsewhere against the measurement

of 'potential', which is not a proper object of measurement, and made these points not to show that Maori *are* reaching their potential, but in the hope of preventing misconceptions based on Durie's not quite adequately explained statement that 'the index of potential for Maori youth is well below sixty percent' (Nash, 1990).

Sociological and statistical approaches to explanation

The general approach to the explanation of social events, processes, and states of affairs, under which description social differences in educational achievement can be placed, requires the integration of structures, dispositions, and practices. A complete narrative of explanation should recognise each of these distinct levels. From the structure of social relations there emerge social organisations with properties specific to their nature; these social organisations require certain dispositions, cognitive, and non-cognitive skills, in order that the social functions they serve are accomplished; and this is done through the adoption of customary functions by individuals who possess the skills required to perform them. The task for sociology is thus multi-faceted: it must (i) describe the relations that constitute social organisations and identify their emergent properties; (ii) identify the cognitive and affectual schemes that generate action within established practices; and (iii) record the customary modes of accomplishing social tasks with respect to their origins and effects. Most commentators, when they want to account for the causes of social events, processes, and states of affairs, produce structure, disposition, practice narratives, although these are rarely acknowledged in such terms. Durie, for example, attempts to explain the causes of Maori–Pakeha disparities in this complex manner. The reference to low income is to a structural property of the household; the reference to attitudinal factors is to a dispositional property of individuals who have acquired them as a consequence of their insertion into the organised system of social relations that constitute their social environment; and the reference to physical and mental abuse is to forms of practice, in this case dysfunctional rather than functional, that may be comprehended most adequately in terms of their history, distribution, and effects.

This multi-level form of explanation, however, although often taken-for-granted in the literature, maintains an uneasy co-existence with those derived from statistical modelling. The highly influential quantitative explanations, those ubiquitous 'at-risk' models of rational policy-making seen as the paradigm instance of 'evidence-based' social science, are exceptionally problematic in this context. The principal difficulty

is that whereas structure–disposition–practice accounts integrate social properties at distinct levels in a complex hierarchical narrative, 'at-risk' models are constructed in terms of 'factors' or 'variables' given the same status as 'measures' and included in statistical models in such a way that they must compete for the explanation of variance. These models have their uses. Baragwanath (1998, p. 95), for example, argues that the 'ability of teachers to identify children who fall into the 'atrisk' category provides opportunities for early intervention', and that may be so. The assumptions of such models are, nevertheless, not to be accepted without careful reflection. There is an inherent tension between the forms of explanation provided by 'at-risk' models and that provided by a multi-level structure–disposition–practice narrative. This tension is implicit in Durie's account which speaks of 'socio-economic, political, and attitudinal factors' in such a way that the causal connections between these are not made explicit, and the force of the underlying integrated narrative in which the relations of social class have their effects by virtue of the 'attitudes' to which they give rise and the practices they support are consequently undermined.

A more or less sophisticated structure–practice–disposition narrative of explanation is the key to an integrated sociological theory able to give both the relations of social class and ethnic status what respective due they have in an account of social events, processes, and states of affairs. When indicators of social class and ethnicity are included in a statistical regression model, of the type that generates 'at risk' profiles, it is an inevitable fact that these indicators will each account for a given proportion of the variance and in that sense will compete against each other. The results of such an analysis may even depend on the order in which the indicator variables are entered into the analysis. The classical approach in the sociology of education has been to investigate the extent to which educational systems discriminate against ethnic groups by virtue of their ethnic status. It can be argued that if the attainments of students of a given ethnic origin cannot be distinguished from those of all other students once the social properties of household income, school type, and so on, as variables known to be associated with educational performance, have been taken into account, then the system can be declared free of a tendency to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. If there is an effect associated with ethnic origin, detected as a residual, then the magnitude of discrimination in the system can be estimated. This is the logic that generates a form of explanation Bishop and Glynn denounce as culture-blind and unresponsive to the aspirations of Maori people. The information generated by such models may, nevertheless,

be considered of legitimate interest to policymakers in a multi-cultural democratic society. If this is a bias of quantitative researchers, as Bishop and Glynn allege, then its principled and motivated nature should be understood.

The class versus race debate is ill formulated; in its own terms it cannot be resolved. Theoretical, technical, and political arguments are mobilised in defence of positions with no scientific value. In contrast a complex structure–disposition–practice narrative recognises the possession of material and symbolic resources by institutions and individuals as a precondition for social practice. The principles regulating the social distribution of effective resources are open to theoretical and empirical investigation. It is a matter of theoretical definition that the relation of class determines whether income from that source accrues from the possession of capital or the exchange of labour power. The dispositions generated as a result of class relations are, of course, a proper object of sociological investigation. A great deal of sociological research has exactly that character. The same approach may be taken with respect to ethnic relations. Where resources are distributed according to ethnic classification then that social fact will be included in any accurate explanation of group disparities. The theoretical, technical, and political arguments involved here may be given a brief discussion.

The theoretical difficulties in the race versus class – ethnicity versus SES – contest arise from the attempt to categorise resources and practices as those generated by relations of a specific kind. It is not always a straightforward matter to make the judgements involved. And it is always possible, of course, that class and ethnic relations in a given society are interlinked in such a way that no sensible basis exists for making a determination in the matter of certain resources. If it is a fact that 'alienation from customary land' is a contributing cause, as Durie argues, of Maori exclusion from education, then it follows that this is a joint effect of colonisation and the incorporation of New Zealand into a capitalist economy. Obviously, this is a causal process specific to a group identified by its descent. The effects of such alienation on education cannot be entered in the ledger as owed to ethnicity rather than to class, but must be acknowledged as a consequence of a process described adequately only with the aid of both concepts. Statistical modelling in this field must, in as much as it attempts to reveal the strength of associations between variables that represent properties of individuals and social organisations, to adopt its own language, find a procedure to measure unobservable concepts such as social class and ethnicity. This problem can always be overcome, for more or less plausible indicators of

SES (such as household income, occupation) and ethnic origin (usually self-ascription to categories provided by the researcher) can always be manufactured, and although it must be admitted that the construction of an indicator to measure that form of alienation that results from the loss of customary land would take some doing, the construction of indicators is generally open to a technical solution. It is the status of the explanations provided by such models that is so problematic.

The fundamental source of most difficulties in this area is, in fact, the nominalist prejudice in favour of taking named concepts as a reference to real properties. A regression model that contains 'measures' of SES and ethnicity will necessarily report *x* per cent of the variance to be an effect of SES and *y* per cent to be an effect of ethnicity. When such findings are taken at face value, as if such causal statements had the status of those made by physical scientists, they are profoundly misleading. This is not an argument for the abandonment of statistical investigation, on the contrary, there is a need for an increase in rigorous quantitative data analysis, but that will only be achieved through greater theoretical sophistication. The tools of theory and method, as symbolic properties, have actually become objects of struggle in the political contest for the right to control the discourse about the causes of social disparities in education. It is a feature of such struggles that one's opponents are positioned as 'biased', unqualified to speak (by virtue of 'not being connected' in the right way), and 'blind' to the truths revealed to privileged insiders. There are, nonetheless, rules of conduct in such struggles, and the pursuit of social science, even in an area so politicised as this one, must give possession of empirical evidence and logical argument a decisive advantage.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates how a particular theory of culture serves the interests of ethnic politics and hence contributes more to ethnic boundary making than it does to any material improvement amongst the disadvantaged. Durie demands the best possible outcomes for Maori students. That accomplishment will, for all the unease such comparisons provoke, require an improvement in their performance at least to the Pakeha level. What policies are most likely to bring about this end? A realistic account of the processes that generate ethnic disparities would seem to be of considerable value to policymakers. It is important to note in this context, however, that the desire for Maori autonomy in education is logically independent of the performance of Maori students

in the existing system. Many writers involved in the development of Maori education take for granted the cultural theory on the causes of educational disparities and make no attempt to examine its empirical or theoretical foundations (O'Sullivan, 2001; Milne, 2002; Whitinui, 2004). But as their cause can be supported no matter what levels of achievement Maori students reach in the system, their indifference to other accounts is to that extent of no consequence. The otherwise surprising lack of interest writers on Maori education show in accounts of the processes that generate disparity looks more reasonable once this disconnection is understood. If the theory that Maori failure is a consequence of Pakeha racism is seen as that most likely to achieve the autonomy demanded by contributors to this literature, then there may be no advantage in interrogating that theory. To Bishop and Glynn, the criterion of an acceptable theory is not its correspondence with the nature of the world, but its possible political consequences. It may seem that to examine as a hypothesis an account that makes family resources and practices central to the generation of educational performance, in as much that it represents a threat to their project, is likely to be unproductive. Better to reject it as 'unsafe'.

The vigorous critique directed at Chapple, Jeffries, and Walker thus responds to its potential threat as a document addressed to policymakers. Bishop and Glynn fear that such 'deficit theories' will undermine their proposals for educational reform by making them seem so unlikely to succeed that political support for the necessary resources will be that much more difficult to obtain. The task for social scientists, however, is to investigate the nature of society and to construct explanatory narratives that describe the mechanisms through which it is maintained and through which it is open to transformation. The transformation of the social order can only be achieved through actions directed at its effective mechanisms and it is for that reason that a realist sociology is imperative. To misrepresent the nature of the social world is, in fact, to deny oneself the opportunity to change it. Marx wrote that it is necessary not merely to understand the world but to change it – but he took it for granted that such understanding was a precondition for planned change.

12
Dogmas of Ethnicity

John A. Clark

Any modern society composed of a number of different ethnic groups must inevitably confront a fundamental question about how public policy is to be determined and acted upon. This question goes back to Aristotle. Should all ethnic groups be treated equally or are there grounds for giving some ethnic groups preference over others? The aim of this chapter is not to arrive at a definitive answer to the question but rather to critically examine some underlying arguments which are often relied upon to support the claim for either equality or preference as the basis of public policy. These arguments, being philosophical, have attained the status of dogmas; rather than being held unthinkingly, they need to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny in order to lay bare their fundamental weaknesses and to expose their limitations as justifications for public policy. Three arguments will be considered: two in favour of equality, cultural relativism and tolerance, and one in support of preference, western science versus indigenous knowledge.

Cultural relativism

Briefly put, the argument for cultural relativism runs thus: different ethnic groups possess different traditions, beliefs, customs, habits, practices, artefacts and the like; there are no objective or independent criteria against which we can make rational judgements about these different ethnic features; therefore, all we can do is regard the various ethnic groups not only as different but also as equally valid social formations, with the only assessment of an ethnic group being made by members of the ethnic group itself. The purpose of the cultural relativism argument is to grant each ethnic group immunity from external critique and to protect their continuing existence as valuable entities in their own right.

If each ethnic group is quarantined off from legitimate assessment and evaluation by others, being subject only to critical comment from those within the group, then to a large extent the identity of the group is preserved as a socially permitted presence.

However, the relativist argument is deeply flawed and as such does not logically support the strategy of equal ethnic respect. There are three fatal objections to relativism: philosophical, ethical and practical. The philosophical criticism of self-refutation points out that the relativist claim is presented as a general statement to apply to all systems of thought and all groups, so it is universally true in its application. But since the claim falls within the system of thought of a particular group (relativist) then it is only true for this group and for no other group (non-relativists). What the relativist argument does is to assert that the truth of a system of thought is relative to a group but is universally true for all groups. This contradiction between the linguistic expression and semantic meaning refutes the relativist claim.

The second objection is an ethical one. In considering the various systems of thought of different ethnic groups, we are not required to generate a set of criteria against which an ethnic group as a whole is to be judged. This is asking far too much. However, it is still possible to look at particular claims or practices and make sound ethical judgements of these. Incest, female genital mutilation, slavery, cannibalism and the like are almost universally condemned. Yet, to do so is to act contrary to the relativist maxim, so we are faced with a choice: hold firm to relativism and allow the practices to exist or reject the practices and in doing so reject relativism. There is a very good reason why, almost universally, these practices are condemned (and even by relativists, no less than non-relativists, who have no wish to be enslaved by another group or become someone else's meal!); it is because these forms of human conduct offend against the notion formulated by Kant (1952) that we ought to treat human beings as ends in themselves and never simply as means to other people's ends. Such activities inflict pain, even death, gratuitously, on the victim which is never in the best interests of those who suffer. The right to bodily integrity is presupposed in any form of human existence, from the most primitive to the most advanced of societies and ethnic groups, for without its general observance there could be no social living, and it is a principle which is a basic human right to be extended to all human beings by virtue of their being human, and never limited to some and denied to others. In this way, a categorical ethical commitment transcends the relativism of ethnic boundary making while still leaving open the possibility that on occasions we may nonetheless not be able to

reach agreement on what is true/false or right/wrong. But such occasions are more exceptions to the rule rather than the rule itself.

The case against relativism can be generalised: there seems to be no good reason for any social practice, any ethnic belief and so on to be beyond the reach of universal public debate and ethical evaluation. It is a profoundly perverse position indeed to hold that only those who practice female genital mutilation, for example, can legitimately pass judgement on what they do. On the contrary, this is a practice which cries out for universal condemnation, and rightly so, for its denial of a basic human right to some in order to meet the sexual/marital demands of others. A tradition it might be, and a long-standing one at that, but as Hume (1888) long ago observed, that something *is* the case can never be a sufficient ground for concluding that it *ought* to be so. Ethical argument is required. There seems to be no compelling reason to quarantine off any social practice from universal ethical judgement, however sophisticated or ill-informed such determinations may be.

Cultural relativism has serious ethical implications for those who espouse it. To claim that something is quite acceptable in some other ethnic group but is wrong for one's own, and nothing more is to be said about the matter, comes perilously close to the person giving up on morality altogether. Moral judgement is no longer required; rather, morality is reduced to an empirical consideration. If an ethnic group approves of x then x is morally good, which is contrary to the moral view that an ethnic group ought to approve only that which is morally good. And to do this requires abandoning the relativist stance.

The third objection is of a practical nature. If all world views, systems of thought, value positions, social practices and the like are equally valid, with none to be preferred over the rest, then this leaves us in a precarious state of paralysis. One's position may be one's own, but if it has equal status with all others then one has no justification for preferring one's own position over any other. If all are equal, and there are no criteria for adjudication, then the relativist has no rational reason for choosing one position, their own, over another. Choice is impossible, inaction sets in, both of which prevent the living of a human life. (Note that those who are relativists in theory are never relativists in practice!)

Tolerance

A second argument for equality appeals to the pluralistic character of society and urges that tolerance be shown to all ethnic groups.

The United Kingdom, and England in particular, provides a striking example of a multicultural society which not only, officially at least, promotes ethnic tolerance but also exemplifies some of the problems which tolerance can give rise to. In broad-brush terms, England is the 'indigenous' home of the English (whose forebears were immigrants, invaders and colonisers) with the addition of Irish, Welsh and Scots inhabitants. To these have been added immigrants from, for example, Pakistan and the West Indies, with more recent arrivals from Eastern Europe as the result of European Community expansion. Whilst each new influx seems to generate a degree of public response, few have had as much input on the national psyche as Muslims, both before and especially following the London underground bombings on 7 July 2005.

As an ethnic group, Muslims have aroused suspicion in many non-Muslim Britons. For some, this distrust is about as extreme as it gets, bordering on deeply irrational hatred; for others, it comes from not really understanding 'alien' religious practices, or even just puzzlement about why certain clothing is worn. And for a few, particularly those in the gay community, some empathy may be lost though Muslim rejection of homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle. Whatever the response of others to Muslims, the latter have found themselves to be the target of degrees of intolerance due to their commitment to their Muslim beliefs and religious practices. It was in the light of this that in his speech to the Labour Party annual conference in 2004, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair (2004), referred to

> the oldest struggle humankind knows, between liberty and oppression, tolerance or hate; between government by terror or by the rule of law. And let us demonstrate to Muslims here in Britain that these are values we apply to all our citizens and change the law to make religious discrimination unlawful. (p. 2)

In a pluralistic society, liberty, tolerance and the rule of law, if applied well, can do much to sustain the identity and existence of the various ethnic groups and allow them to co-exist in relative harmony. Liberty is important for it allows members of ethnic groups to pursue their legitimate interests provided that the exercise of this freedom is consistent with the right of all others to pursue their legitimate interests. Clearly, the right to engage in a particular form of prayer and the right to wear certain types of clothes are freedoms which can be pursued without limiting the freedom of others to pray or dress in their own style. So, liberty supports the flourishing of ethnic groups and allows them to draw

boundaries around themselves in a way that is contrary to oppression which sets out to eliminate particular groups (e.g. China's harsh treatment of Fulan Gong).

A pluralistic society, to endure, requires tolerance. Without it, if hatred prevails, then ethnic groups, either small in membership and/or lacking power, are vulnerable to the hostility of others and are likely to be subject to the sorts of vengeful acts against them which such malevolence brings in its train. Tolerance consists of a person allowing to exist such things as they may disapprove of, be they beliefs, attitudes, values, social practices, artefacts and the like. A tolerant person may well prefer that such things did not obtain but will, often with reluctance and perhaps even at times with deep misgiving, be prepared to allow them even if they do not find such things all that acceptable and would not necessarily want, adopt or ask for them while acknowledging that others may prefer to do so.

The justification of tolerance has its origins in Locke's (1689) *A Letter Concerning Toleration* which set the direction for a later defence by Mill (1959) in his *On Liberty*. Locke's point, still relevant today, is that repression is not an effective policy for while it may lead to conformity of social conduct, it will never control what people think. Rather, tolerance is an important condition for social improvement and individual development since both require intellectual progress and the growth of knowledge and these can only be promoted if citizens are sufficiently tolerant of others to allow them freedom to express unpopular views contrary to their own. If there can be no guarantee that any one ethnic group has a mortgage on the truth or rightness of their traditions then none is justified in either suppressing the views of others or imposing their own views upon others. But tolerance does not rule out trying to change an ethnic group's views through reasoned argument, for it is reasonable to try to correct perceived error. However, physical coercion to prevent them from engaging in disapproved conduct is inconsistent with tolerance. And the rule of law, set against terror (which the London bombings engendered or were possibly designed to engender), puts in place official recognition of ethnic difference and provides sanctions for those whose conduct violates the legal code which upholds the right of ethnic groups to exist and be treated with equal respect.

However, things are not so simple as just promising liberty, tolerance and the rule of law, for there are limits to their application. Tolerance is not absolute. Some things are to be tolerated and other things not, and the question is where to draw the line, and why? While tolerance is required to allow for any one ethnic group to exercise its right to

freedom, this must be bounded by the necessity to protect the rights of all ethnic groups to exercise legitimate freedom, so tolerance requires that maximum freedom for any one ethnic group is consistent with maximum freedom for all ethnic groups. And it is here that certain things cannot be tolerated; for example, opinion and conduct contrary to the moral rules necessary for preservation of a free and tolerant society. Two examples will make this point starkly. In the political campaign leading up to the 2005 British general election, the *Observer* reported on the fiercely contested constituency of Bethnel Green and Bow. Several Muslim women were asked whether their first allegiance is to Islam or feminism or Britain. Said one: 'I am a Muslim first. Islam is precious to me, it is our way of life' (Odone, 2005, p. 14). For many non-Muslim British citizens, this prioritisation of Muslim first and British second is captured in the expression 'British Muslim'[1] and appears to be a matter of some concern because of its import for citizenship. One implication which could be drawn is that if religious faith overrides national identity when a choice is to be made between being Muslim and being British, then the former will prevail over the latter, sometimes with dire consequences, which leads to the second example. Following the London bombings, Raghavan (2005) reported a young friend of one of the suicide bombers as saying 'why should we care about the London bombings when thousands of innocent Muslims are being killed in Iraq?' (p. 135).

It is at this point that tolerance is stretched thin as questions are asked about the limits of toleration. A multicultural society presupposes tolerance as a necessary condition for its existence, but this does not entail the extreme libertarian principle of 'anything goes'. Far from it, for we can always ask: Should the tolerant tolerate those who are intolerant of the tolerant? There is no reason why tolerance should extend to tolerating views which, while depending on tolerance for their espousal, nonetheless destroy (or could have the effect of destroying) the very tolerance which allows such views to be expressed at all. Hence the paradox of tolerance – too much tolerance can lead to intolerance which threatens the very tolerance which permitted it in the first place. Tolerance under threat closes ranks, by drawing a tighter boundary around itself while at the same time imposing punitive sanctions and restrictions through the rule of law on the freedom of speech of those who violently attack tolerance. (To bite the hand that feeds is to invite a swift response.)

But the effect is to draw the noose more tightly around the wider ethnic group to which more extreme members belong, thereby placing

in this case tolerant Muslims in the community in a position where they may no longer regard themselves as tolerated citizens. Malicious attacks on mosques, offensive remarks on Muslims and a general antipathy towards things Islamic may have the effect of marking ethnic boundaries in stark terms while also placing the security of certain ethnic groups, or individual members of them, at considerable risk because the tolerance of ethnic pluralism is diminished through fear of what this might lead to. So, while tolerance is a precondition of multiculturalism and its practice is an important strategic device for ethnic boundary making, there are dangers for ethnic groups when tolerance is pushed beyond its limits by those members intolerant of the tolerant. Clearly, there are costs of intolerance to be borne by the intolerant themselves.

Preference

Whereas the claim for ethnic equality is based on the premise of treating equals equally, that of ethnic preference is built on the notion of treating unequals unequally. This position is at its strongest in the voices of indigenous peoples who maintain that their 'first nation' status distinguishes them from, and entitles them to preferential treatment over, other ethnic groups whose later arrival through colonisation or immigration accords them lesser status in regard to public policy. The case for ethnic preference rests on a number of arguments, one of which will be considered and found to be problematic: indigenous knowledge versus western science.

The idea that a distinction can be drawn between indigenous and scientific culture and knowledge has been used to support the claim that certain ethnic groups, especially those native to a land, can be distinguished from other ethnic groups in a way which entitles them to separate and preferential treatment. The argument itself is not new. In the early days of anthropology, the concern was with the encounter between European and non-European peoples and was discussed in terms of such dualisms as 'civilised' versus 'savage', 'pre-logical' versus 'logical' and 'pre-scientific' versus 'scientific'. This theorising took a distinctly philosophical turn in the 1960s to 1970s where the debate between, for example, Hollis, MacIntyre, Taylor and Winch (Winch, 1958; Wilson, 1970) focused on rationality and apparent irrationalities in other cultures. It is within this tradition that the contemporary claim about indigenous knowledge is to be understood.

In New Zealand, the argument has taken a particular form. In 1999, Te Papa held an exhibition of the life of the Moriori people. Te Papa is the national museum of New Zealand in Wellington; the Moriori are/were the indigenous people of the Chatham Islands located some 700 kilometres southeast of Wellington. In 1835, Maoris from the mainland invaded the islands, exploited the Moriori's treasured covenant of peace enshrining a centuries-old ban on bloodshed and set about killing hundreds of Morioris and enslaving the rest for decades. This hugely significant event in the history of the Moriori people was almost completely omitted from the exhibition, thereby producing a fierce debate between academic historians and the more anthropologically inclined museum staff. Said the museum's Chief Executive, Cheryll Sotheron:

> Cultural differences and knowledge systems will produce different narratives. When you start having these big shifts away from what I was born with, which is the paradigm of western scholarship, you see there are other knowledge systems, they are very different, and they need to be acknowledged if we are going to be honest about our histories. (Barnett, 1999, p. 11)

As a philosopher/historian, Peter Munz (2000) objected to this. He reports that the Museum chairman of Te Papa, Sir Ron Trotter, defended Te Papa arguing that there are 'two equally valid systems of knowledge that may be applied to telling our stories (pp. 13–14), and in doing so consulted Professor Mason Durie, who advised that

> 'First, there are many different standards of knowledge and each standard reflects the cultural situation of the historian. There is no real truth . . . . People who do not understand *Matauranga Maori* . . . may have difficulty in understanding this. Second, the Museum is justified in suppressing the truth about the massacre because it accepts the inherent value of Matauranga Maori. The idea that there is only one truth must be rejected. The Museum is committed to the recognition of different knowledge bases' (Munz, p. 14).

More recently, Durie has expanded on this dichotomy. He holds, in respect to culture and conceptual understandings, that there are various bodies of knowledge and different forms of logic, proposing the following classification (2005b, p. 10).

Indigenous knowledge	Science
Holistic	Analytic
Accepted truths	Sceptical
Based on close encounters with the natural environment	Based on measurement and evidence
Often intuitive	
Emphasises relationships	Highlights differences
Practitioners older	Practitioners younger
Time enhances knowledge	Knowledge constantly changing

Within this typology, Durie locates the debate between science and indigenous knowledge: on one side is the 'promotion of science as the only valid body of knowledge', while on the other side there is a 'rejection of science by indigenous peoples' because those who promote science engage in 'misinterpretation of knowledge by use of system-bound criteria' (p. 9). There are two ways of addressing this distinction. The first is to regard them as competing epistemic positions and judge them accordingly and the second is to treat them as different in some fundamental respect and therefore not comparable.

If indigenous knowledge and science are held to be rival epistemic accounts then a number of acute philosophical problems arise. First, if the characteristics of indigenous knowledge, as Durie lists them, accurately portray this particular form of knowledge, the same cannot be said for the picture of science he gives. There are many conceptions of science and this is but one and not a good one at that. Consider some of his criteria. Much science of the kind Kuhn (1962) labelled normal science is not sceptical at all. Science does not always require measurements even if it does demand observational evidence. While differences may be important, so too are similarities. And as the history of science reveals, far from constantly changing scientific knowledge is also conserved – to use Neurath's (1983) model of replacing planks of a ship while keeping it afloat, science makes changes here and there while retaining a coherent and systematic whole.

If Durie's account of science is seriously flawed, so too is the distinction he draws between this and indigenous knowledge. Many of the characteristics he attributes to indigenous knowledge also characterise science, or at the least some theories of science. The Duhem–Quine (Quine, 1990) thesis makes a powerful case for epistemic holism – science

is a sprawling network of connected statements such that no statement is tested in isolation but only as part of a conjunction of theory holistically conceived, such that a refutation reverberates across the system. In science, as elsewhere, accepted truths have a central role to play, for a statement which in the face of rigorous empirical testing can withstand refutation is, for the time being, usually accepted as true, and this is especially so of observation sentences of the kind, 'The liquid in the beaker turned green.' Science is intimately connected to encounters with the natural environment (biology, chemistry etc.). Many important scientific discoveries have been as the result of intuitive hunches of the kind Popper (1959) called 'bold conjectures'. Science emphasises relationships between phenomena, especially in its search for causal explanations. And to the extent that a theory or empirical finding can repeatedly withstand refutation then time enhances its status as knowledge.

There are three further aspects of this account of the science/indigenous knowledge divide which need to be confronted: truth, logic and the rejection of science. If Durie, as Munz reports, actually holds that 'the idea that there is only one truth must be rejected' then those committed to this position must overcome several powerful challenges. First, there is a conceptual problem concerning truth. Truth is a property of sentences (it is sentences which are true or false) such that a sentence is true if the world is as the sentence says it is and false if it is not. Contradictory sentences about the same thing cannot both be true (but both could be false). To use Tarski's (1983) oft-quoted example:

'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

If snow is white then the sentence 'Snow is white' is true while the sentence 'Snow is red' is false. And this goes for all that we say about the world (keeping in mind that a sentence being true or false is an ontological matter whereas our *knowing* a sentence to be true or false is an epistemic one concerning evidence). On pain of contradiction, rival truths make no sense. Second, there is an empirical problem. On many things, indigenous and non-indigenous peoples agree on the truth of a sentence. All can assent to 'It is raining' – here, there is one agreed truth, whatever else might be culturally attached to it. Third, there is a logical problem. What of the sentence itself: 'the idea that there is only one truth must be rejected'. This is presented as being the one truth, but if self-referentially applied, is false. Truth, so portrayed presents insurmountable difficulties.

Similar points might be made concerning logic. Durie, like many others in the tradition he works within, asserts that there are 'different

forms of logic'. Quite what this means is not altogether clear. Logic, as employed by science, is concerned with the relationships of words within and between sentences. The laws of logic, such as identity and non-contradiction, and deductive and inductive reasoning, in both propositional and symbolic systems of logic, govern scientific theorising. Strip all of this away and it is not clear what alternative forms of logic exist that indigenous knowledge can lay claim to.

Finally, if 'science as the only valid body of knowledge' is accompanied by 'rejection of science by indigenous peoples' then we need to be very clear about the justification of this rejection. Why is indigenous knowledge considered to be superior to science? There is, first, a conceptual issue. If science is broadly defined as knowledge (from the Latin word 'scientia' for knowledge) then science is the only valid body of knowledge, so indigenous knowledge, on this reading of science, is as scientific as any other body of knowledge. So why would indigenous people reject science and in doing so reject their own indigenous knowledge? Second, even if we define science more narrowly to mean that which scientists engage in, why reject science in toto, dismissing all of the procedures of science and all of science's accumulated theorised empirical findings? This would leave indigenous people very impoverished indeed. And here is the point: indigenous people are wise enough to use indigenous knowledge when it is to their benefit to do so but are also sufficiently pragmatic to replace it with scientific findings when the latter offer better outcomes, as it often does. (But we should also note that science does not provide all the answers, and has failed us horrendously on many occasions). Nonetheless, given the greater explanatory power of science over indigenous knowledge, it is hard to rationally justify the outright rejection of science in favour of indigenous knowledge, in which case it is impossible to defend the argument that as a literal body of knowledge indigenous knowledge is superior to science, and hence the argument falls as a buttress for a policy of preferential treatment.

The alternative, and more compelling, view is to conceptualise indigenous knowledge and science in dissimilar ways. Munz (2000) offers a way forward when he suggests Durie's argument is mistaken: '*Matauranga Maori* and scholarship are not comparable and, therefore, not available as alternatives. They serve two entirely different and incompatible purposes. Matauranga Maori is a belief system designed to bond people into a community and whether or not it gives a true factual account is irrelevant. In fact, its misrepresentations (i.e. its mythologies) are particularly efficient in the sense that all the

people who mythologise one and the same story in one and the same way are clearly identifiable as members of a given group – and the resulting solidarity is of real social value. To be an effective social bond such a system must indeed contain myths, which have to be beyond criticism' (p. 14).

One way of drawing boundaries around ethnic groups is to point to the myths which give an ethnic group its identity, at least in part. Myths are usually long-standing 'stories' which at the time of their origin were most likely formulated in order to explain some event, phenomenon or experience. Passed on from one generation to the next, these early theories, created to explain things in the absence of a viable alternative account, in due course come to occupy the status of a revered and venerated ancestral heritage which gives the ethnic group of today its historical identity or continuity. The myths bind the contemporary ethnic members to their forbears in a deeply emotional and profoundly psychological way (Munz, 2000; Rata, 2005a), for it is not only the 'blood lines' which unite but just as significantly so too do the shared ethnic chronicles. At their initial formulation, those who created the myths understandably held them to be plausible explanations which at the time allowed them to account for their experience to their satisfaction. And it goes without saying that some of these myths were extremely novel and creative, still holding us to their charm for their elegance and originality. But as they were passed down the ancestral chain, new explanations became available, developed within the ethnic group and imported from external sources, such that nowadays the early picture tends to be regarded as no more than fiction, interesting but untrue. Now, this is not to deny that myths do serve a powerful ethnic purpose of promoting cultural solidarity and enhancing ethnic cohesion. The passing on of myths, inter-generationally, preserves the ethnic identity of a group by linking past to present and present to future in order to ensure ethnic continuity.

Now, so long as the myths are regarded as no more than myths, they tend to pose no great problem to the ethnic group of origin nor to other ethnic groups. Every ethnic group has its own set of myths which other ethnic groups often find delight in learning about, for they add to the richness of understanding the ethnic lives of others, and the learning of myths, one's own and those of others, is an important part of a child's education not to be missed for the ethnic insights they offer.

But problems arise when the myths, or some of them at least, are held to be literally true. If the myths were the only explanation available to us,

then we could do no better than accept it as the best account for now. But with most myths this is not the case at all; over time, other explanatory reports have been generated so the myth in its contemporary guise must compete with these rival theories. And it is here that tensions are clearly evident. Consider two examples, both from New Zealand and built around Maori mythology. The first concerns the origins of the New Zealand land mass. In brief, Maui fished it up: 'The Maori people say that the North Island of Aotearoa, which certainly is shaped like a fish, is Te Ika a Maui; and according to some tribes the South Island is the canoe from which he caught it' (Alpers, 1996, p. 57). Against this is cast a modern rival couched in the language of the physical sciences – of tectonic plates, geological compression, volcanic and seismic activity. On the face of it, given its greater explanatory power, the scientific story seems to be the more plausible of the two, and widely accepted as such. But, surprisingly, not universally so.

According to Dr Paul Reynolds of the National Centre for Research Excellence for Maori Development, 'This type of research is colonisation as usual. Indigenous people will be saying we already have our stories about our origins, so we don't need any scientific rationale to justify our origins.' Reynolds is on safe ground when he claims indigenous people have their own creation stories. But the conclusion he draws from this indisputable fact – that further inquiry is not required – follows only if these stories are true. 'Only if we are certain . . . that Maui did fish the North Island up . . . should we dismiss the scientific alternatives out of hand. Reynolds is committed to the literal truth of Maori creation myths' (Whyte, 2005, C9). If Reynolds is trying to persuade us that the Maori version of the origins of New Zealand is the literally true one and that the scientific alternative is false (assuming that his views have been accurately reported), what are we to make of this stance in the light of substantial contrary opinion that the scientific explanation has greater truth value than the myth?

Any resolution of this conflict would require far more argumentation than is possible here, but some suggestive directions are possible. One would be to ask how well each account coheres with the rest of our theoretical system. A second would be to explore which is the more parsimonious – the one which is limited to the physical realm or the one which requires the positing of metaphysical entities. A third would be to inquire into which offers the more plausible causal explanation of how the land mass came to be. On each of these the myth does not fare well; so one would be hard-pressed to understand why, in this case, anyone would seek to defend the apparently

indefensible. If this second strategy is adopted, that science and indigenous knowledge are of different epistemic orders, then the conflict between them is effectively eliminated, but this does come at a high price for those who would promote preferentialism. No longer can science be rejected in favour of indigenous knowledge, in which case the argument that the superiority of the latter leads to preferential policy treatment fails.

Conclusion

Whilst there may be cogent arguments for either equality or preference as the basis for social policy, the three dogmas considered here do not provide a satisfactory platform for policy direction. As general principles upon which social policy can be developed, equality and preference are logically incompatible. Equal treatment of ethnic groups rules out preferential treatment of particular ethnic groups; preferential treatment of one ethnic group excludes equal treatment of others. As a rule, in a pluralistic, democratic society, equality has first claim on the formulation of social policy, but this may, on occasions, be limited by the demand to give special preference to a particular ethnic group such that, with regard to social justice, some specific need ought to be met. This leaves it open to the application of preferential treatment. If we begin with a presumption in favour of equal treatment for all then the onus is on those who seek preferential treatment to demonstrate in what way any particular difference is one which ought to result in differential treatment in their favour.

All this means that indigenous peoples, like any other ethnic group, must argue for preferential treatment on a case-by-case basis rather than appealing to a general rule of preferentiality. Even if the claim for preference is grounded in a legal entitlement, this is never enough for the determination of public policy about what ought to be. Morality trumps the law in the sense that laws (or conventions) never determine what is morally good, even if it reflects it; on the other hand, morality may, and often does, judge a law to be morally wrong over which of equality or preference ought to prevail in determining public policy in an ethnically pluralised society. There is no simple answer to give, no straightforward formula to apply. Any solution will be arrived at through rational debate, joy and disappointment, and an overriding concern to be as fair as possible to all concerned, bearing in mind that not everyone's interests can be met on every occasion.

Note

1. Given the greater emotional allegiance to being Muslim than being British, it is very unlikely that replacing the expression 'British Muslim' by 'Muslim British' will have much practical effect. It is also worth noting in passing that while 'British Muslim' is a commonly used term, there appears to be no equivalent term such as 'British Catholic', 'British Protestant' and so on. Why 'British Muslim' should be so favoured is not clear.

13

Historical Revisionism in New Zealand: Always Winter and Never Christmas

Graham Butterworth

> The move from poverty to wealth is, in a social sense, an advance in material well-being. It is not adequately captured in statistics of gross national product, national income, or real wages. Death has always been the ultimate threat, and the move from poverty to wealth is first of all a move away from death. Its first indicators are statistics on life expectancy, death rates and infant mortality. Famine and hunger are next on the list; again the move from famine and hunger as indicated statistically by a declining incidence of malnutrition and its related diseases. Plague is the next of the ancient afflictions, and it may be taken as symbolic of all fatal and disabling diseases; the move away from them is another move from poverty to wealth. Poverty tends to be associated with illiteracy: superstition and a life lived within an extremely narrow setting. (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986, pp. 3–4)

The control of historical interpretation by emergent and ruling elites is a common political strategy used to secure the ideological dominance required to maintain political power and privileged access to economic resources. The struggles over national narratives are often hard-fought, as Yoshiko Nozaki observes, in her (2005) analysis of the Japanese textbook controversy over 'comfort women' in the Asia–Pacific War (1931–34) (p. 217). The historical revisionism that has accompanied culturalist politics is a contemporary version of the politics of history that Nozaki describes. As groups draw on the past to provide the raw material for the new politics, the new interpretation may pay scant regard to the historical facts, as events and details not required in

these new 'narratives' are edited out or even altered in the retelling. This chapter uses the example of New Zealand's new historiography to document the process by which historical material is used to serve that nation's culturalist ideology. It focuses primarily on the way in which history has been rewritten to present a new way of understanding contemporary Maori socio-economic inequalities. In the new 'narrative', the nineteenth-century European government is accused of deliberately adopting strategies to ensure the decline of the Maori population, a decline which enabled detribalisation and land alienation for settler ownership and development.

Ethnic relations in contemporary New Zealand between the majority European population and the Maori minority is given standing and legitimacy by the new interpretation of two interacting factors. It is widely assumed that the historical experience has led to significant socio-economic disparities between Maori and non-Maori today. The history is seen to be one of military oppression, dispossession and sustained marginalisation as a result of government action or inaction. It validates and animates the 'grievance mentality' of that powerful faction of Maoridom which benefits most from the historical reparations of recent decades that have seen sizeable amounts of land and money awarded to revived tribes. Yet a study of the population aspects of these interlocking analyses shows that the evidence upon which the new interpretation is based is used in a manner to support an ideology rather than to delineate the historical reality.

From the start of colonisation Maori population status was seen as a key issue in the success or otherwise of governments' attempts to reduce socio-economic disparities between its Maori and European citizens. Every government, from the first colonial governorship of Hobson to the present, has conceded the need for special policies for Maori and tailored their policies and expenditure accordingly. The acquisition of British sovereignty had, as one of its aims, that the endangered Maori population would become substantially better off as the result of British government. Hence, during the Crown Colony period and in the Censuses as late as 1911, information was collected about the area of land under cultivation, numbers of stock and manner of cultivation to measure Maori progress in the new economy. Though this economic emphasis was to diminish after the wars of the 1860s, what did concern Parliament and government officials keenly, and was to remain a concern until the 1920s, was the decline in Maori population. This was shown by a number of surveys of Maori communities, most notably a survey in 1851 of Maori communities around Wellington, Kapiti and the Wairarapa

to ascertain their size and socio-economic status, including possession of carts and ships. My own analysis was that European and Maori communities were not so far apart as they were to later become. No equivalent survey was ever done later, but Ernest Beaglehole's (1946) study of the Otaki community in the late 1930s painted an embarrassing picture of a deprived and marginalised community experiencing a substantially lower standard of living than their pakeha (white) neighbours.

A common belief in the mid-nineteenth century was that Maori, like other indigenous people, were destined to die out before the encroaching European. One prominent settler politician, Dr Isaac Featherston, talked – in 1856 – of a European duty 'to smooth the pillow of a dying race', as did John Logan Campbell, a prominent Auckland leader. However others took a more activist approach. Derek Dow in his important but non-revisionist 1999 study, *Maori Health and Government Policy 1840 to 1940*, makes it clear that Maori health was of considerable concern to colonial and settler governments.

The size of the Maori population and consequently issues of infant mortality and life expectancy were substantive political issues and, according to the revisionist account, the failure of government in these areas is proof of pakeha ill-will and a valid source of Maori grievance. The rightness of Maori grievance is widely accepted and contributes to government policy towards Maori. According to the Race Relations Commissioner ('Race Gaps', 2006), there had to be no 'let up' in government efforts in tackling disparities. He cited 'children born of Maori and Pacific Island parents' as 'facing an avoidable mortality rate two to three times higher than for other New Zealanders'. Infant mortality and life expectancy are leading elements in indigenous discourse as population issues play an important role in historical revisionism. The intention of this chapter is to explore the historical evidence about the Maori population in order to judge if the conventional wisdom about that population, including the role and motives of pakeha administrators, rests firmly on the historical record.

The dominant historical interpretation

The changes in historical understanding that now characterise revisionist history are actually quite recent (post-1970s), and amount to a revolution in historical interpretation. Its proponents are often very interested in population issues, hence the value of focusing on such issues to provide a critique of what is, a much larger, project of historical re-interpretation. Colourful phrases like Dr Featherston's are very well

known and there are numerous references in revisionist texts to Maori bewailing the declining numbers and foreseeing themselves as doomed to extinction. The existence of these references has tended to validate the view that Europeans were uncaring about Maori population decline and indeed welcomed it. This interpretation was first given historical validation in mainstream academic writing by a 1955 Master's thesis (Sorrenson, 1955) on the purchase of Maori lands. Two subsequent articles from the Sorrenson thesis (1956 and 1963) linked land loss with population decline. In addition the land loss was said to be caused by a scandalous purchase policy that gave no protection to Maori land sellers. According to Sorrenson, Maori were forced into the Maori Land Courts to defend their rights to the detriment of their system of food production. Moreover they fell into debt because of the costs of litigation and had their health undermined by excessive consumption of alcohol, poor food and substandard accommodation. Since then, in the historical and Maori minds, population decline and land loss have been inextricably linked, an interpretation taught as historical fact in the nation's schools and universities.

Maori population and Maori health 1790 to 1900

Population issues loom large in any discussions of indigenous people and the Maori are no exception. The population shrank from an estimate of slightly above 100,000 in 1769 to the low point of 41,993 in 1891. This decline of 58 percent[1] was due initially to the impact of European imported diseases, but the musket wars of first three decades of the nineteenth century contributed significantly, either directly through death or indirectly through the effects of population displacement and major migrations (see Plate 29, *New Zealand Historical Atlas*, 1997; Ballara, 2003). Undoubtedly the state of medical knowledge at the time was unable to alleviate the effects of introduced disease but it is a considerable leap to go from this to attributing motives to the British. The effects of the tribal wars of the period from 1820 to 1842 were very much a result of the inherent values of Maori society rather than any European intervention.

The number of Maori at the time of Cook is a matter of informed guesswork. Cook himself thought that the population could have been 400,000, but his scientific observer, Dr Forster, on the second voyage, thought the North Island population was only 100,000 (New Zealand Population Census, 1956, p. 6). Cook's initial estimate was the greatest, other observers set the population below 200,000. By 1842 Europeans

were estimating Maori numbers at between 107,000 and 120,000. The first Census (1857–58) enumerated Maori population at 56,049. The tendency has been for archeologists and demographers to revise those early figures downwards.

> Estimating the number of deaths during the early nineteenth century is especially difficult, since establishing the Maori population at 1769 has been and has to be, a matter of informed guesswork. There can be no doubt that there was a decline in the population between that date and 1840. Maori themselves spoke of the time when 'men were plentiful'. The most informed estimates are Ian Pool's: his conclusion was that the population declined from all causes, including migration, fertility levels, infant mortality, epidemics and warfare – from about 100,000 at the point of contact to 70–90,000 at the time of the Treaty of Waitangi. Taking the lower of the figures as the more likely, Pool thus estimates a total population loss of 30,000 over the 71 years to 1840. The death rate may have varied between 38 per thousand per annum to 45 per thousand per annum. (Ballara, 2003, pp. 45–6)

From 1840 to 1896 Maori population continued to decline until it reached its lowest point in the census of 1891 when it was estimated at 41,993. Nineteenth-century Maori population counts, it must be remembered are not true censuses, but are enumerations taken by appointed enumerators, whose efficiency varied.[2] The dominant interpretation aspires to show that Europeans wantonly caused Maori population decline but has been unable to do so. Yet the settlers were never allowed to conduct warfare on their own account against Maori, as occurred to the Aborigines in Australia (Ward, 1983, p. 170). The Maori politician, Tariana Turia, has spoken of a 'holocaust' on the Wanganui River when hundreds of Maori were poisoned by flour treated with arsenic but could provide no evidence beyond it being a tradition. The following explanation is more likely. Richard Taylor, a nineteenth-century missionary, records in his journal a raid on Wanganui where a merchant had to abandon some bags of flour and in anger poisoned them with arsenic. Taylor read the merchant a lesson on the wickedness of his action and there is no further reference in the journal to the matter. If any deaths had resulted, Taylor, whose mission area included the Wanganui River, would certainly have heard about it. It should be noted that missionaries were ready and able to protect their congregations and apart from their local influence could call on their parent bodies in London.

The only other occasion where European killed Maori, except in the course of individual crime, was during the wars of the 1840s and 1860s. James Cowan's two-volume history of those wars (1922) lists casualties on both sides. His final estimate of total casualties from 1845 to 1872 has 560 killed and 1050 wounded in the British and Colonial forces, 250 friendly Maori killed, and 2000 hostile Maori killed and another 2000 wounded. One of the doyens of the revisionist history, James Belich (1986) argues very vigorously that hostile Maori casualties were grossly exaggerated to cover up the fact that the government forces often had the worst of the fighting. The result is that the revisionist histories of the wars accept Maori casualties were relatively slight because of the intermittent nature of the wars and the Maori style of fighting. Probably only in Taranaki where Maori were under arms during 1859–61 and from 1863 to 1869, did the wars have significant demographic consequences. In South Taranaki, too, there was a systematic destruction of villages.

However, the main influence of revisionist history concerns the putative link between population loss and land selling, and the motives of Europeans in this process. Keith Sorrenson's work has an iconic place in the new historiography, because it was the first to systematically make this link and present land-selling as a process deliberately allowed by the government to demoralise and debauch Maori landowners. This interpretation has been under challenge by Crown Law Office researchers investigating the Gisborne, Hauraki and the Kaipara claims (Goldstone, undated; WAI No. 863; Goldstone, 2002; WAI No. 814; Loveridge, 2000). They argue that in the 1860s and 1870s Maori, in fact, controlled the court process so that its hearings did not result in debauching or demoralising its clients. The political purpose of the Court was to give Maori secure land titles to avoid the difficulties that had arisen from the Waitara purchase and from others in the 1850s. In particular, Sir Donald McLean, Native Minister from 1869 to 1876, was anxious to avoid confrontation and to reduce the sources of friction between Maori and pakeha (Ward, 1983). He choose men as judges who were fluent in Maori and knowledgeable about Maori society such as Judges Rogan, Monro and Smith who had experience as surveyors or interpreters and were fluent in Maori.

Though the Court later developed into an independent bureaucracy, there always remained a strong Maori presence and the judiciary and staff were sympathetic to Maori leaders such as the politician, Sir Apirana Ngata. Certainly it was a consciously lawful body with strong legal restraints to prevent Maori landowners being cheated. So far, little evidence of underhanded dealings have been produced before the Waitangi

Tribunal and, as Ward (1983) shows in his writings on Maori land legislation, there was a continuing concern at the political level about Maori reducing themselves to landlessness through the workings of the Maori Land Acts. Though there was much tinkering, McLean put in place a system that attempted to reserve a fair proportion of Maori land and prevent outright fraud. That there were continuing sales of Maori land was due to mutual need: Maori society's need for money; European society's need for land. Increasingly such transactions took place in an orderly bureaucratic environment that would not tolerate fraudulent or improper dealings with the land (Boast, no date). As a result of the Treaty settlement process, which provides for historical reparation, every sale of land has to be minutely examined for improper behaviour by historians employed by the government. It was said in late twentieth-century New Zealand that Public Historians looking to earn their keep had to be able to research the dealings with former Maori land blocks, a position compared to the British saying that every British historian worth his salt had to be able to edit an Anglo-Saxon charter.

The Sorrenson (1955) thesis, however, fits into the modern retribalising mindset. The past selling of Maori land is now repudiated and there is a total rejection of the view that Maori ancestors had once seen the land as a surplus asset. Any land sale is considered to involve some underhand dealing on the part of the land purchaser. How deeply rooted this belief of a causal relationship between land loss and population loss is in Maori ideology is demonstrated by Professor Mason Durie's (2005) *Nga Tai Matatu: Tides of Maori Endurance*, where in a rather slipshod way, he correlates a diminishing Maori population to declining Maori land ownership. I say slipshod because the table claims to run from 1800 to 1901 but includes land ownership at 1911 and is notable for taking the highest population estimate, 150,000 in 1800, which archaeological and demographic opinion would not support. The last line in the table gives Maori population in 1901 (when it has begun to rise) and Maori land in 1911. Yet despite continuing land loss from 1891 to 1911, Maori population had risen from its low point of 41,993 in 1891 to 49,844 in 1911 – a crucial fact which contradicts the whole thesis of land loss equals population decline.

The received view was that nineteenth-century government offered little health care to Maori (MacLean, 1964, p. 145), a view that Raeburn Lange supported in his 1972 master's thesis. Indeed nineteenth-century medicine was just beginning to become scientific. By far the greatest contribution to the reduction in mortality came from improved sanitation and disease prevention, not from medical treatment. However,

Derek Dow's 1999 study of Maori health and government policy provides sufficient evidence to rebut that claim. According to Dow (1999, Chapter 1), once the colonial government was put on a sound financial basis under Governor Grey, it quickly moved to institute hospitals that gave free admission to Maori patients, appointed subsidised Native Medical Officers to treat Maori in their home areas and even instituted campaigns to vaccinate Maori.

While the effectiveness of these programmes is hard to measure, there is no doubt that Maori were interested in the services on offer and took advantage of them. Between 1847 and 1850 Governor Grey set up hospitals at Wellington, Auckland, Wanganui, New Plymouth, Bay of Islands and Dunedin to treat Maori and indigent Europeans. In the late 1840s Maori comprised some 90 per cent of both inpatients and outpatients. Figures are harder to obtain for the 1850s but in his history of New Zealand (1859), A.S. Thomson claimed that some 2580 Maori were admitted as patients. Grey also began the practice of creating subsidised Native Medical Officers. These were doctors in private practice who were paid to treat Maori patients in their own areas. Though these men were characterised by critics of the scheme as ill-qualified, drunken, womanisers, Dow's research suggests a different picture. Most were qualified practitioners in good standing. By 1866 there were some 29 appointees, which Dow calculates amounted to 20 per cent of registered medical practitioners. This service was to continue into the twentieth century until the advent of social security in July 1939 made hospital services free and lowered the cost for doctor's services.

Another source of medicines and assistance was the Department of Education, created in 1879, which managed the Native School system. Under the guidance of John Pope, the inspector of Native Schools, teachers were encouraged to play a role in health care and it seems that a number of teachers actively did this, dispensing medicines provided by the government and looking after sick children. This role is seldom acknowledged but they must have played a role in improving Maori health and passing on European ideas about health and hygiene. Some certainly nursed their charges during epidemics.

A final factor omitted from the present historical discourse is the high degree of intermarriage that took place in the period from 1820 to at least 1850. Even later, when there was a substantial settler population of European men and women which in other colonial societies saw intermarriage discouraged, if not outlawed, intermarriage remained permissible and the able half caste in New Zealand was able to move and achieve in both societies. The classic examples of this are the politician Sir James

Carroll (1854–1925) and the doctor and anthropologist Sir Peter Buck (1877?–1951). Unfortunately there is no biography of Sir James Carroll but he has an entry in *The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (Orange, 1993) while J.B. Condliffe's biography of Buck, *Te Rangihiroa: A Life of Sir Peter Buck*, was published in 1971.

The impact of this group on Maori society has yet to be explored. Maharaia Winiata (1967, p. 150) pointed out that most of those who led the Maori renascence at the turn of the century were the product of mixed marriages. It is probable that their European spouses conferred some genetic immunity to European diseases to their children, introduced some European ideas about the care of babies and children and also passed on European techniques of nursing the diseases that would have made them less virulent.

Certainly by the 1870s, Pool (1991, p. 75) considers that the initial rapid decline of 1.5 per cent per annum between 1840 and 1878 had fallen to 0.9 between 1878 and 1891, and Maori population had entered a period of recuperation that would see a slow increase of 0.6 per cent between 1891 and 1901. Set out below is his estimate of overall Maori population trends.

Maori Population 1769 to 1896

Year	Number	Intercensal growth rate
1769	Slightly above 100,000	
1840	80,000	
1857/58	61,500	−1.6
1874	47,940	−1.5
1878	46,050	−1.0
1881	44,700	−1.0
1886	43,050	−0.6
1891	41,993	−0.6
1896	42,564	+0.3
1901	44,514	+0.9

Source: Adapted from Ian Pool *Te Iwi Maori* . . . Auckland 1991, pp. 57, 76.

Pool has some interesting observations on the ratio of children (0–4 years) to women (15–49 years) and the infant mortality rate, both crucial to Maori population recovery. In 1844 it was as low as 72 children per 100 women, the 1857/58 enumeration found it was 87, between 1874 and 1886 it fluctuated between 106 and 116, in the decade from

1891 to 1901 the child/woman ratio rose from 120 to 127. At the same time the infant mortality rate was dropping. Between 1844 and 1857 it was 400+ per 1000, between 1857 and 1874 it was 370+, and between 1886 and 1896 it fell to 330 and in the decade 1901–11 it was 230 per thousand (p. 77). In summary, Pool argued that the Maori population increased as it developed some form of immunity to the introduced pathogens. While he considered that Maori needs were not being met in this period, he was writing before Dow's analysis of government health policy.

The real problem in respect to population growth or decline was less land selling than life-style. In Maori New Zealand in the period between 1840 and 1891, there were three possibilities: to maintain a traditional lifestyle relatively undisturbed by Europeans, to live in a partially Europeanised life-style or to opt to try to live in a fully European way. Pool has a table for 19 iwi (tribes) showing their child–woman ratios at various periods, which supports this interpretation. Rarawa, a remote North Auckland tribe, whose way of life would be relatively unchanged, has ratios above the national average for this period, while those tribes such as Waikato, Taranaki, Atiawa, which had opposed the government in the 1860s and were resistant to acculturation, had poor ratios. Tribes such as Ngapuhi and the South Island tribes, which had been subject to a long period of acculturation, had experienced significant European settlement and had accepted the European way of life, were consistent in showing the high child–woman ratios. The significant European presence was necessary, for even a tribe like Ngati Porou, which had been a strong ally of the government and was favourably disposed towards acculturation, was below the New Zealand average. (Pool, 1991, p. 96). By the 1890s the population was starting to recover, and was to grow all through the next century, despite continued land selling during the 1890s, and in the years 1910–24.

The Young Maori Party and Ratana, 1900–1950[3]

The next fifty years in Maori history were marked by the twin concerns, as the religious leader Wiremu Ratana said, of 'the health of the body and the health of the land'. Here Ratana expressed the continuing concern over Maori population numbers and health, as well as concern over land loss and the failure of Maori to benefit from land ownership. The two principal movements in Maori society at this time were, from 1897, the Young Maori Party led by Apirana Ngata, who advocated Maori acquiring the skills of the pakeha in the context of a christianised

tribalism, and, from 1920, the Ratana movement which was also a political party of Christian reform. It was eager to adopt European life-style through the restoration of their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Both groups looked to government for assistance to improve Maori health.

Government, and with it pakeha society, had changed. The first generations of colonial society had been small in size and scattered with limited resources, a situation reflected in the small size of government. In the 1870s there were only some 300 public service positions, which grew to 400 in the 1880s. The 21-year Liberal Government (1891–1912) was in favour of state regulation and intervention. It was blessed by finding new exports in meat, wool and dairy products that substantially increased New Zealand's wealth and government revenues. A number of new departments were created and by 1913 there were 4918 public servants (Henderson, 1990, p. 397). Among their creations was a Department of Health, which accepted responsibility for Maori health and was gradually given the power and resources to become effective. By the late 1890s it was clear that the Maori problem was less that of epidemic disease than of endemic contagious disease. By the 1900s, though, a high level of fecundity was offsetting this. There was still a high infant mortality rate of some 230 per 1000 between 1901 and 1911, and Maori life expectancy was low in comparison to other New Zealanders who enjoyed one of the highest rates of life expectancy in the world. Pool (1991, p. 77) does note that Maori life expectancy was higher than for parts of Polynesia or some parts of Europe, including Spain.

The other change in the 1900s was that there was now a Maori movement, the Young Maori Party that could deal with government and pakeha society on its own terms. This group was deeply concerned with population decline and saw the solution in Maori adopting a more European life style. Its members emphasised the need to improve hygiene and sanitation in Maori villages. Under their influence a Maori Councils Act was passed that established elected Maori Councils and village committees with the responsibility to enforce sanitary by-laws. The first Maori doctor, Maui Pomare, was made a full time Native Medical Officer and he began a vigorous campaign of health reform. In 1904 a Native Sanitary Inspectorate, drawn from local Maori leaders, was created to improve the villages. Subsidised doctors were continued and Public Health Nurses were appointed to work in Maori areas. This system reached its apogee in 1909 and thereafter was allowed to run down, though the nurses and subsidised doctors continued.

Maori casualties in the First World War and the death rate in the influenza pandemic of 1918 reawakened concern about Maori survival. Dr Peter Buck was appointed Director of Maori Hygiene in the Health Department to establish a system of Maori Health Councils. However the Maori Hygiene Division fell foul of government parsimony and the direction of public health thinking. The two broad trends in medicine and public health administration were professionalisation and bureaucratisation. The Maori initiative was running against these trends and fell victim in 1930 when the Maori Hygiene Division was disbanded. It was argued that it was better that the whole health system should concern itself with Maori health problems not with a small, inadequately funded group. The election of New Zealand's first Labour Government in 1935 and the creation of the welfare state meant that the health and hospital services were properly funded and Maori were given equal access to them.

Maori infant mortality and life expectancy, 1901–66

Years	Infant Mortality (Per 1000 births)	Year	Life Expectancy at Birth Males (Years)	Females (Years)
1901–11	230	1901	35	30
1926	150–60	1926	42	40
1941–45	135	1936	46	46
1961–65	40	1945	49	48
		1951	54	55.9
		1961	59.1	61.4
		1966	61.4	64.8

Compiled from Ian Pool, 1991, pp. 114–115, 145–146.

It can be seen from those statistics that infant mortality declined 475 per cent and life expectancy increased by 75 per cent for males and 116 per cent for women during this period – not unimpressive figures.

It was not until the 1920s that Maori and pakeha realised that the Maori population had ceased to decline and, indeed, was now growing rapidly. By the mid-1920s the Maori birth rate was higher than the European (Hunn, 1961, p. 20). In 1928 the birth rate was 25.27 per 1000 for Maori compared to a non-Maori rate of 21.06 and by 1956 the Maori rate was almost double the pakeha rate. This growth took much of the heat out of the population debate and Maori politics became

more concerned with land and governance issues. The overly high infant mortality rate and the disparity between Maori and European life expectancy was known and commented at the time but it was not the burning issue it would become.

The 1940 book of essays, *The Maori People Today*, epitomises that period. Though the book exposed some very disturbing disparities, its tone is optimistic. The editor, Professor I.L.G. Sutherland, in the concluding essay, wrote:

> Though European self-congratulation is expressed a shade too readily, especially in this Centennial year, and is not what the situation calls for, it does say much for the qualities of the two races concerned that this survey does not appear to have disclosed any issues or likely issues between Maori and *pakeha* which cannot be resolved by tolerance, mutual understanding and active goodwill. (Sutherland, 1940, p. 440)

This congratulatory tone continued throughout the 1950s with, for instance, the Minister of Maori Affairs noting that the youthful Maori population now numbers 130,000 and that 'Maori and Pakeha share fully the opportunities, rights, privileges and jobs that New Zealand affords today' (Souvenir Programme, 1956, p. 7).

The Modern Period, 1951–2001

The publication of the highly influential Hunn Report on the Department of Maori Affairs in 1961, and the associated reports it gave rise to, eroded this optimistic picture. By the late 1960s a new generation of educated Maori was willing to tackle official complacency head on. Among other issues that they confronted the government with was infant mortality. Though the Hunn Report had only two innocuous recommendations to make about health, its comments and the statistical supplement showed how great were the disparities in life expectancy, birth and death rates. Hitherto the Maori death rate had seemed comparable to the European at 8 to 9 per thousand. However, the Hunn Report's more detailed figures showed that for Maori under 20, the rate was 6.61 deaths per thousand compared to a European rate of 1.92, 344 per cent higher for Maori, the death rate for Maori over 20 was 13.09 (European 13.28). (Hunn, 1961, pp. 21–2).

The result was to indelibly impress on the majority of the population the poor position of modern Maori in relation to pakeha. Noel Hilliard's novel, *Maori Girl* (1960), which vividly documented the negative urban

experiences of one Maori girl, awakened pakeha opinion to the fact that the urban Maori migration, which had been taking place from the Second World War, was not necessarily a positive experience for Maori. But to my mind these would have been ephemeral if it had not been for the revision of New Zealand historiography. Up to the 1950s New Zealand history had been a narrative of a story of mutual respect, co-operation and integration, inevitably interrupted by mercifully brief periods of antagonism, most notably in the 'Maori Wars'. But now another story emerged into the public arena during the 1970s. It was one of continued strife and of the oppression of the Maori by the pakeha. Dick Scott began with *Ask that Mountain: The Story of Parihaka* in 1975, Tony Simpson reinforced it in 1979 with *Te Riri Pakeha: The White Man's Anger*; in 1984 Jane Kelsey told the story of oppression from another angle in an article 'Legal Imperialism and the Colonisation of Aotearoa' (1984, pp. 20–43). Angela Ballara (1986) gave another version in *Proud to be White*? These writings were given credibility by the work of other professional historians who wrote about pakeha trickery and aggression in early colonisation, in precipitating the wars in 1860, in invading Parihaka in 1881 and Maungapohatu in 1916, and in finding a general tendency of the pakeha law and administration to ride booted and spurred, over the Maori people.[4] By the 1980s what was once a new and revisionist historiography had emerged as an orthodoxy.

The empowerment of the Waitangi Tribunal to hear Maori grievance claims back to 1840 was one consequence of this new orthodoxy. It meant that the Waitangi Tribunal now had the power to hear Maori claims that had been carefully nurtured in the oral tradition of the marae. As Andrew Sharp notes, 'one of the most notable features was the art and sophistication with which it listened to and relayed a Maori version of history to a wider audience' (Sharp, 1990, p. 4; see also pp. 3–7 for ideas to which I am heavily indebted). The story was now that Maori had been almost unrelievedly subject to wrongs and injustices at the hands of the new colonisers and that the time had come to condemn past and continuing injustice and ensure the Maori were able to lay claim to a different and better future.

This story of injustice was validated by what was known of Maori socio-economic circumstances. A position of substantial relative deprivation has been shown in a number of publications and Maori leaders had justly complained of the continuing inequalities. In a word, both discourses validated each other. Present Maori inequalities could be seen as the consequences of historic injustice rather than the consequences of a number of contemporary factors, including socio-economic ones

resulting from the migration into the urban unskilled labour force in the decades immediately preceding the economic downturn which began in the late 1960s.

The Maori birthrate continued to be high for the rest of the twentieth century so the Maori population remained youthful. Both infant mortality continued to fall and life expectancy to rise so that the ever-growing Maori population gave Maori elites considerable influence in New Zealand politics. Where population change is concerned the whole process of grievance maintenance is very clear. Professor Mason Durie is a prominent Maori academic commentator on the Maori situation. An examination of population change in his 2005 book, with the rather down beat title of *Nga Tai Matatu: Tides of Maori Endurance*, is indicative. One of the four reasons given for earlier population decline was the state of demoralisation associated with forced changes in social and economic structures. The statistical table in his book, referred to above, associates population decline with diminishing land ownership. Despite citing Ian Pool's population statistics as his source, the demographer's 'best estimates' are ignored. This may be because for earlier years they show a smaller population and therefore a lesser decrease. Durie also ignores Pool's finding that 1891 was the lowest point in population decline and thereafter population grew. Moreover his population and land figures do not match up. His last land total is for 1911, yet his population figures end at 1901. A reason for this important omission may be that between 1891 and 1911 the Maori population had grown by 7851 to 49,844, yet land ownership had declined by 35.2 per cent. This was almost the same rate at which land had been lost in the preceding 51 years. Clearly land loss and population decline are not so closely related as Durie claims (2005, p. 31). The population resurgence is described matter of factly. No mention is made of inter-marriage. In a later section called 'Disparities', the different life expectancy between Maori and non-Maori are highlighted with no discussion about how dramatically they have improved during the twentieth century (p. 40).

Conclusion

There is no doubt that historical scholarship requires constant investigation and criticism so that inaccuracies may be corrected as more information becomes available. However, the revision of New Zealand history in regard to Maori–pakeha relations is less about the improving of that history and more about creating an ideology that advances the political and economic interests of the Maori elite. This chapter has

traced the way in which revisionist writers have ignored the steady reduction of the gross disparities between Maori and pakeha of the past, as well as ignoring the evidence that these disparities appear likely to continue to reduce as the Maori middle class continues to grow in size. Instead these influential writers have created and sustained a grievance mentality enabling a section of the Maori population to accept the role of historical victims – a mindset in which 'it is always winter and never Christmas'.

Notes

1. Pool, Ian *Te Iwi Maori: A New Zealand Population, Past, Present & Future* Auckland University Press Auckland 1991 p. 56, 57, 76. I have preferred Pool's 'best estimate' because it is based on careful analysis of the enumerations and includes Maori who were placed in the general population figures. He is Professor of Demography at Waikato University, author of two books on Maori population.
2. Pearce N.G. 'The Size and Location of Maori Population between 1857 and 1896' M.A. thesis Victoria University of Wellington examines various regions in the light of varying census figures and reaches this conclusion. She considers that the population was beginning to recover in some areas in the 1880s.
3. The author has an unpublished MS 'The Health of the Body, the Health of the Land' which analyses Ngata and Ratana's policies on health and land.
4. Space does not permit a full discussion of this trend. One should note the diversity of the works involved from sober and carefully documented accounts like Keith Sinclair. *The Origins of the Maori Wars*, Ian Wards *The Shadow of the Land (1968)*, Alan Ward, *A Show of Justice* (1973), Judith Binney *Mihaia* (1979) and Claudia Orange *The Treaty of Waitangi* (1987) to polemics like Dick Scott's A*sk that Mountain*. The whole process seemed to me to reach its apogee in Judith Binney's 1983 article 'Maungapohatu Revisited' or 'How the Government Underdeveloped a Maori Community' in the *Journal of the Polynesian Society* vol 92 no 3 (1983) pp. 353–92. This carefully details the sufferings of the community that Rua Kenana tried to re-establish in Maungapohatu in the late 1920s. The article ignored the fact that it was a millennial initiative that completely ignored the economic realities of its site and failed to consider whether there was any precedent for the government underwriting such communities.

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